The confluence of identity and legitimacy has long played a significant role in the survival or demise of autocratic regimes in the Middle East, including and particularly in Egypt. Today is no different under Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the latest dictator to control the country through a mixture of brutal repression and appeals to both past and future Egyptian greatness and identity. But a closer observation of Sisi's approach to the issue of identity and legitimacy, personified by massive development projects akin to previous Stalinist thinking, reveals a deeper weakness threatening the regime in Cairo.
A debate about Egypt's identity emerged after the January 2011 revolution against former dictator Hosni Mubarak, which fostered an expansion of social, intellectual and political freedoms. Was the country Islamic, ancient Pharaonic, Nasserist-Arab or even the liberal legacy—albeit a superficial one—of the dynasty of Muhammad Ali Pasha? The sudden public opening offered a rare opportunity for Egyptians to have these conversations in new ways.
Sisi came to power without much interest in creating, or more accurately, tailoring a new and complete identity for the political system he led. Instead, he worked through various cultural tools to capitalize on Egypt's diverse historical identities, utilizing his preferred version of each when convenient. Public debate surrounding those identities, conversely, was stifled.
Sisi did not abandon the narrative of Islam as the spiritual religion of Arab peoples in general. However, following his 2013 military coup against political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood, he rejected an activist—and thus potentially critical—version of Islam. He directed media, cultural and artistic resources through dozens of programs and dramatic works during his early years in power to distort the Islamist version of Islam in society to his whims.
In parallel, he tailored a version of Islam that combined preaching and wisdom, utilizing institutions like Al-Azhar and Sufi orders, alongside prominent figures like former Grand Mufti Sheikh Ali Gomaa, to co-opt a "correct" form of Islam. In parallel, he rejected any political or activist representation. Through repressive tools, Sisi also emptied and eliminated any space for these movements to operate outside of the will of the state.
In parallel, a nationalist-Arabist tendency persisted, especially in the early years of his rule. The banners citizens raised to support Sisi were divided between his image and that of the leader of Arab nationalism, former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Sisi exploited this comparison, attending every Nasserist celebration. He promoted himself as not just an Egyptian leader, but an Arab one, carrying a nationalist project to uplift the entire Arab nation—starting in Egypt.
Sisi came to power without much interest in creating, or more accurately, tailoring a new and complete identity for the political system he led.
- Ahmed AbdelHalim
Similarly, Sisi utilized the country's ancient history—Pharaonic Egypt—to serve this legitimizing narrative. The breathtaking April 3, 2021, parade of ancient Egyptian mummies is crucial in this regard. Recorded as a historic day, the state transferred 22 royal mummies from the Egyptian Museum in Tahrir Square to the National Museum of Egyptian Civilization east of Cairo. Sisi walked as if he were a pharaoh of Egypt's long history, blending images of the ancient and the modern, on a red carpet—a new divine leader with no equal in the nation's long history.
At the time, a debate spread among different social classes about the question of belonging: "To which identity does Egypt belong?" Voices celebrating Egypt's Pharaonic heritage, rather than its Arab or Islamic identity, grew louder, as the country and president marked a historic day to glorify the country's ancient history.
However, Sisi avoided fully adopting or nurturing any one of these identities as that of the modern state. The regime was not interested in building or rebuilding a tailored Arab, Islamic or Pharaonic identity. Instead, it was content to invoke each of them on different occasions as its needs desired to bolster its legitimacy.
The mummies' parade marked a key moment for this dynamic. On other occasions, when addressing the Palestinian cause, the goal has been to evoke Nasser, as seen in the recently leaked recording of Nasser's speech about peaceful solutions—not war. Yet another narrative, representing moderate and tailored Islam, has been utilized on occasions like the anniversary of the 2013 military coup or in the fight against armed Islamic organizations—most notably the Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-Sinai).
Indeed, rather than standing alone, these identities undergird the regime's primary focus: a developmental project and a "New Republic," including economic and urban projects, job opportunities and investments. Since Sisi's rise to power, Cairo has repeatedly promised a coming renaissance for Egyptians, offering shifting timeframes for citizens to see the effects of the state's projects.
Rather than standing alone, these identities undergird the regime's primary focus: a developmental project and a "New Republic," including economic and urban projects, job opportunities and investments.
- Ahmed AbdelHalim
However, as time has passed, and particularly since 2019, Sisi has stopped urging Egyptians to be patient. His speeches began to ignore the impoverishment that citizens were experiencing as his development project faltered. Sisi began repeating narratives on heroic stances—specifically that of saving the country and its people from the conspiracies hatched against Egypt. Conspiracy through past identity became a key tool of regime legitimization and repression.
In recent years, Egypt has suffered under persistently high inflation. Since the dollar jumped to nearly 50 Egyptian pounds, the prices of goods, especially imported ones, have multiplied. The poverty rate among Egyptians reached 29% in 2020, according to a Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics report at the time—its latest. The World Bank noted an increase in 2022, reaching 32%.
Tens of billions of dollars in accumulated foreign debts—increasing every year—compound the worsening economic conditions, with the state's general budget largely spent on paying interest. Those payments reached 79% of the budget's revenue this year. It is no secret that for the past two years, Egyptians have become poorer and more miserable. Many segments of society have turned to making money through technology, using apps that profit their users.
A major reason for this downturn stems from the state's development projects since 2014, which have not benefited citizens, as opposed to bolstering the regime's image and a false sense of legitimacy through identity as personified in grandiose construction. New cities were built in Cairo, New Alamein and other areas, but "sovereign" bodies affiliated with the Egyptian Armed Forces took ownership and supervision over these projects. Corruption has run rampant as a result.
There is also a lack of transparency and accountability before the Egyptian parliament regarding massive budgets and oversight of private and sovereign funds. An absence of competence worsens this dynamic, with responsibilities given to regime allies—not those with expertise and knowledge. As such, these projects have produced billions of dollars in waste.
This brand of authoritarianism has historically failed to realize such projects, just as it is failing today under Sisi. Whether an identity-based narrative for the Egyptian conscience or a real developmental project that improves people's lives in sectors such as consumption, culture, education, health and transportation, this model has only succeeded in realizing a narrative of exceptionalism—meaning its suppression of anyone who opposes it.
This suppression, exercised directly and indirectly on many Egyptians, has created a state of fear, anger, repression, despair and emigration among wide segments of Egyptian society, a dynamic likely to worsen with time while failing to seriously bolster the regime's legitimacy.
