Marc Martorell Junyent is a writer and researcher whose work has appeared in Responsible Statecraft, The New Arab, Mondoweiss and other publications.
Last month, Egypt became the third country within just a year to reach an agreement with the European Union to contain migration to Europe in exchange for an economic lifeline. Following deals with Tunisia and Mauritania, the agreement with Egypt represents another step in the externalization of the EU's migration policy—and a big one at that. The two previous deals, even when combined, stayed below the €1 billion mark, while the one with Egypt includes a colossal €7.4 billion ($8.1 billion) aid package and elevates the EU's relationship with Egypt to a "strategic partnership." Hafsa Halawa, an Egyptian political analyst, called it "utterly unprecedented" for the EU and European policy.
During her visit to Cairo in March to sign the pact, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, announced that both sides would "work on our commitment to promote democracy and human rights." Standing alongside Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who seized power in a coup in 2013, von der Leyen did not elaborate on how she planned to do that. Sisi has relentlessly repressed opposition to his rule. Under his regime, Egypt's jails have been packed with tens of thousands of political prisoners. Sisi was reelected in December 2023 in a tightly controlled election that, like the two previous ones he also won handily, was neither free nor fair.
The EU's agreement with Sisi's government directly allocates €200 million ($216 million) to "migration management"—a relatively small amount in proportion to the overall €7.4 billion aid package. Rather than really focus on containing migration, "the essence of the Egyptian strategic partnership is economic: most of the funding takes the form of macro-financial assistance," notes Anthony Dworkin of the European Council on Foreign Relations. It is unlikely, however, that the thinking of EU decision-makers is as compartmentalized as the classification of the funds would suggest.
It's clear that one of the EU's goals in supporting Egypt's ailing economy is avoiding the prospect of Egyptians leaving the country en masse in search of better economic opportunities in Europe. Although in 2023 Egyptians were only tenth on the list of nationalities of migrants reaching Europe irregularly (at 13,639, according to figures from the International Organization for Migration), in 2022, they topped that list with 21,753 arrivals. (By comparison, Syrians led the list in 2023 with 38,703 arrivals, followed by Moroccans at 29,804). And in contrast to Tunisia, direct migration from Egypt is negligible. Egyptian migrants trying to reach Europe typically travel to Libya first and cross the Mediterranean from there.
Israel's war in Gaza added new urgency to the negotiations between the EU and Egypt, amid fears that a looming Israeli offensive on Rafah, where more than 1.5 million Palestinians are sheltering, could lead to a massive displacement of Palestinian refugees over the border into Egypt.
A joint declaration from the EU and Egypt, heralding "their commitments to build on their long-standing relationship," is mostly a compendium of half-empty sentences that sheds little light on how the EU's "migration management" funds will be spent. A large part of the money will likely be dedicated to preventing the arrival in Egypt of more refugees from the civil war in neighboring Sudan. Close to half a million Sudanese have crossed the border into Egypt since the war erupted a year ago, although many may have returned due to dire conditions in Egypt. Very few Sudanese refugees have managed to reach Europe, and the EU clearly wants it to stay that way.
It's clear that one of the EU's goals in supporting Egypt's ailing economy is avoiding the prospect of Egyptians leaving the country en masse in search of better economic opportunities in Europe.
- Marc Martorell Junyent
The European Commission is now planning to fast-track part of the financial aid to Egypt without waiting for the endorsement of the European Parliament, the EU's only directly-elected institution. The Commission argues that sidestepping the usual parliamentary oversight is necessary given the urgency of Egypt's economic crisis and the proximity of European Parliament elections this June, which could delay the approval process. But there appears to be another reason for fast-tracking the deal: von der Leyen's desire to avoid a replay of the parliamentary debate held last month on the EU's migration pact with Tunisia, which included €105 million to Tunisia for "border management" and nearly €1 billion in additional loans and financial support. Senior members of the European Parliament denounced that agreement, accusing the European Commission of "bankrolling dictators" and claiming that the aid to President Kais Saied's government had been diverted, including €150 million that apparently went to Saied directly, instead of being invested in EU-supported projects under the agreement.
The deal with Tunisia has only emboldened Saied, who was effectively rewarded by the EU despite seizing full power in Tunis in a coup in 2021. He has continued to dismantle Tunisia's democracy, and abuses against migrants in Tunisia have been on the rise. Last September, his government refused to allow five members of the European Parliament to enter the country, even though they were on an official mission to evaluate the political situation in the country, following a fact-finding mission earlier in 2023 that found "political backsliding on democratic standards and human rights." They were due to meet with Tunisian NGOs, trade unions and opposition leaders.
The European Parliament's foreign affairs committee demanded a "detailed explanation" from Saied's government, condemning its conduct as "unprecedented since the democratic revolution in 2011." The episode revealed the double-standards at the heart of the EU's migration policy. European leaders supporting the recent migration agreements have often argued that, while imperfect, they give the EU the ability to raise concerns about human rights and democracy directly with leaders like Saied and Sisi. But the evidence so far shows that Europe's leverage in Tunisia has decreased, not increased, since the deal was struck.
All these deals reflect seismic shifts underway in the EU's migration policy. This week, the European Parliament finally approved, by a narrow margin, a package of laws collectively known as the New Pact on Migration and Asylum that will significantly restrict the entry of migrants and asylum-seekers to the EU. The sweeping changes to the EU's rules on migration and asylum were approved by the European Parliament while protesters in the public gallery shouted: "This pact kills! Vote 'no'!" The new laws, which took almost a decade for the EU to negotiate, have been denounced by human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Rescue Committee, as paving the way for more suffering by migrants and refugees and more violations of their human rights.
The pact, which will come into force in 2026, will establish new EU "border centers" to hold asylum-seekers, where they can be quickly vetted and (more likely) deported. In the name of "crisis regulation," EU member states receiving a "mass influx" of migrants and asylum-seekers—though that threshold is vaguely defined in the new laws—will be allowed to suspend some basic rights, "moving closer to legalizing the denial of the right to asylum," as Human Rights Watch warns. Under the pact, European countries that are not border states can avoid taking in asylum-seekers in countries like Italy and Greece by instead contributing to so-called "solidarity funds." The funds might be used to build detention centers at the EU borders or to fund migration control outside the EU, in the form of the Tunisia and Egypt agreements. European officials will also be allowed to collect biometric data, including fingerprints and facial images, from children as young as six.
European politics are at the heart of these harsh new laws on migration, with parties on the traditional right and left both fearing more political gains by far-right populists riding an anti-immigrant wave. The president of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, from von der Leyen's center-right European People's Party, has defended the migration pact as essential to stave off right-wing populism, especially months before EU elections—despite criticisms that the new policies mirror far-right proposals to restrict migration overall and wall Europe off from refugees and asylum-seekers. European Commissioner Ylva Johansson, who belongs to the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats and helped steer the negotiations for the migration pact, echoed Metsola's view. Johansson noted that "the far-right lives on fear" and the recent pact had shown migration was manageable, contrary to the far right's claims.
But polls ahead of the EU parliamentary elections in June present a far less rosy picture. Forecasters are predicting that "the main winners in the elections will be the populist right," with far-right parties projected to finish second behind the European People's Party. They would not be the second-largest parliamentary group only because they are divided into two factions: Identity and Democracy, and the European Conservatives and Reformists. Perhaps even more worrying than far-right electoral gains is the fact that von der Leyen and the leader of the conservatives in the European Parliament, Manfred Weber, have already been courting some far-right leaders, such as Italy's Giorgia Meloni.
For xenophobic politicians pushing for a race to the bottom, one refugee on European soil will always be one too many.
- Marc Martorell Junyent
Von der Leyen has not only stood side by side with Meloni to unveil the migration agreements with Tunisia and Egypt, but has also praised Meloni's migration deal with non-EU Albania. Under that agreement, Italy will send male migrants and asylum-seekers directly to the Balkan country, where their asylum requests will be processed by Italian immigration officers. Meloni seems to have won over von der Leyen by backing the EU's ongoing aid to Ukraine against Russia's invasion, in contrast to Hungary's Viktor Orban.
After the EU parliamentary elections in June, European conservatives are likely to look to their right to reach agreements in parliament and fill posts for the European Commission. In a meeting last month in Bucharest, the European People's Party endorsed von der Leyen as their choice to repeat as president of the European Commission and approved an electoral program that marks a notable shift to the right. European conservatives want to triple the workforce of Frontex, the troubled EU border agency, and increase its powers and budget. Frontex stands accused of turning back migrants in the Mediterranean while neglecting its obligation to save the lives of those in danger. Frontex's director from 2015 to 2022, Fabrice Leggeri, who abruptly resigned while under investigation for those abuses, is now running for the European Parliament on the list of Marine Le Pen's far-right National Rally. "Our objective is clear: to regain control of the borders of the European Union and France," he declared in announcing his candidacy.
In the electoral program they presented in Bucharest, von der Leyen's European People's Party also proposed sending asylum-seekers to non-EU countries upon their arrival to Europe, in a model similar to the widely criticized Rwanda plan put forward by the British government (which the United Kingdom's Supreme Court unanimously ruled was unlawful). The European conservatives' electoral program pays lip service to "the fundamental right to asylum" while proposing to introduce quotas of accepted people, which de facto would make the right to asylum a privilege. Ukrainian refugees would be excluded from these restrictions.
Europe is falling prey to two dangerous myths. The first is that denying migrants and asylum-seekers a humane and dignified reception (and one that adheres to international law) will directly result in fewer arrivals. Migrants will try and reach Europe even if these supposed "pull factors" are taken away. Consider why migrants want to leave Tunisia, Egypt or other countries across North Africa and the Middle East in the first place—to escape economic deprivation, political repression and, in countries like Syria, civil war. The second myth is that Europe's more traditional or "moderate" conservatives can reverse the far right's rise by adopting some of its anti-immigrant policies and talking points—in other words, by pandering to nativism and racism. This kind of thinking ignores the other reasons for the far right's popularity, including the center right's own past policy failures, most of all deeply unpopular economic policies like austerity that hollowed out public services. The second myth also risks shifting the red lines on basic human rights standards for the sake of xenophobic politicians pushing for a race to the bottom. For them, one refugee on European soil will always be one too many.
Most migrants and asylum-seekers have no vote in the EU's upcoming election. As it is, however, they stand to lose the most when Europeans go to the polls in June.
