العربي
Jordan's parliamentary elections in September 2024 attracted global media attention due to the plurality of votes for the country's leading Islamist political party, the Islamic Action Front, and provided King Abdullah with fresh justification to keep the parliament inactive from September 10 to November 18. Rather than heralding democratic participation in the country, the elections and what followed highlight the evisceration of the parliament's shrinking authority in the country. Instead, the King has further concentrated power in his hands, avoided any scrutiny or accountability of his performance, promoted grandiose and wasteful development plans, and further limited the right of Jordanians to choose their political leaders.
This briefing paper analyzes the electoral results in the recent elections and contextualizes them in the long history of King Abdullah's efforts to limit and restrict the functioning of the parliament. The paper evaluates the King's increased repression in the country, including a clampdown on independent political and civil society voices, reviews the King's proposed development plans, and recommends policy responses for the U.S. government.
Concentration of Power in Monarchy, Increased Authoritarianism
Jordan has a bicameral legislative body, which has seen the monarchy significantly diminish its authority over decades. Since the 1950s, when parliament held real decision-making authority, it has been gradually stripped of its influence, transformed into little more than a political façade used by the monarchy when needed. A series of constitutional amendments, proposed by King Abdullah II and swiftly approved by Parliament in 2014, 2016, and 2021, have further curtailed its role.
The Jordanian constitution mandates elections for the lower house of parliament every four years. The lower chamber, the House of Representatives, comprises 138 elected members, while the upper chamber, the Senate, consists of 69 members—all appointed by the King. This appointment process grants the King control over the legislative process, as the Senate holds the power to override legislation passed by the elected House of Representatives.
Beyond legislative control, the King wields extensive executive authority. The government is not formed from parliament; rather, the King unilaterally appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and ministers at his discretion. This makes the Cabinet collectively, and each minister individually, serve at the King's pleasure, with limited accountability to parliament aside from occasional committee appearances. Additionally, the King directly appoints the heads of the army and security apparatus, the Judicial Council, and the judges of the Constitutional Court. He also appoints the Jordanian Mufti and the Supreme Judge of the Sharia courts.
Following independence, the Jordanian Parliament was the focal point of governance. The constitution defines the political system as a "Parliamentary, Hereditary Monarchy." However, in April 1957, King Hussein, the father of the current King, reversed this balance of power, consolidating authority within the monarchy. He sidelined Parliament, arrested and imprisoned numerous elected members, arbitrarily dissolved legislative bodies on multiple occasions, and suspended parliamentary elections from 1966 to 1984, when he allowed a supplementary election to replace the deceased members elected in 1966. In fact, Jordan remained under continuous martial law from 1957 until 1989. That year, in response to protests against the country's economic crisis, the government lifted the ban on political parties and restored Parliament, allowing for the election of an entirely new legislative body.
Jordan held its most recent parliamentary elections on September 10, 2024, amid a period of intensified political repression, marked by the arrest of activists and writers, widespread bans on political parties, and other anti-democratic measures. Authorities engaged in arbitrary arrests, prolonged pre-trial detentions, and the dissolution of civil organizations and political groups, limiting civic space. They used the Cybercrimes Law to criminalize peaceful political activism and restrict freedom of expression.
The ongoing national debate in Jordan regarding the King's multiple constitutional amendments (2011, 2014, 2016, 2021) reflects a deep sense of mutual mistrust between the King and Jordanian institutions and its citizens. Pro-Government media have justified his absolute control over the military and security apparatus as a safeguard against the possibility of an opposition-led parliamentary majority forming the cabinet. Furthermore, the King's pursuit of unchecked authority over state institutions underscores his insecurity about leading an institutionalized democratic state. All key components of the Hashemite regime, including the royal family, their allied business elite, and top officials who prioritize loyalty to the king and his family, reject democratic rule.
Since 1954, the Jordanian government has extensively relied on the Crime Prevention and the vague provisions of the Penal Code to imprison peaceful democratic activists and render pretrial detention against them a common practice; the August 2023 Cybercrime Law expanded the government's authority to persecute public speech. Numerous Jordanian writers, journalists, and activists have been prosecuted and jailed under these laws, including Hiba Abu Taha, activists protesting Jordanian policies during the Israeli genocide in Gaza, and Ayman Sandoqah, a member of the Teachers' Syndicate who was arrested for posting a message to the King on Facebook. Authorities have imposed severe punishments on detained activists and writers, often subjecting them to lengthy pretrial detention. For example, activist Sabri Al Mashala, a teacher from Thiaban (50 km south of Amman), was held in pretrial detention from December 27, 2022, until the State Security Court sentenced him on December 28, 2023, to four years in prison for allegedly "inciting to undermine the political regime." His lawyer, Ali Braizat, was also briefly detained during a visit to meet with his client.
Prior to the September 2024 elections, the government banned dozens of political parties, including several dedicated to advancing the rights of marginalized rural communities. The Independent Election Commission, which also licenses political parties, issued weak justifications for the bans—citing doubts about the parties' loyalty to the king.
Jordanian authorities have also cracked down on the nation's sole semi-independent human rights organization, the National Center for Human Rights, unlawfully shutting down the Teachers' Syndicate and refusing to enforce a court ruling to reopen it, a decision pending since June 2022.
For decades, Jordanian authorities have also relied on military courts—misleadingly dubbed "State Security Courts"—to try civilians. These courts, operating under the Military Judicial Department, feature military-appointed judges who serve in uniform alongside civilian judges appointed by the government. The government uses these military courts to prosecute peaceful activists, writers, and intellectuals, despite repeated international calls to end the practice.
Members of parliament are not immune to oppressive action. On June 6, 2021, the Parliament voted to expel Osama Al-Ajarmah, citing accusations of "insulting the parliament, its prestige, reputation, members, and internal regulations." This decision followed a verbal altercation between Al-Ajarmah and Speaker of Parliament Abdel Moneim Al-Odat on May 24, 2021. On the day of the expulsion, Al-Odat stated that Al-Ajarmah's remarks about His Majesty the King were "condemned and unacceptable" to the House of Representatives.
Subsequently, Al-Ajarmah was tried by the State Security Court on charges including endangering public safety, inciting strife, manufacturing flammable materials for illegal use, and drug use. On January 26, 2022, the court found him guilty of all charges, including "threatening the life of His Majesty the King," and sentenced him to 12 years in prison.
On January 18, 2023, the Jordanian Parliament voted to expel another one of its members, Mohamad Al Fayz, without any judicial review. A special parliamentary committee accused Al Fayz of breaching both parliamentary and diplomatic norms, claiming that he had damaged the country's reputation and its political regime. The charges stemmed from a public statement he published on December 14, 2022, titled "A Letter to the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman", in which he argued that the Saudi government's economic aid to Jordan was only benefiting a "corrupt class."
The September 2024 Parliamentary Election
On September 10, 2024, Jordan conducted its parliamentary election, with only 32.25% of eligible voters—amounting to 1.6 million out of 5.1 million—heading to the polls to elect a 138-seat parliament, according to Musa Maitah, President of the Independent Election Commission (IEC). For the first time in the nation's electoral history, the IEC reported that 260,000 ballots—approximately 16.25% of the total votes cast—were left blank as a symbolic rejection of all political parties. While the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the country's leading opposition party aligned with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, was indeed the strongest performer, this is more a product of the weakness of other opposition groups in the country and the government's targeted actions against them.
Citing Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the Election Law authorizing the IEC to approve eligible voters, IEC removed 727,000 individuals from the country's voters' lists. Of these, IEC excluded 515,000 Jordanians living abroad because the law provides no clear voting process for expatriates. In addition, IEC omitted 212,000 people without a registered address from the final voters' list. Including these 727,000 votes in the general voter lists could have reduced the voter turnout rate to 28%.
The voter turnout, blank ballots, and IAF election gains greatly challenged the King's assertion that there was a national consensus on governance. Analyst Mohammad Ersan attributed the low turnout to widespread frustration among Jordanians over the lack of meaningful political reform. A conclusion backed by another commentator aptly characterized the 16.25% of voters who submitted blank ballots as "the invisible political party," in the context of tightly controlled political conditions and repressive measures.
The 2022 Election Law effectively excludes and omits the choices of a significant portion of voters, resulting in a parliamentary composition that fails to fully represent all voters. On June 10, 2021, King Abdullah II established the Royal Committee to Modernize the Political System, designed to review the political parties and election laws and appointed former Prime Minister Samir Al-Refai as its chairman. Al-Refai had little public credibility to serve in such a role, as had overseen the rigged 2010 election and had himself faced demonstrations demanding his resignation when he was prime minister for attacks on civil society. Within weeks of its formation, three committee members resigned, with one expressing concern that the committee was designed to "merely uphold the status quo."
Based on the committee's recommendations, Parliament enacted the 2022 elections law, introducing a dual electoral system for the 138 seats in the House of Representatives. Under this law, voters elect 41 seats by selecting from a national list of political parties, and elect 97 seats from a constituency list of individual candidates, whether independent or party-affiliated, across 18 local districts.
Among the 25 political parties contesting, the IAF emerged as the leading party, securing 31 of the 138 seats (22%). It won 17 out of 41 (42%) party list seats —significantly higher than its 28% share of the total vote (464,350 out of 1,638,351). Meanwhile, the other nine pro-government parties (most of which identified as centrist or conservative despite lacking any clear ideological platform) collectively secured the remaining 24 party list seats (58%), despite receiving only 35% of the votes cast (571,882 out of 1,638,351). Because 37% of the voters (602,119 out of 1,638,351) chose candidates from party list seats that did not reach the 2.5% threshold for representation in Parliament, their votes were effectively excluded from representation in the countrywide seats in Parliament.
In the local district, individual candidate votes, candidates affiliated with the IAF won 14 seats, one of them a Christian from Amman's second constituency; independent individuals secured 10 seats; and a collection of mostly conservative candidates who identified closely with the government or monarchy captured 73 seats.
The media magnified the IAF's electoral performance, its best to date, portraying it as a major triumph that demonstrated the election's integrity—a claim backed by international observers—and framed the contest as the first truly free vote since 1989. Many Israeli and Western media outlets expressed alarm over the Islamist gains. Israeli social media shared a photo of the father of Maher Al-Jazi, a former Jordanian noncommissioned officer who in 2024 had killed three Israelis on the Allenby Bridge before dying in retaliatory Israeli fire, voting for the IAF. Western media headlines, such as "How Dangerous Is the Islamist Victory in Jordan's Elections?," effectively adopted the Jordanian monarchy's narrative, like that of many other Arab autocratic regimes, framing the Islamists' success as a threat, and using it to spread fear about democratic progress in the Arab world.
Alternative analyses of the IAF gains stressed two key influences on the results. One was an external factor—the impact of Israel's carnage of Palestinians in Gaza —which increased voter support for the IAF as the only organized opposition party critiquing Israel. The other was the strong support of a well-organized and disciplined Islamist voting base whose social services and charities have popular support. Although rarely examined, this investment in local communities is crucial to understanding why the IAF has remained Jordan's dominant political force for decades and has withstood the government's pressure against political parties.
A closer look reveals three underlying dynamics. First, non-Islamist groups such as socialists and nationalists have long faced unique political pressure; during the martial law period of 1957-89, the Muslim Brotherhood was the only non-banned political organization allowed to operate freely in Jordan. Second, since lifting the ban on political parties in 1989, the authorities have systematically stifled all political movements, regardless of their ideology or influence. They have employed softer measures to weaken Islamists, like depriving them of key resources and fostering internal divisions. The government encouraged splits within the Muslim Brotherhood, including supporting the formation of Zamzam in 2014 and an alternative but same-named "Muslim Brotherhood" organization, led by former General Inspector Abdel Majeed Thnaibat in 2015. Earlier, in 2007, the government seized control of the Islamic Center Association, a longstanding charity established and managed by the Muslim Brotherhood, to weaken the IAF by stripping it of a key source of strength and weakening its ability to mobilize voters in elections. The government has used more aggressive tactics against non-Islamist opposition, such as closure, licence revocations, prolonged detention of active members, and intimidation to deter new recruits.
Third, the regime's proponents have promoted a decades-long narrative that Islamist factions are the only opposition to the King, effectively encouraging support for them as a vote in opposition to the King. Moreover, the pre-election ban of many non-Islamist parties five months before the vote, along with efforts to instill fear within the non-Islamist spectrum, contributed to Islamist success. This strategy effectively reinforced the illusion of a stark divide between the monarchy and the Islamists, overshadowing the deeper popular discontent over issues like corruption, unemployment, and diminishing freedoms in the country.
International observers were present on the ground, concentrating mainly on election day procedures and issues with the balloting process. Jordan permits international oversight of its general elections through a bylaw under the current Election and ICE laws that authorize "executive instructions" to organize such monitoring. On August 12, 2024, Freedom House released a pre-election assessment, assigning Jordan a score of 9 out of 32 for the freedom within its "electoral system and political participation." The European Union deployed international monitors during the voting process, while local oversight was predominantly handled by the Independent Election Commission, semi-governmental bodies like the National Center for Human Rights, and various local NGOs.
The European Union's Election Observation Mission pointed out that undemocratic laws, such as the Cybercrimes law, negatively impacted the electoral process. It recommended that these laws be amended to ensure that Jordanians can exercise their fundamental rights, especially freedom of speech, which is the cornerstone to a functioning democracy.
Significance of election results
King Abdallah's ever-growing consolidation of power—bolstered by increasingly repressive laws and policies—has effectively stifled any genuine prospects for political reform and democratization in Jordan. Simply holding parliamentary elections does nothing to counterbalance the country's "not free" status in Freedom House's 2024 report, where Jordan scored just 33 out of 100 due to both the absence of robust political and civil rights and the intensification of political repression.
Rather than addressing the challenge of increasing political participation and implementing inclusive policies, the authorities in Jordan have used the IAF's positive election results as justification to maintain the very conditions that led to the election outcomes. In an environment marked by political fear and uncertainty, the election results have helped create a misleading impression of a clear-cut divide between the regime and Islamists, the latter emerging as the most significant "winners." The King has capitalized on the election results to play the "Islamists are coming" card, intensifying the crackdown on peaceful activists across the political spectrum. At the same time, due to "a lack of effective parties to compete with the Islamists", the authorities have leveraged inflated fears of the Islamists' rise to power to mobilize their adversaries' political voices and aligned with anti-Islamist regimes in the region—particularly the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.
Aftermath of Elections
After the election, the King delayed Parliament from convening for 68 days—from September 10 to November 18—without providing any explanation, leaving its elected members inactive. This move appears to have been designed to further curtail the already limited power of Parliament, the body meant to represent the Jordanian people, and reinforces the widespread view that the King regards Parliament with condescension and disdain, dismissing its legitimacy as a cornerstone of modern state governance.
On November 18, after reinstating Parliament, the King delivered his Throne Speech—an event similar to those in other constitutional monarchies, intended to outline the performance and plans of the government's work. Instead of providing a substantive work agenda, the King's address had a patronizing tone, reminiscent of a business owner issuing orders to subordinates. He introduced vague proposals, such as a political modernization project and an economic modernization vision, presented as standalone achievements without any acknowledgment of the significant economic and political challenges currently facing Jordanians. Additionally, the King directed the Parliament to pursue specific projects and admonished the representatives on their roles, instructing them to "establish work rules and parliamentary practices, where competition is based on platforms and ideas" that "clearly reflect the State's interests and priorities."
In interviews conducted by DAWN on February 25 and 26, 2025, three members of Parliament—who requested anonymity—voiced their disapproval of the speech. One member, known to be loyal to the King, stated bluntly that the speech "was not appropriate," while the other two accepted describing it as "humiliating."
A Legacy of Disrespect for Parliament and Representative Bodies
Since ascending to the throne in February 1999, King Abdullah II has repeatedly shown little regard for Jordan's constitutional institutions, frequently dissolving parliament—a power rarely exercised by monarchs in parliamentary democracies.
A brief review of the King's numerous dissolutions of parliament evidences this. On June 16, 2001, he dissolved parliament and reshuffled the cabinet on the same day, citing the need to improve the country's election law. However, it took two years—until June 17, 2003—to activate a temporary election law; this was one of 200 temporary laws enacted during a prolonged suspension of parliament between 2001 and 2003, in which the government and monarchy essentially ruled by decree. The King did not allow new elections until June 17, months after he used brutal force to quell demonstrations that had erupted in early November 2002, in Ma'an, 250 miles south of Amman. Some commentators argued that the parliamentary suspension was intentional, designed to diffuse political anger following the American invasion of Iraq in April 2003.
This pattern persisted in the following years. On November 23, 2009, the King dissolved the parliament elected on November 21, 2007, in which the IAF lost nearly two-thirds of its seats. The National Center for Human Rights, along with other civil society organizations, withdrew from monitoring the 2007 election, refusing to participate in what they deemed mere formalities that failed to meet the objectives of genuine electoral oversight. The 2007 elections had taken place three months after the July municipal elections, during which the government transported army officers in military buses and instructed them to vote as illiterate citizens. This move led the IAF candidates to withdraw from the municipal election, declaring, "[t]he rigging of municipal elections exceeded all expectations." Parliament remained suspended from 2009 to 2010 until new elections were held on November 10, 2010. Both the 2007 and 2010 elections were later described by Retired Lieutenant General Mohammed Al-Raqad, former director of the Jordanian General Intelligence Department 2008-2011, as "rigged elections."
In response to the Arab Uprisings in 2011, the King promised a series of democratic and constitutional reforms and proceeded to amend the constitution, convened a royal committee to "to do whatever is necessary to improve political life in Jordan", promised to democratize the country in a series of published discussion papers, heralded major political changes, and promised decentralization. He engaged personally in discussions with the opposition, much like his father, King Hussein, did following the 1989 demonstrations. While he made numerous promises during these meetings, distanced himself from what is known in Jordan as "loyal demonstrations," for thugs used to attack opposition demonstrations, all of these promises ultimately led to no tangible results—yet they were designed as tactical steps using empty rhetoric to avoid public demand for real reforms. On October 4, 2012, he dissolved parliament to facilitate the election of a new assembly under the amended constitution. New parliamentary elections were held on January 23, 2013, though they were marred by boycotts from various political parties, including the Islamic Action Front.
Following the 2013 coup in Egypt—which marked a broader regional shift toward counter-revolutionary, dictatorial power—the King once more amended the constitution, abandoning his reform promises and concentrating power in his own hands. On May 29, 2016, he dissolved the 2013-elected parliament and immediately appointed a new cabinet.
Amid cross-country demonstrations in February 2018 over high income tax hikes and rising prices, and as protesters chanted "the people want to bring the government down," King Abdullah II dismissed the cabinet on June 4, 2018, to appease demonstrators.
A New Cabinet Without New Policies
On September 15, 2024—just five days after the parliamentary election—King Abdullah II designated Jaffar Hassan as Prime Minister and charged him with forming a new cabinet. In his letter of designation, the King emphasized that the government should adhere to his longstanding initiatives and ideas. He made it clear that these directives should take precedence over any independent authority of the new parliament and that public debate on the more contentious aspects of his plans should be curtailed.
King Abdullah II instructed the new cabinet to make his mega-projects—especially the Economic Modernization Plan (EMP)—a top government priority. The EMP, which the King claims requires "doubling investment," is positioned at the forefront of efforts to develop critical sectors such as water, transportation, and energy. The EMP's Executive Program proposes several projects with questionable benefits for the Jordanian economy, including the country's staggering unemployment rate. One such project is a new railroad connecting Amman to the southern port of Aqaba, despite the existence of the historic Hejaz Railway, which has linked Amman to Aqaba since the late 19th century. Other initiatives include power grid connections with neighboring Iraq and Egypt to facilitate the export of electricity from a large-scale renewable energy project. Additionally, the program aims to expand the capacity of the King Hussein Bridge between Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territories by constructing new facilities for both passengers and cargo.
However, many Jordanians remain skeptical about the projects' cost-effectiveness and long-term value, voicing concerns over their potential negative socio-economic and political impacts. Some experts have even dismissed the initiatives as a "design by deception." Experts argue that mega-projects typically force a country to borrow further, exacerbating the country's rising debt burden. Over the past 15 years, Jordan's debt-to-GDP ratio has steadily increased, reaching a staggering 114.7% in 2022. Moreover, the additional debt from the EMP is expected to worsen the government's net lending/borrowing position, which was already projected to deteriorate to –7.6% of GDP by 2024.
King Abdullah has also demanded that the Cabinet continue work on a new city project—even though its location and name remain undisclosed—citing its "key role in mitigating the pressure on Amman and Zarqa." However, it remains unclear how the project will address the persistent over-expansion of these two cities. Extensive research shows that many Jordanians leave their hometowns to seek work opportunities and better services in Amman or Zarqa, highlighting the uneven geographical distribution of economic development. Meanwhile, the government has made little progress in developing the other ten of the country's urban centers, such as by establishing reliable public transportation systems that could improve mobility across the national market.
Rather than building a new city, investing in local development might more effectively relieve the population pressure on Amman and Zarqa and encourage residents to return to their hometowns. Critics, including a World Bank June 2024 report, have proposed alternatives to the project by utilizing potential resources of Greater Amman Municipality.
The King also established a new body within the Royal Court to supervise and evaluate the government's performance, effectively bypassing the role of Parliament—the only institution with constitutional authority to oversee the government. In his letter of designation to the new Prime Minister, Jafar Hassan, the King made it clear that his new mega-projects would be overseen by him rather than Parliament: "The implementation of the Economic Modernisation Vision is subject to follow-up and evaluation through the mechanism created at the Royal Hashemite Court, with my direct engagement." This statement implies that the government now operates under the King's authority alone, rather than being held accountable by Parliament.
The establishment of this self-governing body effectively positions the King and his Royal Court as surrogates for public opinion and state institutions—including Parliament—in overseeing the government and ensuring accountability. This move aligns with the King's repeated disregard for Jordan's constitution, particularly Article 26, which explicitly requires him to exercise his executive authority through his ministers. Upon ascending to the throne, King Abdullah II was widely attributed as stating: "I am not like my father. I want to do what I want, and whoever speaks out, I will silence them." Just months into his reign, on December 12, 1999, he formed the Advisory Economic Council—a loosely structured body operating under his direct supervision. The King appointed the director of the "Economic Department" at the Royal Hashemite Court as its Rapporteur. Dominated by influential business figures, the council became the central authority overseeing privatization efforts and played a key role in shaping monopolistic entities—some owned by the council's own members—particularly in the renewable energy and water sectors.
The King has established numerous other executive institutions and bodies that operate independently of the Government and Parliament. Some of these bodies are personally chaired by the King—for example, the King Abdullah II Fund for Development, the Jordan Design and Development Bureau (JODDB), the King Abdullah II Centre for Excellence, and the King Abdullah II Design & Development Bureau (KADDB). Other bodies, such as the National Center for Security and Crisis Management (whose website is not publicly accessible) is chaired by the King's half-brother, Ali. The Higher Council for Science and Technology is chaired by the King's uncle, Prince Hassan bin Talal, while the Royal Scientific Society—founded in 1971 and chaired by Prince Hassan bin Talal—has been presided over by his daughter, Sumaya bint El Hassan, since 2006. Sumaya has even branded herself as a "determined Taurean," citing her astrological sign as part of her qualification to lead the country's foremost scientific body. In addition, the Jordan Media Institute is headed by the wife of the King's brother, along with many other institutes, some of which have previously been reported on by DAWN.
Recommendations
To the Citizens of Jordan:
Participate in elections, vote, and form political parties; these are essential steps toward achieving peaceful change. Opting out of civic and political engagement will not bring reform or democratization; rather, it increases the ability of the monarchy to exercise complete political control over the country.
To the Parliament:
— Safeguard Freedom of Expression: Parliament's Public Freedoms and Human Rights Committee should conduct a review of, and question justice ministry officials about, the government's suppression of Jordanians' rights to free speech using the Cybercrime and Crime Prevention Laws.
— Protect Political Parties and Ensure Fair Implementation of Political Party Law: Initiate an investigation of the government's 2024 refusal or revocation of licenses for 25 political parties, maintain strict supervision over licensing of political parties; amend the political parties law and bylaw to require parliamentary oversight and approval of licensing of political parties.
— Protect Parliamentary Immunity: Amend the by-laws governing the operation of parliament to prohibit the expulsion of members of Parliament because of their opinions or views.
— Enhance Parliamentary Representation by Amending the Election Law:
– Amend the Election Law to
– ensure that voters selecting countrywide lists for parliamentary seats for parties that fail to meet the 2.5% threshold are included by, for example, allowing parties to transfer their party list votes to another party; and
– ensure the right of voters outside the country to participate in elections by voting at embassies and consulates around the world.
These proposed amendments do not address all of the reforms needed for the Election Law, but are limited to the issues addressed in this briefing paper.
To King Abdullah II:
1- Repeal anti-democratic laws, including the Crime Prevention Law and the Cybercrime Law; pending repeal, instruct the cessation of enforcement of these problematic laws.
2- End bans of, and interference in the activities of, political parties; prohibit security agencies from harassing and detaining peaceful activists, particularly members of political parties.
To the United States:
Over 3,800 U.S. military personnel are deployed to Jordan, providing significant security support alongside more than $1.45 billion in annual military aid. This assistance comes as the Jordanian economy struggles under the weight of corruption and nepotism, with reports alleging that billions of dollars have been diverted by the royal family from international loans and aid into tax havens
-Condemn King Abdullah's increasing repression and centralized rule; take note of the growing resentment among Jordanians that risks instability and political upheaval in the country.
– End military support for the Jordanian government in light of its record of systematic and widespread human rights abuses.
– Remove U.S. forces from Jordan to avoid further endangering the people of the country
