Ola Almadhoun is a Palestinian journalist and communications specialist based in Washington, D.C. With firsthand experience covering multiple wars in Gaza, she previously worked with UNRWA and U.N. Radio before joining the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa) in the U.S. (LinkedIn) (X)
Since the signing of the Sharm el-Sheikh Peace Agreement—which, among its twenty points, calls for Hamas to give up its weapons—fundamental questions have arisen about the movement's future. Will Hamas truly disarm? And if it does, will it disappear or reemerge through political transformation under a more liberal, pragmatic ideology—like the Syrian precedent?
Any discussion of Hamas leads to Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), given their decades-long rivalry over authority and political influence in the Palestinian national movement. Hamas's longstanding ambition to join and influence the PLO dates back to the 1990s, when it demanded 40%-50% representation in the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and proportional influence across PLO institutions—an early indication of its intent to compete with Fatah for leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA).
The PA's growing weakness, coupled with its rejection by both the United States and Israel, has left the political landscape in disarray. That isolation became evident when Washington revoked entry visas for several Palestinian officials ahead of the annual U.N. General Assembly gathering, including long-running President Mahmoud Abbas. This environment could open the door to multiple scenarios for filling the resulting power vacuum, with a renewed and rebranded Hamas potentially emerging as one of them—particularly if the PA fails to implement reforms, hold new elections or articulate a credible national vision.
Today, Hamas faces no choice but to alter its core ideology and strategy if it wishes to secure a place in the political landscape acceptable to the United States, Israel and the Arab region.
- Ola Almadhoun
However, the Palestinian Authority has shown no intention of reform. Rather, Abbas's latest decree appointing Hussein al-Sheikh as interim president in the event of a vacancy bypasses the Palestinian Basic Law, reinforcing political succession over renewal. The move undermines legitimacy and further erodes public trust—a dynamic it can ill afford amid historically low approval ratings.
Hamas emerged in 1987 as an Islamic armed movement aimed at resisting Israel. Two decades later, it entered the political arena, winning the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. Following its 2007 military takeover of the Strip from Fatah and the PA, Hamas solidified control over Gaza, ruling for nearly two decades while holding firmly to its arms.
But after the events of Oct. 7 and the devastating two-year war between Hamas and Israel that followed, the equation changed. Today, Hamas faces no choice but to alter its core ideology and strategy if it wishes to secure a place in the political landscape acceptable to the United States, Israel and the Arab region. Hamas' greatest challenge lies in its popular base: Abandoning its most sacred principle—armed resistance—could cost the movement its legitimacy, both domestically and regionally. Alternatively, its loyal followers may view that move as a strategic necessity, tactically shifting for political space to survive, rather than a betrayal of faith.
Such a transformation would resemble that of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the former leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), previously al-Qaeda in Syria, who reinvented himself as Ahmad al-Shara'a—later accepted as Syria's legitimate president. Once facing a $10 million U.S. bounty, al-Shara'a abandoned jihadist rhetoric, renounced violence, declared alignment with the axis opposing Iran and Hezbollah and adopted his real name as part of a broader rebranding effort. These steps enhanced his legitimacy regionally and internationally.
The U.S. quickly removed him and his government from terrorism lists, lifted sanctions on Syria and recognized his leadership. Trump even personally met with al-Shara'a. Arab states, from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to Turkey and Qatar, followed suit, welcoming Syria's return to the regional fold.
This case illustrates a clear pattern: The only scenario in which Washington and the West are willing to forgive the past is when a former adversary renounces extremism, refrains from confronting Israel and aligns with regional and Western interests. This opportunity now presents itself to Hamas, particularly after meetings held between senior U.S. officials—including presidential hostage envoy Adam Boehler—and Hamas leaders in Doha, marking a notable shift in U.S. pragmatism toward the group that suggests potential openness to engaging Hamas should it follow a similar path.
The idea that Hamas seeks to present itself in a new form is not beyond discussion. Former Hamas political advisor Dr. Ahmed Yousef has stated that the movement is not interested in ruling Gaza indefinitely, believing instead that it may reintroduce itself under a new brand to reenter the political arena. Achieving this transformation would allow Hamas to protect its interests and members, open channels of communication with the West and project an image of moderation while renouncing violence. Whether Hamas can successfully transition remains uncertain, but any attempt at a new identity rejecting violence in its political program would be notable.
Regional powers differ in approach. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Turkey each play pivotal roles in shaping Gaza's future and deciding who governs it. Their positions regarding a politically transformed Hamas will be decisive. It would be in Qatar and Turkey's interests for Hamas to disarm and reemerge as purely a political faction, allowing it to remain part of the regional landscape.
Hamas could turn toward Saudi Arabia itself—the region's architect of transformation—to rebrand as a political movement with a new identity rooted in deep ideological shifts.
- Ola Almadhoun
Saudi Arabia's role is more complex. In Syria's case, Riyadh sponsored and embraced the profound and dramatic changes within the new Syrian regime. However, leaked reports indicate that the Kingdom seeks to disarm and sideline Hamas, favoring and funding the PA while carrying out institutional reforms to strengthen its governance. This stance will likely persist if Hamas clings to its militant ideology.
Yet there may be another path: Hamas could turn toward Saudi Arabia itself—the region's architect of transformation—to rebrand as a political movement with a new identity rooted in deep ideological shifts. The goal would be to seek Riyadh's support, just like Damascus.
Recent developments indicate significant gravitation toward Saudi Arabia's leadership on regional issues. Even Hezbollah called on Saudi Arabia to open a new page, the latter of which has itself undergone a remarkable transformation, becoming more open, reform-oriented and actively involved in rehabilitating other states—including Syria.
The establishment of an international stabilization force (ISF) in Gaza, though met with suspicion and concern, could adopt a different meaning when considering its potential composition. If Qatar and Turkey—Hamas' key allies—are among the participating countries, this would implicitly signal protection of the group's interests and a pathway toward its rehabilitation, reintegration and reentry into the political arena in a new form, given their close ties to the group. Such an approach aligns with the subtle U.S. inclination toward their inclusion, even if Israel has expressed opposition to Turkey's involvement.
The U.S. position, while not overtly stated, also may reflect a degree of openness toward Hamas. The meeting between U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Wittkof and senior Hamas official Khalil al-Hayya is notable, as the tone was cordial. Wittkof reportedly offered condolences to al-Hayya for his son's death, telling him, "I lost a son too. We are members of a very cruel club—fathers who have buried their children."
This encounter suggests that Washington's stance remains pragmatic: What matters is not past hostility, but whether the other party aligns with its long-term strategic vision for the region. Syria encapsulates what once seemed impossible as a regional reality today.
Still, for Israel, it is unlikely—even under U.S. or Arab pressure—to accept any role for Hamas, regardless of how much it changes or transforms, within any future Palestinian governing structure, especially in the wake of the trauma of Oct. 7. This was evident in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's warning that "hell will break loose" if Hamas does not disarm. Whether Washington overrides such concerns remains to be seen.
The question, then, is whether Hamas will witness a similar transformation in U.S. policy—one that brings political openness and economic recovery. The outcome remains uncertain, but the prospect of Hamas's rehabilitation may well represent the most plausible, and perhaps stabilizing, scenario ahead.
