Bakr Hazem Al-Zubaidy is an Assistant Lecturer at the College of Political Science, University of Baghdad. His research interests include modern and contemporary political history, regional and international organizations and their role in crisis and conflict management, as well as sovereignty and international governance. His profile is available on ResearchGate. Facebook |X
The U.S.–Saudi strikes on Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) sites across Iraq on July 28 widened the regional war into another arena. They also disrupted a fragile domestic effort: Armed factions that had faced growing pressure to place their weapons fully under state authority by Sept. 30 gained an opportunity to present themselves as defenders of Iraqi sovereignty. That paradox — not only the immediate military damage — is central to understanding the political cost of using military force in Iraq.
According to U.S. Central Command, American and Saudi aircraft struck logistics and weapons sites in eastern Iraq in response to more than 30 drone attacks over the previous 72 hours that it claimed were directed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps against U.S. forces and Saudi energy infrastructure. Saudi authorities offered a more specific allegation: Drones launched from Iraqi territory had targeted petroleum facilities in the Eastern Province and Riyadh, although the facts remain unconfirmed.
The PMF said that at least 20 of its members were "martyred" in the strikes, while 32 others were wounded. Under Law No. 40 of 2016, the PMF is part of Iraq's armed forces and reports to the commander-in-chief. It is not simply a collection of militias, although some PMF-affiliated factions retain significant autonomy from the state and close ties to Iran. Striking its facilities was therefore sensitive: The casualties belong to an official institution, even as Baghdad debates these factions' conduct.
Within hours, Iraq's political agenda shifted. Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi chaired an emergency National Security Council meeting centered on sovereignty and official security personnel, highlighting a rejection of foreign interference. The prime minister's meeting immediately highlighted how striking an institution created by Iraqi law gave political rivals that had been divided over weapons a reason to close ranks, even if out of political necessity.
Striking an institution created by Iraqi law gave political rivals that had been divided over weapons a reason to close ranks, even if out of political necessity.
- Bakr Hazem Al-Zubaidy
Baghdad's response reflected that dual reality. The presidency condemned the strikes as a violation of its sovereignty and an attack on official security institutions while reiterating that Iraq must not become a launchpad for attacks on its neighbors. Al-Zaidi also visited the PMF headquarters, directing officials to honor the martyrs and care for the wounded. The focus shifted from alleged cross-border operations to the state's duty to defend its territory and personnel.
Tensions have deepened over whether Baghdad had prior knowledge. United States President Donald Trump claimed the operation was coordinated with the Iraqi government. Baghdad denied granting approval or receiving advance notice, demanding that Riyadh produce evidence that the attacks originated in Iraq. This disagreement matters: Without a shared evidentiary process, attribution becomes a justification for unilateral force rather than a basis for Iraqi enforcement.
Before the strikes, the government had begun turning the long-standing principle of a state monopoly on arms into policy. Parliament approved a program that included security-sector reform, Al-Zaidi formed a committee to manage the relationship between political parties, armed factions and the PMF and the government set Sept. 30 as the deadline for bringing unauthorized weapons under state control. Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib al-Imam Ali announced steps to inventory and hand over weapons, while other factions resisted or remained ambiguous.
Those measures placed holdouts on the defensive. A deadline, a negotiating mechanism and public commitments from major factions forced opponents to justify their autonomous arsenals and explain on what grounds they could unilaterally authorize actions capable of drawing Iraq into war.
The strikes reversed the direction of scrutiny. The question went beyond concern about armed actors operating outside effective chains of command to the state's ability to defend its people and territory. The attack complicated implementation of the existing Iraqi disarmament deadline.
Sovereignty has unusual political force in Iraq because it is both constitutional and experiential. Articles 1 and 9 of the Iraqi Constitution define Iraq as fully sovereign, prohibiting militias from operating outside the armed forces. In a country shaped by invasion, occupation and external intervention, defending those principles confers political legitimacy. The U.S.–Saudi strikes thus enabled armed factions to appear as both challengers to state authority and defenders of sovereignty. They did not erase objections to autonomous weapons but raised the cost of pressing the issue.
The strikes reversed the direction of scrutiny. The question went beyond concern about armed actors operating outside effective chains of command to the state's ability to defend its people and territory.
- Bakr Hazem Al-Zubaidy
In this context, the government cannot merely rely on condemnation of the strikes. After the attack, the Iraqi National Security Council reaffirmed the state's exclusive authority over weapons and said only constitutional institutions may respond to threats. Baghdad may hope to reject external force while enforcing a unified chain of command that prevents factions from using Iraqi territory against another state. This resolves the apparent contradiction: The strikes strengthened factional rhetoric in the short term, but the government can still turn consensus on sovereignty into reform if it clarifies that defending Iraq's borders does not legitimize unauthorized arms.
Externally, Saudi Arabia's direct military role departs from recent trends in bilateral relations with Iraq. Since reopening its Baghdad embassy in 2015, Riyadh had enhanced relations through diplomacy and economic engagement. The two sides fostered cooperation through investment agreements, growing trade through Arar, a Gulf electricity interconnection and continued political coordination. This allowed the Kingdom to present itself as a partner in Iraq's development and an alternative to U.S.-Israel-Iran polarization. Using force inside a country Saudi Arabia had sought to win over therefore created a new test at a particularly inopportune moment, when Baghdad was trying to contain regional escalation.
Riyadh invoked its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, claiming it did not seek escalation but would protect its interests. Yet the political cost was immediate: Al-Zaidi postponed a planned visit to Riyadh, giving critics ammunition to recast Saudi Arabia from an economic partner to a violator of Iraqi sovereignty.
The operation also sets a regional precedent. A Gulf state showed its willingness to strike Iraq when it believed Baghdad could not stop threats emanating from Iraqi territory. That may produce short-term deterrence, but it expands the confrontation and weakens the de-escalatory logic of the Saudi-Iranian agreement announced in Beijing in 2023. It also reinforces a destructive cycle: Limited Iraqi control invites intervention; intervention gives armed actors a rationale for retaining weapons; and those weapons invite further intervention.
Three scenarios now stand out.
First, individual PMF-affiliated factions could retaliate against American or Saudi interests, drawing Iraq deeper into the regional conflict. Second, the government could use the broad defense of sovereignty to accelerate security-sector reform. That outcome is possible, but only if Baghdad separates condemnation of the external attack from accountability for unauthorized operations and applies one legal standard across all armed formations.
The third, and absent further escalation, most likely scenario is a managed stalemate: Iraq avoids open war but fails to achieve a full monopoly on arms. The underlying tensions remain concrete rather than abstract: competing chains of command, incomplete integration of PMF-affiliated units, contested attribution of cross-border attacks and the readiness of neighboring states to act unilaterally when they distrust Iraqi enforcement. Any new incident could reactivate this cycle.
Breaking it requires Baghdad, Riyadh and Washington to establish mechanisms for joint investigation, verification and rapid information-sharing on cross-border attacks. Iraq, for its part, should reaffirm, not reinvent, the existing Sept. 30 schedule and pair it with weapons inventories, accountable command arrangements and judicial enforcement. The central problem is not the absence of legal language protecting sovereignty; it is the gap between formal authority and effective control.
Washington and Riyadh have likely made a serious strategic miscalculation. By acting as Baghdad attempted to consolidate control over arms, they weakened the government's message, allowing armed factions to claim the mantle of sovereignty. A strike can destroy sites and capabilities, but if it increases the domestic legitimacy of the actors it targets, the strategic balance sheet may remain negative.
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
