Mehrzad Boroujerdi is Dean of the College of Arts, Sciences, and Education at Missouri University of Science and Technology.
Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei is the most enduring political leader in the Middle East today. Since assuming the position of Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1989, he has entrenched himself through decades of strategic appointments, institutional control and the suppression of dissent, consolidating power in ways that have allowed him to outlast rivals and reshape Iran's political order and the broader Middle East. Today, however, his rule faces perhaps its gravest test: Mounting economic turmoil, a new level of brutal suppression against political dissent and the consequences of last year's military confrontations have shaken the foundations of his authority, raising urgent questions of succession and the future of Iran's political system.
First nominated for the position of Supreme Leader on June 4, 1989, following the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Khamenei expressed deep hesitation:
"I am truly not worthy of this position. I say this from the bottom of my heart. I have said it many times, and I say it again now … We must choose someone who, in terms of Islamic jurisprudence, piety, political and social insight, public acceptance, revolutionary background and firm revolutionary stance, is recognized both by the people and by the elites. I say it frankly: This burden is heavier than what my weak shoulders can bear."
So, how did a man who so openly doubted his qualifications become one of the world's longest-reigning autocrats?
Born in 1939 into a clerical family, 14-year-old Ali Khamenei encountered Navvab Safavi (1923–56) while studying theology. Safavi, a fiery Shia cleric and founder of the militant Fada'iyan-e Islam group, had already orchestrated the assassinations of former Iranian Prime Ministers Abdolhossein Hazhir (1902–49) and Ali Razmara (1901–51), alongside the staunchly secular intellectual Ahmad Kasravi (1890–1946). Khamenei later said that hearing Safavi speak ignited within him the first sparks of Islamic activism.
The 12-day skirmish with Israel and the United States in June 2025, followed by the 2025–26 protests, represent the most serious challenge to Khamenei's reign.
- Mehrzad Boroujerdi
Despite this early influence, the young seminarian eagerly immersed himself in a wide array of literature. His reading spanned Western classics like Victor Hugo's "Les Misérables," Leo Tolstoy's "War and Peace," Romain Rolland's "Jean-Christophe," Mikhail Sholokhov's "Quiet Flows the Don" and Dante's "Divine Comedy," as well as the timeless Persian poetry of Hafez, Saadi and Rumi. He participated in literary and intellectual gatherings in his hometown of Mashhad, befriending Ali Shariati, the leading lay Islamic ideologue of his time. As a result, Khamenei became one of the more intellectually inclined among his clerical peers.
In 1957, Khamenei met Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, becoming his student in Qom the following year. Around this time, he developed a keen interest in translating the works of prominent Arab intellectuals. He began with "A Tear and a Smile" by the Lebanese-American poet and writer Kahlil Gibran, followed by influential texts like "In the Shade of the Qur'an" and "Islam: The Religion of the Future" by Sayyid Qutb — the leader of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. The writings of Qutb, an American-educated thinker who nonetheless voiced unwavering opposition to Western sociopolitical systems, left a lasting impression on Khamenei.
Enduring prison and exile under the Shah and surviving a 1981 assassination attempt that paralyzed his right hand, Khamenei's stock rose with Ayatollah Khomeini. Following the 1979 revolution, Khomeini appointed him to several key positions. Khamenei was among the first clerics to enter government service, becoming deputy defense minister, member of the Revolutionary Council, Friday prayer leader of Tehran, member of parliament and finally Iran's first clerical president (1981–89).
His presidency, however, was marked by paradox: Although he held the highest elected office during a time of war, more powerful figures eclipsed him, including the prime minister, the speaker of parliament and the deputy supreme leader. During the Iran-Iraq War, Ayatollah Khomeini entrusted Speaker of Parliament Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani with control over the armed forces — bypassing Khamenei. In 1987, a public rift emerged between Khomeini and Khamenei over differing interpretations of the supreme leader's authority.
Khamenei's time as president profoundly shaped his leadership style before becoming Supreme Leader in 1989. Lacking personal charisma, he compensated with patience, meticulous micromanagement and skilled oration, gradually consolidating power. He orchestrated the elevation of his religious status to ayatollah, sidelined rivals, promoted loyalists and suppressed opposition. His handpicked allies came to dominate religious seminaries, government ministries, state-run enterprises and the intelligence and security apparatus. Through these calculated moves, he amassed the authority, experience and networks necessary to rule Iran for 37 years as a hardline ideologue.
Khamenei faces critical decisions: whom to trust, whether to relinquish power and, if so, how to choreograph a possible succession, including who, when and by what means.
- Mehrzad Boroujerdi
As Supreme Leader, Khamenei oversaw a sustained crackdown on dissent. Notoriously thin-skinned regarding his legitimacy, he directed the draconian silencing of print and social media and authorized the violent suppression of major protests, including the 1999 student demonstrations, the 2009 Green Movement, the 2022–23 Women, Life, Freedom uprising and the 2025–26 protests that led to the ruthless killing of thousands of Iranian citizens. He frequently invokes the need to confront Iran's "enemies" — chiefly the United States and Israel — warning of Western "sedition" and "cultural invasion."
He was also the chief architect of the "Axis of Resistance," entrenching Iran in the internal affairs of countries across the Middle East. Yet Khamenei displayed political pragmatism when he opted to remain on the sidelines during critical moments like Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Yet the 12-day skirmish with Israel and the United States in June 2025, followed by the 2025–26 protests, represent the most serious challenge to Khamenei's reign. At 87, the Supreme Leader is largely in hiding, drastically reducing his public appearances out of concern for his safety. Even if he is not physically removed in the near future, he will still be forced to confront the devastating collective consequences of Israel's uncontested aerial dominance over Iran, America's crippling of Iran's nuclear infrastructure, the battering of key regional allies like Hezbollah and Hamas, a worsening economic crisis and the infamy of ordering the most brutal crackdown on popular dissent in Iran's modern history.
The pressing question now is whether Khamenei can survive the political and strategic fallout unleashed by these events — despite the desperate efforts of his increasingly unconvincing propaganda machine.
There is little hope that the frail, cancer-stricken and delusionally narcissistic Khamenei — who for nearly four decades tolerated no vision but his own — will pivot toward humility, embrace penitence and offer public contrition. His longstanding political behavior resembles a vindictive leader steadfastly resistant to even modest reform. The ayatollah has consistently demonstrated a mindset that American historian Richard Hofstadter famously called the "paranoid style in politics:" a disposition characterized by conspiracy thinking, deep suspicion and an obsessive fear of hidden enemies.
As custodian of the world's first theocracy born from popular revolution, Khamenei is deeply preoccupied with regime survival, despite the ruin his hubris has wrought. He understands that, despite hollowing out the state and concentrating power, Iranian society is no brittle papier-mâché construct to be shaped or sidelined without consequence. Steering the ship of Iranian politics demands deftness, especially when trust — arguably the regime's most vital form of social capital — is in perilously short supply and the nation's moral ecology lies profoundly unsettled.
Khamenei faces critical decisions: whom to trust, whether to relinquish power and, if so, how to choreograph a possible succession, including who, when and by what means. Dictators often retreat into denial, clinging to a delusion of infallibility, and Khamenei appears to have fully embraced that terrain. At best, he may be living out his own King Lear moment — a decline marked by misjudgment, betrayal and the glimmers of hard-won, if belated, clarity.
Similarly, the prospect of negotiating with his archenemy — the United States — as his friendless regime suffers from a deficit of confidence and holds less leverage than ever must stir a whirlwind of anxiety. A man long encased in a bristling armor of certitudes may now confront the menacing shadow of the Revolutionary Guards, who seek to cling to power while leaving little headroom for his heir or the future he once imagined he could control.
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
