Osama Al-Shoumri is a researcher and human rights advocate focusing on academic freedom, minority rights and social resilience in conflict zones. As a direct witness to the academic environment in Syria, he documents patterns of discrimination and supports displaced and at-risk students from southern Syria. Facebook |X
In theory, transitional justice is a process designed to confront the legacy of past abuses, aiming to hold perpetrators accountable, restore trust between citizens and institutions and lay the foundation for a more just and stable political order. Typically, it begins after violence subsides: when societies turn from conflict toward reconstruction. Yet in Syria today, even as trials begin for officials from the regime of former President Bashar al-Assad, this framework is invoked under entirely different conditions.
Calls for transitional justice are emerging amid ongoing violence in Syria's post-Assad regime landscape. Across the country, reports of killings, arbitrary detention and collective punishment continue to surface, while public discourse increasingly shifts toward reconciliation and efforts to rebuild institutions. Recent events across Syria do not point to isolated incidents but to a recurring pattern of violence that cuts across regions and actors. What is often presented as fragmented or localized unrest reveals, upon closer examination, a broader continuity of abuse.
In the coastal regions, reports of mass killings targeting Alawite civilians continue to emerge, accompanied by sectarian narratives seeking to justify or obscure such acts. Recent reports have documented cases of abductions targeting Alawite women and girls, suggesting that such violations may be more widespread and severe than officially acknowledged, with some incidents reportedly downplayed or reclassified by local authorities or affiliated actors in ways that undermine victims' claims.
In Suwayda, violence against Druze communities has produced repeated calls for self-determination. In recent months, demonstrations have emerged demanding separation from the interim government in Damascus. Some participants have raised Israeli flags and images of Israeli political figures as a signal of those who supposedly stand alongside them in the face of direct threats.
The absence of accountability does not merely prolong instability. It entrenches violence as a structural feature of the current order.
- Osama Alshoumri
Additional reports have also documented abuses affecting Druze women, reflecting the widening scope of violence and its disproportionate impact on vulnerable groups. This shift reflects a growing conviction among the local population that the existing state apparatus cannot ensure their basic safety. Meanwhile, areas previously controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces have clashed with the interim government, with Arab and Kurd animosities boiling.
In this context, documented patterns of violence, detention and coercion demonstrate that abuses are not limited to one faction or ethnic group. Yet rather than prompting accountability, these incidents are frequently absorbed into cycles of silence or denial. While the context and motivations vary, actions across the political spectrum in Syria contribute to one overarching reality: No actor can claim immunity from scrutiny. Indeed, violence in Syria has not ceased; it has evolved, adapting to new political conditions.
The absence of accountability does not merely prolong instability. It entrenches violence as a structural feature of the current order. Across Syria, propaganda and sectarian rhetoric have been systematically deployed to target specific communities, deepening divisions and undermining social cohesion. Alawite, Druze and Kurdish populations have all faced sustained campaigns of vilification, often framed in political or religious terms to justify exclusion, violence or discrimination.
Media — both traditional and social — functions as a central tool in this process, amplifying fear, resentment and suspicion. Narratives portray certain groups as threats, outsiders or illegitimate actors within the state while concealing or rationalizing the violence they endure. These campaigns shape perceptions, eroding trust, fragmenting communities and corroding the social fabric that underpins any functioning nation.
The impacts are significant. In a society where communal bonds are intentionally eroded and mutual suspicion is institutionalized, the foundations of justice are compromised. Transitional justice cannot succeed in an environment where the population remains fragmented and reconciliation is undermined by propaganda. Without restoring social trust, accountability risks becoming superficial and unsustainable.
Indeed, the structure of political authority in post-Assad Syria raises fundamental questions about accountability. Under Interim President Ahmed al-Shara'a, key institutions have been shaped through centralized decision-making rather than inclusive or representative processes. The constitution was drafted under a narrow framework and direct supervision from the current ruling group, rather than emerging from a genuinely broad and inclusive societal consensus, reinforcing the concentration of power in a single authority. Likewise, the formation of the legislative body has relied on appointment rather than a free and fair electoral process, further entrenching the absence of genuine representation.
In Syria, the language of transitional justice risks becoming detached from the structural conditions required to make it meaningful.
- Osama Alshoumri
In parallel, the interim authorities announced the establishment of human rights and transitional justice commissions, presented as institutional steps toward accountability. While notable, there has been little visible evidence of substantive activity, public reporting or tangible outcomes associated with their work since their formation. While understandably a difficult task, the issue of transitional justice cannot be delayed.
These commissions also have structural shortcomings. Formed through top-down appointments rather than an inclusive national process, these bodies have not been accompanied by clear mandates, transparent procedures or meaningful engagement with affected communities. As a result, their role remains largely undefined, raising concerns that they exist more as window dressing for the West than as effective mechanisms capable of delivering accountability and justice, let alone advancing a genuine process.
This concentration of power reproduces familiar authoritarian patterns, with executive and legislative functions overlapping without meaningful oversight mechanisms. Institutions function less as checks and more as extensions of authority — as under the Assad regime — leaving legal frameworks without the independence needed to deliver justice or sustain Syria's transition.
This reality is further reflected in the issuance of a broad general amnesty in February 2026 by al-Shara'a, presented as a step toward reconciliation but raising profound concerns about accountability. The decision appears to exceed even the already expansive powers consolidated under the constitutional framework established under his authority, extending to a wide range of crimes and offenses committed prior to its issuance.
Amnesty mechanisms are frequently framed as tools for post-conflict recovery, but the breadth of this measure and the absence of clear distinctions in responsibility constitute serious shortcomings. In practice, the order fails to address critical issues like the fate of forcibly disappeared detainees, further deepening distrust and perceptions of injustice. In this context, institutions function as mechanisms that protect and reproduce impunity rather than instruments for justice. Thus, in Syria, the language of transitional justice risks becoming detached from the structural conditions required to make it meaningful.
Questions of sovereignty further complicate this fragile landscape. In recent months, repeated Israeli incursions into Syrian territory — starting with the capture of Mount Hermon and extending into western Daraa and much of Quneitra governorates — have occurred with little to no clear response from the central authority. This absence of a defined position raises critical concerns about the state's capacity to assert control over its territory or protect its citizens under a unified Syrian flag, even while recognizing the power asymmetries at play.
The issue extends beyond external actors. When sovereignty violations are met with ambiguity or silence, it signals a broader institutional weakness that undermines the legitimacy of governance itself. Sovereignty is not only a matter of borders; it is a prerequisite for administering justice. Without it, accountability becomes structurally uncertain.
These realities present real questions as the country begins important judicial proceedings for former Assad officials implicated in grave crimes against the Syrian people. Yet they raise a more fundamental question about the concept of transitional justice itself: If violence continues without accountability, power operates without oversight and entire communities no longer trust the state, what exactly does "transitional justice" mean in Syria today?
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
