Conditionality as a Tool for Human Rights Advocacy: Workshop Report and Recommendations

However, regardless of context, a common theme has repeatedly surfaced: the sidelining of human rights issues for supposed geopolitical interests. Moreover, if such support were to be conditioned—or even severed completely—the question was immediately raised as to whether this would fundamentally alter the calculus of the recipient actor. In other words, would the conditioning of such support lead to positive change, or could it actually lead to these actors becoming more repressive and result in the U.S. losing its supposed "leverage" over these actors?

The second speaker sought to reorient the question of conditionality by shifting the conversation to the supposed purpose of this support in the first place: the idea that such assistance somehow advances "U.S. interests." Instead of asking if conditionality as a strategy itself is worth pursuing and if it would have the intended result, the speaker questioned the overbearing logic of providing this assistance in the first place. First, they began by noting that the ways in which the United States differentiates various forms of aid and assistance—such as military aid, economic aid, arms sales, etc.—are not viewed abroad as so neatly differentiated. Whatever the specific form of the support, it is support nonetheless: regardless of how it is justified or seemingly compartmentalized, this assistance is ultimately intended to support these governments.

How, then, does such assistance advance "U.S. interests," as is commonly cited as the original impetus of the support? To begin with, the speaker noted the immense ambiguity surrounding the term "U.S. interests" and how, in the Middle East, in particular, the United States has been operating abroad without a clearly defined strategy or objective. Support for these actors is simply predicated on the abstract notion that vital U.S. interests are being advanced, and that conditioning or severing this assistance would negatively impact Washington's interests. However, without clearly defined regional interests, the U.S. is operating on the notion that such support advances American security or prosperity, or that such assistance provides the U.S. with leverage over these actors—what they referred to as the "fantasy of leverage." In fact, they argued that if one were to critically assess the heavy U.S. presence in the region and the large swaths of assistance provided to these autocratic actors, one would quickly realize that America is paying a large price tag for things that run contrary to its national interest, not to mention the interests of the people of the Middle East who are living under these autocracies.

This discussion prompted one participant to point out that the original rationale for much of this support has actually disappeared. The case of Egypt was used as a prime example. Most commonly, the massive amounts of military and economic assistance delivered to Egypt following the Camp David Accords with Israel have traditionally been viewed as a type of "bribe" to maintain peace between Cairo and Tel Aviv. However, the situation is dramatically different today than it was at the time of the Camp David Accords: Not only is there a substantial military asymmetry between Israel and Egypt today, but both Cairo and Israel maintain the same regional geopolitical posture today. The idea that these two states would go to war is near unthinkable. In fact, as one participant noted, Egypt's Sisi and Israel's Netanyahu share many of the same views and positions on regional issues. Moreover, another speaker explained how such aid—even if not interpreted directly as a bribe—is largely ineffectual for its claimed purpose. They note how military aid to these governments has not been effective in fighting terrorism and provided the example of the insurgency in Egypt's Sinai, which only continues to worsen. Likewise, economic assistance to these countries does almost nothing for the economic situation in many of these countries that remain dominated by different forms of cronyism.

One speaker reoriented the conversation to address the question of whether or not U.S foreign policy is fundamentally interested in human rights objectives? Regardless of whether the support serves its intended purpose or if conditioning such assistance would serve to alter the calculus of the recipient actor, a more basic and fundamental question needs answering: Is the United States interested in advancing human rights objectives in the region? The answer was that the U.S. never imposes conditions or severs this support to autocratic states in the Middle East because they are genuinely not interested in human rights objectives, even if they claim to the contrary. In short, as one participant explained, the U.S. does not care about democracy or human rights in the region. It only wishes to advance its own interests.

The speaker explained that the underlying rationale for this can be found by examining the guiding principle that has dominated U.S. policy in the region for decades: the myth of authoritarian stability. This idea refers to the belief that—in such a "volatile" or "dangerous" region—supporting and maintaining the autocratic regimes in the region are the best ways to promote U.S. interests. In other words, the fundamental goal of U.S. policy has been to keep these autocratic governments in power, out of fear of what could take their place if they were to be removed.

It was noted by several participants that this is a discourse that has been encouraged by these regimes themselves. By branding themselves as the only bulwark against "extremists" or "terrorists," these regimes present themselves as the only actors capable of maintaining a semblance of order in the region. For the U.S., regional policy then becomes a matter of cost-benefit analysis: toleration of human rights abuses and support for these autocratic rulers, or bearing the consequences of the alternative if these governments were to fall. This then embeds America with these actors and creates a stake in the sustainment of these regimes. Everything else—including human rights—falls to the side, and conditionality becomes viewed as anathema to this strategy. Several participants agreed that it is critical for this myth to be properly dispelled and for U.S. policy to fundamentally reorient itself before real change can occur.

Critical to note is that several participants highlighted the centrality of three forces in the U.S. that have served as bulwarks against either conditioning or severing support to these countries, as well as impediments to Washington fundamentally reassessing its relationship with these actors: the military-industrial complex, lobbyists, and centers of knowledge production within the D.C. beltway. Indeed, they highlighted how different actors/groups within the U.S. have interests of their own that they wish to advance. It was noted that massive arms sales and different forms of military aid also serve to subsidize the military-industrial complex and that different lobbying organizations and centers of knowledge production seek to steer U.S. policies in favor of their own agendas, all of which make efforts to curb U.S. support to these actors very difficult.

The conclusions reached at the end of the first session represented the broader debates surrounding the notion of conditionality and whether such approaches actually work in practice. Several speakers and participants emphasized that conditionality is no longer a feasible tool of human rights advocacy. They argued that the ultimate objective of these governments is to remain in power, and the conditioning of U.S. support will not alter the overbearing calculus of those in power nor will it result in the altering of their behavior. However, others countered with the notion that these governments do in fact care a great deal about U.S. support, and go to great lengths to guarantee that this assistance is not conditioned. Viewed from the outside, it may appear that these governments view this aid as inherently fungible, but in actuality, they care a great deal about maintaining such assistance and remain susceptible to conditioning pressures from Washington.