Sam Ali is the pseudonym for a researcher and reporter from Yemen, whose real name is not being used given the security situation in the country.
On Dec. 3, armed forces affiliated with the UAE-backed, secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) launched a sudden offensive in eastern Yemen, seizing control of Hadhramaut. The move prompted widespread speculation that the anti-Houthi coalition would be permanently changed, with partition resulting from an independence declaration all but guaranteed. That assessment soon proved premature, as the Saudi-led response raised more questions than answers in the south and among forces still fighting the Houthis.
The STC's offensive drove out tribal forces led by the Saudi-backed chief, Amr bin Habrish, and the 1st Military Region army units affiliated with the Islah party—the Muslim Brotherhood's Yemen branch and Abu Dhabi's Yemeni nemesis. The following day, Emirati-backed forces advanced into al-Mahra, seizing the governorate bordering Oman, which had not previously been under STC control.
On Dec. 5, Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Chairman Rashad al-Alimi left the provisional capital, Aden, for Riyadh. In parallel, the National Shield Forces—Saudi-funded troops loyal to al-Alimi—withdrew from several areas, including Aden, while Oman temporarily closed its border with al-Mahra. In Riyadh, al-Alimi held several meetings with regional and Western diplomats. Yet despite calls from local, regional and international actors, the UAE-backed STC refused to withdraw from the two eastern Yemeni governorates.
Whether Riyadh can translate its intervention into a durable political and security framework in southern Yemen remains unclear, particularly as the PLC struggles to stabilize the south and preserve a fractured anti-Houthi coalition.
- Sam Ali
Founded in 2017 with Emirati financial and military backing, the STC seeks independence for southern Yemen. It framed the offensive as a campaign to "liberate all the soil of our homeland, South Arabia." With the takeover of Hadhramaut and al-Mahra, the secessionist movement had total control over all eight governorates that previously constituted South Yemen—an independent state that existed from 1967 until Yemen's unification in 1990.
These year-end developments unfolded rapidly, marking the most heated round of a long-running rivalry in the country in years, pitting Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—alongside their respective Yemeni proxies—against each other. This round has been the most confrontational, with the two main Gulf state partners and key actors in Yemen "publicly announcing their divorce." In recent years, both states have pursued diverging interests, backing different Yemeni political factions and military forces while wrangling for control of the country's southern and eastern territories.
Ibrahim Jalal, a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told Democracy in Exile that the recent developments "appear to reflect an Emirati counter-response to Saudi Arabia's push for assertive de-escalation measures in Sudan, following the [Saudi] Crown Prince's meeting with President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C." Jalal believes the outbreak highlights "an unprecedented level of Saudi–Emirati geopolitical rivalry across the shores of the Gulf of Aden [where] Abu Dhabi upped its game by Saudi Arabia's southeastern borders."
"It is an assertive mode of negotiations by proxy, reflecting possible miscommunication, misreading, miscalculation and above all discontent. It shakes the level of trust between the two allies, as well as Oman," he concluded.
The STC outbreak also marks the largest territorial shift since the 2022 U.N.-brokered ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and Iran-backed Houthis of northern Yemen, with the land grab accounting for nearly half of Yemen's mainland. Both Hadhramaut and al-Mahra had remained a tumultuous arena of the Saudi-UAE rivalry—particularly Hadhramaut, Yemen's largest governorate and home to about 80% of the country's oil wealth. It also shares the longest border with Saudi Arabia of any Yemeni governorate.
Yemen's next phase is no longer being written in Aden or Sana'a, but in Hadhramaut, where power is now being tested, negotiated and contested.
- Sam Ali
Bin Habrish leads a large tribal bloc in Hadhramaut and has called for greater local autonomy, mobilizing his forces to protect the governorate's "sovereignty, resources and endeavors." Based in Hadhramaut's Valley and Desert region, where Yemen's major oil fields are located, the Saudi-backed chief made a preemptive move in late November to block advances of the UAE-funded Hadhrami Elite Forces (HEF), which are loyal to the STC. Based in Hadhramaut's Coast region, the HEF swiftly advanced on bin Habrish's bastion, driving out his Hadhramaut Protection Forces and forcing him to flee to Riyadh.
Fernando Carvajal, who served on the United Nations Security Council's Panel of Experts on Yemen, told Democracy in Exile that bin Habrish "handed the STC the opportunity they [a]waited for over the past seven years." Yet that "was clearly an opportunity they [the STC] couldn't take advantage of," Carvajal argued shortly after the takeover of both eastern governorates.
He said the STC would "face a huge challenge in trying to consolidate power in the south and govern," adding that the UAE would also "face a major challenge [that] the STC can't cover without proper support, training and weapons …This move places the STC in an awkward position as they did not prepare for such an opportunity."
"Realistically speaking, a southern state is not in the near horizon, too many variables [are] in the way," he concluded. "A southern state cannot exist in peace and prosperity as long as the Houthis are in control of northern territories and 20 million people."
As Jalal similarly argued, the STC move was not "the final stage of developments in the south," but rather "far from a fait accompli." By the end of December, he said, the "delusion of finality" surrounding the STC's push had faded along with its hope for independence from the north.
On Dec. 30, Saudi warplanes bombed two Emirati ships carrying weapons and military vehicles for the STC in Mukalla, Hadhramaut's capital city. Hours later, Abu Dhabi announced it would withdraw its remaining forces in Yemen. Meanwhile, the STC agreed to the deployment of the National Shield Forces in areas it had taken in Hadhramaut, maintaining its presence.
Then, on Jan. 1, the STC announced a constitutional declaration outlining a two-year transitional period ahead of a southern referendum on self-determination. This move proved too much for Riyadh. As such, Salem al-Khanbashi—Hadhramaut's governor—launched a campaign involving more than 30,000 National Shield Forces troops against the STC. Dubbed the "Camps Handover Operation," the campaign regained control of STC military camps in both Hadhramaut and al-Mahra within 36 hours—swifter than the STC's two-day takeover.
By Jan. 10, the PLC announced that it had regained full control of all areas previously held by the STC, one day after the UAE-backed movement controversially dissolved and its leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, reportedly fled Yemen. Now, the future of the STC remains uncertain amid internal rifts and the exile of its leader. Following a PLC request, Riyadh is planning to convene a conference of major southern political factions to shape Yemen's future.
The Saudi-backed PLC, however, still faces immense challenges in south Yemen. As it seeks to unify a wide range of security and military forces—including UAE-backed units—under the command of the Saudi-led coalition, members of the dissolved STC's local leadership met on Jan. 13 in Aden. The meeting stressed "the insistence of STC leaders—who gained control over military camps and retained security forces and administrative positions in Aden, Lahj, al-Dhale, Abyan, and Shabwa—on using this power against the will of state and its backer, Riyadh."
However, as Amjad Khashafa, a Yemeni scholar and researcher, recently argued, "The bigger picture is that a new equation is taking shape in Yemen; one in which the country's future is no longer being determined in Sana'a or Aden but in the valleys and coastal plains of Hadhramaut." As he sees it, "For the first time, the governorate is testing the possibility of a local governance model that could redefine the relationship between the internationally recognized government and its tribal and political components."
"A sharp Saudi-led correction," has already been triggered, Jalal said—an outcome that had not occurred in over a decade. Whether Riyadh can translate its intervention into a durable political and security framework in southern Yemen remains unclear, particularly as the PLC struggles to stabilize the south and preserve a fractured anti-Houthi coalition. What is increasingly evident, however, is that Yemen's next phase is no longer being written in Aden or Sana'a, but in Hadhramaut, where power is now being tested, negotiated and contested.
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
