Mira Al Hussein is an Emirati sociologist specializing in the Arab states of the Gulf. Her research focuses on state-society relations, citizenship, migration and women's rights in the region. She holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge.
Following the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to the president of the United Arab Emirates, took to social media to offer advice to Syria's new rulers. The UAE, he declared in mid-December, "presents a successful regional model to be emulated," delivering "stability, justice and prosperity."
Such language, which Gargash and other Emirati policymakers articulate often, reveals how the UAE envisions itself as a state with a unique mandate to lead and influence the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the UAE emerged as a key player in reshaping the region's political landscape. Guided by an assertive and interventionist foreign policy, the UAE has positioned itself as the counter-revolutionary champion of authoritarian "stability" in a region marked by conflict and unpredictability. This political agenda has led to the UAE being categorized by observers as a "middle power" alongside other regional actors like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, often resulting in both cooperation and tension among these Gulf neighbors.
Yet the UAE appears to dismiss any "middle-power" categorization as a misrepresentation of its true stature. Far from competing for parity within the Gulf, the UAE sees itself as transcending such reductive labels. Instead, it envisions its role as operating in a distinct realm—one shaped by its ambition to craft a unique identity and assert an influence untethered by conventional frameworks. Gargash's message to Syrians to "emulate" the UAE following the fall of the Assad regime perfectly encapsulated this inflated view of itself.
The UAE's self-proclaimed vision diverges from the expectations of many political analysts, who often interpret the UAE's role in the region through a realist lens, overlooking the state's articulation of its lofty ambitions. Ebtisam al-Ketbi, the president of the Emirates Policy Center, a think tank in Abu Dhabi, illustrated this perspective in an August 2024 podcast interview. When asked about the UAE's "effective borders," al-Ketbi navigated the question in a way that offered a glimpse into the country's evolving self-perception. While borders define geographical size, she said, they are seen as irrelevant to political ambition and influence. The question itself likely aimed to normalize the UAE's outsized regional role, reflecting how notions of transcending "territorial boundaries" occupy a space in unofficial Emirati discourse.
The stunning overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria presents a profound challenge to the UAE's ideological stance and regional strategy.
- Mira Al Hussein
This self-perception is also deeply intertwined with the UAE's political ideology, particularly its opposition to political Islam and its alignment with what it perceives as a "civilizational camp" alongside the West. This alignment not only pits the UAE against the clashing values of political Islam and its regional supporters, but also reinforces its self-image as a stabilizing force for modernity and tolerance. By framing Islamist movements as the antithesis to this modernizing vision, the UAE positions itself as a defender of secular governance and a bulwark against perceived threats to regional stability. This ideological stance not only shapes its domestic policies—including its repression of political Islam at home, imprisoning activists and dissidents deemed to be Islamists—but also underpins its regional interventions, often justified through the rhetoric of "safety and security."
Yet after a decade of uncompromising opposition toward political Islam at home and throughout the region, the UAE has willingly ceded opportunities to act as a mediator between the West and Islamist movements—a role that neighboring Qatar has readily assumed. This trade-off reflects the UAE's calculated decision to transform into a state that is not only ideologically incompatible with Islamists but also resolutely unwilling to engage with or accommodate them. In doing so, the UAE presents itself as sharing the West's inability or reluctance to "speak the language" of Islamists, preferring instead to leave such mediation to actors it deems more aligned with those it characterizes as regressive.
This self-conception is rooted in a deliberate distancing from a religious identity that the UAE perceives as culturally and civilizationally misaligned with the values of its Western partners. More strikingly, the UAE now casts itself as not merely aligned with the West but as a cautionary voice within this alliance—urging its Western counterparts to reconsider what it views as a misplaced tolerance toward Islamist movements.
This fiercely anti-Islamist perspective was starkly illustrated in a widely circulated statement from 2017 by the UAE's foreign minister, Abdullah bin Zayed, who claimed that Western countries were becoming "incubators of terrorism" due to their tolerance toward "Islamists." His remarks, frequently invoked by far-right politicians and analysts in Europe and the United States, embody the UAE's claim that it is better equipped to discern the inclinations and intentions of Islamist groups than its Western allies. In this way, the UAE promotes itself as a custodian of secular governance and even modernity, offering both partnership and ideological guidance to its allies. Thus, implicit in the UAE's rhetoric about "safety and security" is the conviction that any disruption to its development trajectory—through dissent or political activism—risks undermining its progress and relegating it to the instability and turmoil it associates with its neighbors throughout the region. In this way, the UAE's self-image projects not only a political vision for securing its own future but also a model of governance and so-called progress that it believes sets it apart from the rest of the Middle East. This model, according to Emirati officials, can also be marketed and exported abroad, just as Gargash presumed to advise Syrians following the fall of Assad's regime.
Guided by an assertive and interventionist foreign policy, the UAE has positioned itself as the counter-revolutionary champion of authoritarian "stability" in a region marked by conflict and unpredictability.
- Mira Al Hussein
The UAE sees itself as geographically entrapped in a region with which it shares little civilizational affinity. Yet it does not see itself as geographically or ideologically bound, as it extends its metaphorical borders through the export of its governance model and ideology, thereby expanding its sphere of influence beyond physical confines. Its ideological alignment with a Western "civilizational camp" affords it both political impunity and the rhetorical tools to frame its regional role as supposedly representative of the West's collective political, economic and security interests. This self-perception is evident in the UAE's use of imperial language, such as framing Emirati involvement in Sudan's war, where it supports the brutal militia known as the Rapid Support Forces, as necessary to "protect [the UAE's] investments and strategic interests," as articulated by al-Ketbi. It reflects a worldview that sees other countries as mere zones of influence or neocolonial outposts. (This week, the United States accused the RSF of committing genocide in Sudan, imposing sanctions not only on the RSF's leader but seven companies based in the UAE that have procured weapons for the paramilitary group.)
Juxtapose this Emirati narrative with former European Commission Vice President Josep Borrell's metaphor of Europe as a "garden" surrounded by a "jungle" of the rest of the world, wherein the garden assumes responsibility for "taking care of the jungle outside." Despite publicly criticizing Borrell's remarks as racist and discriminatory, the UAE has internalized this logic and applies it to its own foreign policy, effectively casting itself as the garden in its own Middle Eastern "jungle."
The stunning overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria by rebel groups led by the Islamist movement Hayat Tahrir al-Sham presents a profound challenge to the UAE's ideological stance and regional strategy. The UAE had been rehabilitating Bashar al-Assad in the region, helping to end his diplomatic isolation after years of civil war. Assad's fall and the resurgence of political Islam in Syria under HTS, a group with previous ties to al-Qaida, exacerbate the UAE's longstanding concerns about the destabilizing potential of Islamist movements. Domestically, the UAE's rigid opposition to political Islam makes it particularly difficult to show compromise or even tacit acceptance of the legitimacy of any Islamist group in the region. Acknowledging an Islamist movement's success abroad could force the UAE to confront uncomfortable questions about its ongoing imprisonment of individuals it labels as Islamists at home, undermining its authoritarian claims of safeguarding stability and modernity.
Even members of the "civilizational camp" with which the UAE aligns itself, including Western allies, tend to show greater flexibility in dealing with Islamist movements, and indeed European and American officials have visited Damascus in recent weeks to meet with Syria's new rulers. Their ability to distance themselves from Islamists—culturally, linguistically and religiously—provides them with a degree of maneuverability that the UAE cannot authentically replicate. For the UAE, the shared cultural and religious context with Islamist groups deepens the stakes, making any form of engagement appear as a threat to its foundational ideology and regime narrative.
This domestic constraint, reinforced by the UAE's broader ideological rigidity, significantly curtails its capacity to adapt to the evolving realities in Syria. In contrast to Saudi Arabia, which has demonstrated some political agility by cautiously celebrating the end of the Assad regime and the prospects for a new Syria, the UAE's response appears tightly bound by its entrenched ideological worldview. Instead of recalibrating its approach, the UAE will likely double down on its hard-line stance in the name of authoritarian stability. Yet this inflexibility risks further isolating the UAE from the shifting dynamics of the region, as it persists in advancing its narrow, anti-Islamist vision that is increasingly at odds with the complex and fluid realities of the Middle East.
