Saahil Menon is a writer and investment analyst currently based in Dubai
At the start of 2024, the multilateral BRICS consortium of five emerging economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—underwent its first expansion in 13 years, admitting Ethiopia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Iran to its ranks. But Saudi Arabia, arguably the most sought-after and high-profile invitee, stopped short of joining the bloc as a full-fledged member. When Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman skipped the annual BRICS summit in the Russian city of Kazan in October, it fueled speculation about whether Saudi Arabia could potentially refuse its invitation and content itself with observer or partner status instead. The Saudis have expressed interest in joining the BRICS for several years, starting with statements from the crown prince in 2022, but have also kept their intentions ambiguous.
As far as President Vladimir Putin is concerned, roping the Saudis into the BRICS is a sure-fire means of turbocharging the "multipolar world order" he has championed since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If Saudi Arabia formally joined the BRICS, the bloc would account for the lion's share of global crude oil exports, which could potentially move the kingdom closer to making oil contracts in non-dollar currencies and render BRICS+ all the more attractive to the wider Arab and Islamic world. By holding the annual BRICS summit in the Muslim-majority republic of Tatarstan, Russia was aiming to showcase the country's multi-confessional makeup to delegates from the Middle East and North Africa.
For years now, Putin has gone out of way to win over the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and by extension Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. State-led initiatives include piloting Shariah-compliant banking in certain parts of Russia, agreeing to de-list the Taliban as a terrorist group, and criminalizing the desecration of Qurans. But Russia's outreach may have come up short, which may help explain why Saudi Arabia is second-guessing a geostrategic alignment with Moscow—and by extension, ever joining the BRICS at all.
Saudi Arabia is second-guessing a geostrategic alignment with Russia—and by extension, ever joining the BRICS at all.
- Saahil Menon
There are other factors at play, as the kingdom looks to hedge its bets ahead of Donald Trump's return to the White House. A key but overlooked factor is the brewing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It is no secret that MBS's grandiose Vision 2030 agenda, to transition the Saudi economy away from oil, entails supplanting the UAE, and especially Dubai, as the Arabian Peninsula's commercial and entertainment hub. It is just one point of friction between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, as MBS consolidates ever-more power in Saudi Arabia and openly competes with the UAE for geopolitical and economic influence in the Middle East.
Especially when it comes to normalization with Israel, MBS may have played his cards more wisely than his mentor-turned-rival, Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the president of the UAE. Abu Dhabi has found itself in a Catch-22 since Hamas's attack into Israel on October 7, 2023 and Israel's punishing war in Gaza in response. The UAE has not taken a critical line against Israel, let alone threatened to walk away from the Abraham Accords, which would cause the Emirati leadership to lose face domestically and ruffle feathers in Washington.
The Abraham Accords were supposed to give the UAE some influence over Israeli policy in Palestine—delaying West Bank annexation, first and foremost—but the UAE has not used any of its diplomatic leverage to signal its discontent with the war in Gaza or pressure Israel into adopting a cease-fire. But maintaining diplomatic ties with Israel under the mantra of peace risks pitting pro-Palestinian popular sentiment across the region against the Emirati government. As the International Crisis Group reported earlier this year, "Emirati elites portray the Abraham Accords as a step toward a more harmonious Middle East, with the UAE at its heart"—a message that is increasingly out of step with the brutal realities in Gaza.
Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has driven a much harder bargain when it comes to formally recognizing Israel and is now holding out for NATO-like security guarantees from the U.S. as a pre-condition for normalization with Israel. Riyadh's insistence on a two-state solution, with an independent Palestinian state and East Jerusalem as its capital, looks more like a rhetorical ruse to buy time and extract maximalist concessions from Washington. The Saudis have been running out the clock on Biden's lame-duck presidency and were openly gunning for a Trump victory over Kamala Harris. With Trump's win, they could end up distancing themselves even further from the BRICS—for the right price, which Trump is likely to pay given his transactional approach and personal business ties to the Saudis.
A second Trump presidency, on top of the already bipartisan support for the kingdom in Washington, offers Saudi Arabia far more than the BRICS ever could.
- Saahil Menon
From the standpoint of a thin-skinned MBS, gravitating toward like-minded authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China that avoid passing judgment on or meddling in the internal affairs of other nations was his best bet to spite Joe Biden for labeling him a "pariah." That said, the crown prince knows full well how much the kingdom benefits from close U.S. ties—and American military protection—and how limited his room for maneuver actually is, despite all the talk of a more multipolar region and world. Aiding and abetting the "de-dollarization" agenda being pursued by Russia and the expanded BRICS could prove politically calamitous for the Al Saud family dictatorship, whose self-preservation still hinges on toeing the line with Washington.
At the same time, there is no real value proposition that a country like Saudi Arabia derives from being part of the BRICS. Entering the bloc will have little, if any, bearing on Saudi relationships with existing members—many of whom the kingdom already boasts outsized leverage over. Egypt, for instance, relies heavily on Saudi largesse to keep its failing economy afloat, and in 2022 ceded the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir to the House of Saud as a token of gratitude. There is also the sizeable diaspora of Egyptian expatriates in Riyadh and Jeddah who could be deported on a whim in the event of a diplomatic fallout.
In a similar vein, guest workers from remittance-dependent India and Ethiopia make up much of the migrant labor force across the oil-rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. If anything, the number of Indian and Ethiopian migrant laborers in Saudi Arabia will only grow further given the pace and scale of MBS's outsized infrastructure projects, despite terrible working conditions. One could argue that India's ambivalent stance on the Gaza conflict, after initially pledging its full-throated support for Israel, is attributable to the pressure its ruling Bharatiya Janata Party is under from Gulf monarchies to demonstrate some degree of solidarity with the Palestinian cause.
Ultimately for Saudi Arabia, sanitizing its tarnished image and bolstering non-oil revenue take precedence over lofty anti-imperialist posturing synonymous with the BRICS and especially with Putin's Russia. As such, the Saudis can ill-afford to turn their backs on or fall out of favor with the U.S., which has long provided cover for their abysmal human rights record. A second Trump presidency, on top of the already bipartisan support for the kingdom in Washington, offers Saudi Arabia far more than the BRICS ever could.
