Maged Mandour is an Egyptian political analyst who writes regularly for outlets such as Middle East Eye, openDemocracy, the Arab Digest, and Sada, journal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A graduate of the University of Cambridge, he is the author of Egypt Under El-Sisi: A Nation on the Edge.
Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Egypt Under El-Sisi: A Nation on the Edge, just published by I.B. Tauris.
The summer of 2013 witnessed one of the worst cases of state-led violence in Egyptian history. This violence ushered in a period of intense repression that is still yet to abate nearly 11 years later. The massacres of that summer not only ended any hope of the continuation of Egypt's brief democratic experiment following the popular uprising of 2011, but also laid down the basis for a deep social polarization, essential for the military to cement its hold on power. Indeed, without mass state violence, the military's ability to completely sideline the civilian political forces in the July 2013 coup that brought Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to power, from the Islamist to the liberal and leftist currents, would have been extremely difficult. The key to the military's success, however, lay in the solicitation of public support for the mass repression that the military unleashed—initially, against the supporters of the ousted Islamist president, Mohammed Morsi, later to extend to devour the secular opposition, as well as ordinary citizens that got caught in its growing tentacles.
The military's ability to solicit public support for its repression stems from three, intertwined factors. First is the ability of the Sisi regime to strongly revive a deeply repressive and conservative form of Nasserism, devoid of the classical Nasserist emphasis on social justice that had defined President Gamal Abdel Nasser's rule. This new form of Nasserism revived a deeply entrenched ideal in the Egyptian public psyche, namely the organic unity of the masses and their natural harmony. This allowed the new regime to frame opposition as treasonous acts, fueled by foreign powers, aimed at disrupting this natural harmony, allowing the regime to garner popular support for its repression.
The second and third factors behind the military's ability to foster public support for its repression are very closely connected. During its year in power following landmark democratic elections in 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood's attempts at monopolizing power—and its reported courting of the security services—alienated other civilian forces, except for some Islamist groups. This was combined with the fear of the secular forces, and among large segments of the urban classes, of the domination of the Brotherhood and the establishment of religious rule, which allowed the military to easily co-opt a large number of secular figures, whose support was essential for the early success of the coup.
Sisi's regime requires a state of perpetual crisis in order to remain in power—if the crisis is resolved, then the ideological appeal of the regime fades away.
- Maged Mandour
On the eve of the mass protests of June 30, 2013 that precipitated the coup, the military was able to exploit an already deepening political crisis, which could have been averted if the Brotherhood had understood the magnitude of the impending calamity and that a minimum level of accommodation with other political forces was necessary to avert the danger of a military takeover. In the end, the stubbornness of the Brotherhood and the gullibility, as well as an outright authoritarian streak, of the secular opposition allowed the military to sideline both factions, through a popularly backed tidal wave of repression.
The first wave of this repression, and the popular support on which it was based, not only paved the way for the Sisi presidency, but also allowed the military to completely take over the state apparatus and use its newfound supremacy to reshape the state and the economy in its own image. In essence, it laid the foundation for Sisi's passive revolution, which was carried out with considerable levels of violence. As Walter Armbrust has noted, "The violence of 2013 has . . . become a part of the new political system. The system cannot exist without it."
An analysis of events of the second half of 2013 is critical for understanding the foundation of the regime and how the military came to be the predominant power in the land. Such an analysis is also of critical importance for understanding the future trajectory of the regime, as well as the prospect of democratic transition in the country. The deep social wounds of that summer need to be reckoned with in order for any prospect of peaceful coexistence to be realized.
The poisonous ideological legacy of these events is its most dangerous, and arguably most durable, consequence. These acts of mass state violence required the support of large segments of the population, which entailed an indoctrination in an ideology that is deeply authoritarian and chauvinistic, with fascist undertones. This is a massive hurdle to overcome. It is very hard to argue that the military takeover of 2013, and the repression that followed it, was not immensely popular among large segments of Egyptian society. Indeed, one can even plausibly argue that these acts of violence were performed with a certain level of popular participation, a fact that Sisi likes to remind his audience of whenever the regime is threatened.
This popular participation, which I will call "societal repression," not only refers to direct acts of physical repression but also to the social ostracization of members of the opposition, both Islamist and secular, as well as enthusiastic support for the regime's repression. This process, which was primarily fueled by the regime's propaganda, had a number of significant consequences. First, it allowed the regime not only to consolidate its base but also to create a strong psychological bond with large segments of the population, who saw themselves as partners in the regime campaign to rid the country of traitors, to protect the state from imminent collapse and to preserve traditional values. The fear of social chaos, however, not only stems from the fear of political upheaval or an Islamist takeover, but also from the challenge posed to the conservative, heteronormative values that have been dominant in Egyptian society for decades.
As Armbrust has argued, using the concept of liminality developed by anthropologist Victor Turner, the mass protests of 2011 created a condition of transition between two normative social states, where everything seemed possible. This condition enabled the questioning of existing social norms in a way that caused deep angst for a large conservative audience, who saw the military as the means to end the prevailing condition of social flux. This "liminal crisis" has elicited a ferocious response from the regime and its support base and has been one of the main arenas of struggle between the regime and various segments of the opposition. The second, no less significant, consequence of "societal repression" is that participation in the regime's repression required a belief in a number of fantastical conspiracy theories, bordering on the absurd. This belief was necessary for the regime not only to indoctrinate its followers in its version of Nasserism, but to instill an authoritarian, unquestioning mindset among its base, a real-life example of Orwellian "doublethink," where regime propaganda is taken as an absolute truth, even when it is blatantly contradictory to facts on the ground.
Sisi and his regime have not only taken a large segment of the population hostage, but have inadvertently taken themselves and their supporters along with them.
- Maged Mandour
The regime's moment of hegemony is anchored in a state of polarization and mass state violence. This ideological construct has proven to be extremely appealing, and far more enduring than one would have expected in the summer of 2013. The secret of this appeal lies in the ability of the regime to perpetuate a state of political and social polarization, as well as cultivating the deep historical roots of the regime's revamped version of Nasserism. The regime's ability to appeal to its base depends on mass state violence that needs to continue in order to justify direct military rule.
In simpler terms, the regime needs permanent internal enemies, traitors, terrorists and social deviants to repress in order for its narrative to continue to appeal to its supporters. This has a number of intended and unintended consequences that will have long-terms effects on Egypt's prospects for democratic transition. The clearest intended consequence is the indoctrination of a large segment of society in the regime's ethos of national unity, sameness and a conception of Egyptian national identity as ethereal. This indoctrination acts as a strong barrier against the development of a democratic and civic ethos, which is necessary for democratic practice to flourish. The indoctrination is necessary not only for the military to remain in power but to justify the military's monopoly of political power and its restructuring of the state and the economy in a manner that has not been seen since 1952, all in the name of a Sisified version of Nasserism. Indeed, it provided the ideological base for Sisi's passive revolution and its moment of hegemony.
The intended consequences, however, are also accompanied by unintended repercussions, which will severely restrict the regime's policy options. For example, the regime's ideological construct, which relies heavily on the vilification of the opposition and the insistence on the necessity of repression, will act as an ideological straitjacket stifling elite-led reform. In other words, the regime requires a state of perpetual crisis in order to remain in power—if the crisis is resolved, then the ideological appeal of the regime fades away. This leaves the regime with limited policy options, besides repression, in dealing with the opposition. Hence, the prospect of national reconciliation or the easing of repression becomes unlikely, since repression is now an ideological necessity that the regime cannot escape. This leaves the regime ill-equipped to deal with social unrest, since rather than absorb social protest through accommodation, it is more likely to call on mass repression as its preferred policy response, severely curtailing the ability of the regime to absorb popular anger through concessions. If it does otherwise, the regime would be subjected to immense pressure, not only from its popular base but also from within the security apparatus, which have been deeply indoctrinated in this ideology.
Sisi and his regime have not only taken a large segment of the population hostage, but have inadvertently taken themselves and their supporters along with them.
