Andreas Krieg is a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London and a fellow at King’s Institute of Middle Eastern Studies.
Editor's note: This article is adapted from a paper presented at a policy workshop on the proposed U.S.-Saudi security agreement, which DAWN co-hosted with Georgetown University's Alwaleed Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding.
The negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the United States over a reported security pact are set against a backdrop of shifting priorities, particularly concerning regional security and strategic alliances in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas on Israel. The context of a U.S.-Saudi security deal is defined by a change of view in Saudi Arabia prioritizing engagement over confrontation with other key countries in the Middle East, most of all Iran. Especially after the Iranian missile and drone attack on Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais in eastern Saudi Arabia in September 2019, Riyadh has seen engagement as a more sustainable and balanced approach to addressing its security concerns than direct confrontation. The half-hearted U.S. response to the 2019 attack also triggered a departure in Saudi thinking from relying exclusively on U.S. security guarantees, which the Saudi security establishment has increasingly questioned.
Saudi leadership perceives President Joe Biden's administration as an ineffective group of lame ducks, largely due to its inability to provide strong assurances on anything. That is why, despite the Biden administration's ongoing diplomacy, Riyadh was reluctant to make any significant overtures toward the U.S. before this year's presidential election. Donald Trump's victory over Kamala Harris has reignited the hope in the kingdom that a deal could be had with a more transactional president—a deal that might be more palatable to Saudi interests.
Donald Trump's victory over Kamala Harris has reignited the hope in the kingdom that a deal could be had with a more transactional president—a deal that might be more palatable to Saudi interests.
- Andreas Krieg
But well before the pivotal November elections, the unequivocal U.S. support for Israel made it clear to Saudi Arabia that other nations get far more favorable treatment from Washington than the kingdom, adding more questions for Riyadh about the foundation of U.S.-Saudi relations. It is therefore also difficult for Riyadh to commit wholeheartedly to Washington at the expense of alternatives in a multipolar world. The Saudis continue to seek a more flexible approach to great-power competition involving both China and Russia, which on many security issues appear to be more compromising and willing to make concessions to Riyadh.
Meanwhile, domestically in Saudi Arabia, there is a notable divide in opinion on key issues around the Biden administration's push for its reported "megadeal," such as Saudi normalization with Israel, which Washington has injected into the negotiations over a security pact. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and his inner circle adopt a pragmatic, Saudi-first stance, viewing normalization as beneficial to the kingdom's interests, with the Palestinian cause increasingly being seen as a lost cause. In contrast, the older generation of Saudi leaders, particularly figures close to King Salman, remain resistant to engaging with Israel, viewing it as a toxic entity.
This internal tension is compounded by Saudi Arabia's rivalry with the United Arab Emirates. Riyadh is determined not to appear as a junior partner within the framework of the Abraham Accords, which remains a UAE-led and UAE-centric initiative normalizing relations with Israel, as brokered by Trump. Instead, Saudi Arabia aims to assert its leadership in the region and appeal to the broader Arab world, which translates into normalization with Israel on its terms and not risking public backlash, whether within the kingdom or across the region. Saudi Arabia's leadership role in the region could be at stake if it chose to normalize with Israel without accounting for the rights of Palestinians. The "Palestinian state solution," as one senior Saudi interlocutor called it, must be the foundation for normalizing with Israel.
Saudi Arabia, for its part, has several demands in its negotiations with Washington. These include a U.S. defense treaty with clear, unequivocal commitments to mutual defense and protection in the event of an external attack on the kingdom, modeled on America's defense treaty with Japan. Saudi officials see the recently concluded U.S.-Bahrain Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA), which lacks the strength of NATO's Article 5-style security guarantees, as inadequate. Additionally, Riyadh seeks expedited access to critical defense technologies and a fast-tracked procurement process for advanced American weapons and military hardware. Another key Saudi demand is U.S. assistance in developing the kingdom's own civilian nuclear program, with enrichment capabilities that could be upgraded for military use if necessary.
On the parallel track of Israeli normalization, in order to facilitate a deal, Saudi Arabia seeks some concessions from Israel concerning the Palestinians, at least enough to make any agreement more palatable domestically. Saudi overtures have evolved in recent months from calls for "irreversible steps" toward Palestinian statehood to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's clearer statement in September that Saudi recognition of Israel could not happen before "the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital."
Saudi Arabia is determined not to appear as a junior partner within the framework of the Abraham Accords, which remains a UAE-led and UAE-centric initiative.
- Andreas Krieg
On the U.S. side, the primary demand is Saudi normalization with Israel. Washington also seeks to limit Saudi Arabia's growing strategic engagements with China and Russia in the context of the BRICS and beyond, which potentially includes imposing a veto on the kingdom's bilateral agreements with Beijing and Moscow. Additionally, the U.S. expects Saudi Arabia to act as a bulwark against Iranian influence and activities, both in the air and maritime domains within the Gulf—a demand that could potentially cause friction with Saudi neighbors.
Despite the potential for cooperation, Saudi Arabia remains concerned about the durability of any security agreement with the U.S. as political winds in Washington constantly change. Most of all, Riyadh fears that the U.S. might gradually disengage over time. Saudi policymakers doubt whether a security treaty with the U.S. would pass through the Senate, considering the monarchy's reputational standing in Congress. But only a Senate-approved treaty, which requires a two-thirds majority, can provide the Saudis with the defense guarantees they seek, as it would be shielded from the policy changes from Democratic to Republican administration.
Even if a treaty can be approved, Saudi Arabia is still questioning whether the U.S. can deliver on the defense commitments needed in the Gulf, a region facing unconventional threats of Iran's "gray zone" operations through proxies and irregular warfare, such as drones. Unlike the mostly state-led threats against Japan, a U.S. defense agreement with Saudi Arabia would have to define red lines in an extremely volatile context where networks of non-state actors are trying to bend the threshold of conflict.
