Maged Mandour is a political analyst and author of “Egypt Under El-Sisi: A Nation on the Edge.” He writes for multiple outlets and has made several media appearances as an expert on Egyptian politics and the Sisi regime.
In a surprising July 21 decision, the Badr Criminal Court in Cairo ordered the removal of arbitrarily detained human rights and democracy activist Alaa Abdel Fatah's terror designation, marking a rare easing of the regime's persecution of such a figure and his family. The ruling comes after his mother, Professor Laila Soueif, ended her hunger strike after 287 days following pleas from supporters and family members concerned about her deteriorating health. Her demand was simple: Release her son after more than a decade in prison.
A U.N. expert panel deemed Alaa's detention as arbitrary in May 2025. Whether in response to this U.N. criticism or Soueif's hunger strike, Cairo's decision does not mean that Alaa will be released, nor does it shift Sisi`s reliance on repression as a tool for regime maintenance.
On the contrary, all signs point that to the opposite being true.
Consider the regime's new criminal procedure law, the strongest evidence that any supposed easing of Egypt's grip on human rights and democracy defenders is a mere distraction. The law, which the parliament approved on April 29, legalizes and normalizes the government's ongoing repression of the Egyptian people—including many of the tactics Cairo has long utilized.
For example, the law grants the state prosecutor, at their discretion, the right to deny any defendant's legal representation access to their client's case files or to photocopy them. It also provides legal cover for enforced disappearances—a widespread phenomenon under Sisi—by granting the security forces the right to interrogate any suspect. That right was previously reserved for the public prosecutor.
Now, those arrested can be interrogated anywhere without proper protection, and likely under torture. Still, much of what the bill legalizes was already taking place in practice.
Another central provision is Article 162, which denies the families of victims of torture the right to file a complaint to an investigating judge, granting the power of launching an investigation only to the public prosecutor. The article closes one of the few remaining avenues for victims to address grievances via legal means.
Beyond the new law, the failure of the National Dialogue—officially launched in May 2023 amid a deepening economic crisis—presents another indicator of worsening repression in Egypt. The National Dialogue's stated goal was to establish communication between the regime and the opposition to reconcile long-running grievances. The platform excluded the Muslim Brotherhood, once the most significant opposition element in the country.
This framework, however, did not lead to a systematic change in the Cairo`s policies. Worse, the release of political prisoners was handled on a case-by-case basis. For example, while several prominent political prisoners, including Ziad El Elamy and Hossam Monas, were released in 2022 in an apparent attempt to appease the opposition and bring them to the table, this process was not systematic, nor did it follow any clear guidelines.
A U.N. expert panel deemed Alaa's detention as arbitrary in May 2025. Whether in response to this U.N. criticism or Soueif's hunger strike, Cairo's decision does not mean that Alaa will be released, nor does it shift Sisi`s reliance on repression as a tool for regime maintenance.
- Maged Mandour
On the contrary, evidence suggests that the regime arrested more people than it released. Between April 2021 and 2022, when the pardon committee responsible for early releases resumed its activities, the government released 1,000 political prisoners and arrested another 3,000.
The ongoing salience of torture and extrajudicial killings as a modus operandi of the regime further reflects a complete rejection of meaningful reform. On July 28, clashes erupted in Belqas, a town in the Nile Delta, between protestors and the police after the death of 21-year-old Ayman Sabry. He died in police custody after alleged torture.
Additionally, security forces likely murdered two men in May—an act that was surely covered up. Credible evidence suggests that both men turned themselves in hours before their alleged deaths in what the police described as a shootout.
That incident followed a report by the Sinai Institute for Human Rights, which documented 863 cases of enforced disappearance. The report estimates that Cairo likely forcibly disappeared 3,000 to 3,500 people between 2013 and 2022. Their fates remain unknown.
The hyper-militarized nature of the regime, its ideological underpinnings that centralize repression and the lack of internal or external pressure to ease it are all indicative of a government incapable of meaningful reform, as these incidents reflect.
The primary issue reinforcing repression and preventing reform is the hypermilitarized nature of the government, where no civilian power center plays an effective role in policymaking. Parliament is dominated by a pro-Sisi party, yet, there is no evidence that it plays a role in policymaking. That suggests only limited opportunities for moderate voices within the ruling coalition to oppose repressive policies, effectively diluting legislative power into little more than Sisi's rubber stamp. Power is concentrated in the hands of the military and the security establishment, where hawks continue to dominate.
The regime's ideological necessity for repression to maintain the cohesion of the state apparatus and its base are the second primary issue. The government's heavy reliance on conspiracy theories, coupled with a proto-fascist version of Egyptian nationalism, constitute crucial pillars of this ideology. This dynamic establishes the groundwork for mass state violence and surveillance to maintain a pro-regime narrative and to justify the military's primacy.
In short, the regime requires an endless supply of enemies, traitors and conspirators to justify its grip on power, enabling repression through its base's broader societal fears. That approach only worsens at times of economic despair, including today's situation, albeit with minor improvements due to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and regional support from allies in the Gulf.
Finally, there is a complete lack of sustained pressure from Cairo's allies—specifically the United States and the European Union—to ease repression. The issue is not a priority for international states relative to their other geopolitical interests in the Middle East and North Africa, leaving Egyptians trapped under the weight of unaccountable and unaddressed brutality.
Thus, Alaa's removal from the terror list is a drop in a bucket and likely a distraction or symbolic nod to the West, offering cover for their ongoing support. Sisi's government is arguably the most repressive state in the region after the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. In terms of repression, Sisi is closer to Assad than former Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak, suggesting the will to reform and ease repression is unlikely under today's conditions.
