Ahmad Algohbary is a freelance Yemeni journalist who has reported on the Yemen war for international media since war broke out in 2015. His work has appeared in The Guardian and Al Jazeera English, among other outlets. As Co-Director of Photography, Aloghbary filmed the 2018 documentary “Yemen Skies of Terror,” which was nominated for Emmy and Sheffield Awards, and won an online journalism award. Algohbary has also launched a public funding campaign via his Twitter account to provide support for child victims of the war. He tweets at @AhmadAlgohbary.
On July 20, Yemen's Houthi Movement (Ansar Allah) announced a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, again transforming a dispute over Sana'a International Airport into threats against a crucial energy transit route. The decision marks a major escalation in both Yemen's civil war and the regional conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran, likely to negatively impact Yemenis and communities around the globe.
Acting on the statement, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree claimed on July 22 that the group used ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to target two Saudi oil tankers, the Encelia and the Layla. Saudi authorities confirmed that Encelia was struck in the Red Sea. A third Saudi vessel, NCC MASA, later sustained minor hull damage in another Red Sea attack but continued toward its destination.
The economic effect was immediate: Brent crude moved above $100 a barrel, tanker traffic shifted from the Bab al-Mandab Strait and war-risk insurance for parts of the southern Red Sea rose from around 0.3% of a vessel's value to more than 1%. The blockade was now more than rhetorical, reverberating through oil markets and global trade.
Renewed hostilities make the current situation more dangerous than the war that Saudi Arabia entered in March 2015.
- Ahmad Algohbary
The escalation began on July 13, when Yemen's Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) said it struck Sana'a Airport's runway to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing without authorization. The plane, carrying a Houthi delegation returning from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's funeral in Tehran, diverted to Hodeidah. The Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia and fired missiles toward Abha International Airport in response, their first claimed attack on the Kingdom since an informal truce began in 2022.
Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior member of the Houthi Political Bureau who was aboard the diverted flight, told Democracy in Exile that Saudi Arabia failed to implement earlier understandings, including arrangements to resolve long-running issues concerning public-sector salaries and oil and gas revenues. He claimed that the Houthis had delayed responding because they were focused on supporting Gaza and wanted to leave space for political negotiations. The airport strike, he said, was "the straw that broke the camel's back."
Asked why the delegation returned aboard an Iranian aircraft despite reports that Yemen's IRG offered flights via Yemenia Airways, al-Bukhaiti rejected the distinction. "The issue is not the aircraft's nationality, but Yemen's sovereign right to manage flights to and from its territory without external guardianship," he said. "Yemen alone has the right to determine which flights arrive and depart, not Saudi Arabia."
He made clear that the blockade extends beyond Saudi-flagged vessels: "The measures will include all ships heading to Saudi ports, regardless of their nationality."
Al-Bukhaiti denied coordination with Iran or links to the regional war, arguing the escalation would end only after an end to the "Saudi aggression," a complete lifting of the blockade and a Saudi withdrawal from Yemen. "We are prepared to meet any escalation with a similar escalation," he said.
His claims come amid reports that Iran flew Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel and missile and drone-related equipment to Yemen shortly before the Houthi blockade. Tehran denies arming the Houthis, and the movement rejected the report, although substantial evidence points to Iranian support for the group.
The 2022 truce reduced cross-border attacks, increased fuel deliveries through Hodeidah and restored limited commercial flights to and from Sana'a. Yet it never resolved disputes over salaries, oil revenues, ports and state authority.
- Ahmad Algohbary
The Saudi-led coalition rejected the Houthis' claim that Yemen remained under blockade. Its spokesman, Turki al-Maliki, said over 300 commercial vessels carrying food, fuel, goods and construction materials entered the Houthi-controlled ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Isa in the first half of 2026. He claimed efforts were underway to protect commercial vessels through the Bab al-Mandab, promising a "firm and forceful" response to any threat.
The coalition quickly fulfilled that promise, announcing a "proportionate military response" against Houthi military sites in Hodeidah linked to threats against commercial shipping in the Red Sea. It did not target Hodeidah port, nor the governorate's other ports, claiming they remained open to maritime traffic. The figure challenges the claim of a total closure, but it does not settle the dispute over inspections, delays and restrictions imposed on ships bound for Houthi-controlled ports. For many Yemenis, a port can technically be "open" while the cost and time required to reach it still function as a form of pressure.
Yemen's IRG escalated in turn. Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council heading the IRG, announced the resumption of oil exports and said revenues would support salaries and public services, bypassing Houthi claims of arrangements on these issues. Government-controlled crude exports were largely halted after Houthi attacks on terminals and tankers in late 2022 aimed to stifle IRG revenues.
Al-Alimi's announcement opened a second energy front. While the Houthis threaten Saudi exports, the government attempts to restart Yemen's own. Both sides invoke sovereignty, using civilian infrastructure as pressure points.
For Saudi Arabia, the timing of the escalation could hardly be worse. With traffic through the Strait of Hormuz restricted, Riyadh redirected over 70% of its normal crude exports toward the eastern port city of Yanbu. Tankers heading to Asian markets sail south through the Bab al-Mandab along Yemen's coast, placing the Kingdom's alternative export route within reach of Houthi missiles and drones. It has begun rerouting north through Egyptian ports and the Suez Canal, but at substantially greater cost to buyers, helping inflate energy markets.
The Houthis conducted missile and drone attacks against Aramco facilities in Jizan and Yanbu on July 25. Two Asia-based trading sources said they had been informed of possible damage to fuel and oil storage sites in Jizan, with Riyadh shutting down damaged refineries.
Renewed hostilities make the current situation more dangerous than the war that Saudi Arabia entered in March 2015. Eleven years later, the Houthis control Sana'a and most of northern Yemen. They possess long-range drones, ballistic and cruise missiles and anti-ship weapons with features matching Iranian systems. The Houthis' previous Red Sea campaign, starting in late 2023, demonstrated that they can impose global costs without winning a conventional war. A renewed Saudi campaign would confront a better-armed movement with the proven capability of striking Saudi cities, energy facilities and commercial shipping. This says nothing of Iran-backed militias in Iraq, which reportedly targeted Saudi Arabia on July 28.
The earlier Saudi-led campaign failed to remove the Houthis while devastating civilian infrastructure and deepening Yemen's humanitarian crisis. United Nations investigators documented serious violations by all sides, including disproportionate coalition airstrikes, Houthi shelling, landmines, arbitrary detention and child recruitment.
Reactions are divided among Yemenis living under Houthi control. A.D., a civil engineer who requested anonymity out of fear of retaliation due to press restrictions, believes the Houthis are using the wider confrontation to pressure Washington and Riyadh. "The Houthis benefit from Iranian experts and technology, while Iran benefits from Bab al-Mandab," he told Democracy in Exile. Although he supports reopening Sana'a Airport, he fears Yemenis will pay the greater price.
"Yes, we fear the return of war," he said. "War has exhausted us."
Mustafa al-Manari, an information-technology engineer, welcomed the Houthi blockade, arguing that inspections and delays imposed on ships bound for Yemen raise costs for traders and consumers. "The world cannot tolerate pressure on Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab at the same time," he said. "War is bad for everyone, but if it becomes the path through which rights are recovered, then it is welcome." He nevertheless urged all sides not to attack or blockade civilian infrastructure.
These opposing views capture Yemen's deeper divide. Some view escalation as a struggle for sovereignty to end restrictions on airports and ports. Others see Iran gaining leverage from Yemen's geography while Yemenis absorb the consequences.
The 2022 truce reduced cross-border attacks, increased fuel deliveries through Hodeidah and restored limited commercial flights to and from Sana'a. Yet it never resolved disputes over salaries, oil revenues, ports and state authority. Those unaddressed issues have now returned in a more dangerous form as the Houthis and IRG aim to advance their domestic interests and relative power through the wider regional war. In this context, the Houthis may gain leverage, and the government may recover revenue. But for Yemenis, the outcome risks being painfully familiar: armed actors grow stronger, the state grows weaker and civilians pay the price for decisions made in their name.
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
