Omid Memarian, a journalist, analyst and recipient of Human Rights Watch's Human Rights Defender Award, is the Director of Communications at DAWN.
While the U.S.-Israel war against Iran has entered a fragile pause, with a ceasefire holding for now, its trajectory remains uncertain. It is still unclear whether the parties will move toward a more durable resolution or return to escalation. In an interview with DAWN's Journal, Democracy in Exile, Vali Nasr, a Professor of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University, argues that the consequences already extend far beyond the battlefield.
"The war has begun to impact the United States way beyond the Middle East," he says, pointing to a weakened U.S. global standing, a perception of diminished American power as Iran has "stood up to him … showing the way for other countries to stand up," and a broader backlash in global opinion, with "the big winner in this war … China, and Russia to an extent."
Since the start of the war, Nasr has been one of the leading voices helping explain its dynamics and implications in the media. He is the author of "The Shia Revival," "The Dispensable Nation," and "Iran's Grand Strategy: A Political History." The son of renowned Iranian philosopher Seyyed Hossein Nasr, he has also served as a senior advisor to former U.S. President Barack Obama, working on U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nasr holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and has taught at institutions including the Naval Postgraduate School and Tufts University's Fletcher School.
Nasr offers a clear-eyed assessment of the war's strategic logic and aftermath. "It's much clearer to see why Israel wanted this war," he argues, while explaining that "why the United States might have seen this as the reason for a large war is obviously much less evident." As the war has unfolded, and now paused, the gap between the two has sharpened. The initial goal of collapsing the Islamic Republic "has likely not happened," and as costs rise, the United States may look for an "off-ramp," even as Israel's objectives remain broader.
The interview explores the key dynamics shaping the conflict: the absence of a clear U.S. rationale, miscalculations about Iran's resilience, the regionalization of the war through the Strait of Hormuz, shifting global power in favor of China and Russia and Iran's strategic failures. It also looks ahead to possible outcomes, from escalation to negotiation, and what a durable settlement might require.
Taken together, Nasr's analysis frames the war as a turning point with lasting consequences. In the full interview that follows, conducted on April 7 before the ceasefire was announced, he unpacks these issues in depth, offering a sharp, grounded guide to what has happened and what may come next.
The following transcript is lightly edited for clarity and length.
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Omid Memarian: Some describe the U.S.-Israel war with Iran as a "war of choice," while Marco Rubio has called it the "best and last chance," arguing that Iran's advancing missile and drone capabilities were approaching a point where they could shield its nuclear program. Which of these narratives is closer to reality? And given Iran's military advancements, was this war ultimately unavoidable?
Vali Nasr: An unavoidable war is not the same thing as a necessary war. You have to have a very clear reason why, first of all, it's necessary to go to war: to spend blood and treasure, put the global economy at risk and do everything you're doing. The president never made a case about what issue he was trying to solve in Iran. Most of the explanations came after the war started.
He has also never really explained why it was urgent. Why in February 2026? Why not at another time? He himself had said that Iran's nuclear program was obliterated in June: That, yes, they still had the highly enriched uranium, but it was buried under rubble and they didn't have access to it.
Yes, Iran has a very advanced missile system, but it's not at the range that it could reach the United States. And even if he was going to support the protesters who came out in the streets in January, as he claimed he would do, that moment passed and he didn't do anything about it. So, there was no actual urgent matter on the table.
Later on, he came up with the excuses that Iran had behaved very badly in Iraq, killed a lot of Americans and used IEDs. For 47 years, Iran had been a menace to the United States because of terrorism, but these are not urgent issues. In other words, this has been the case for a very long time.
So, he never explained why there was an issue with Iran that could not be solved without war. Why was it urgent at that moment? Essentially, he chose to go to war largely because he was under the false impression that the regime would fall very quickly if you killed the supreme leader [Ali Khamenei], and that there would be a popular uprising that would break the back of the regime.
He never estimated that they would show resilience, or that they would be able to attack the Gulf economies and world energy the way they did. One day, the verdict will be this — particularly if the cost of the war goes up economically or Americans end up dying in a next phase, let's say with a ground invasion — why did he do this? Why was it necessary? What was the real urgent cause for this war?
You cannot have this kind of devastation to the country's infrastructure and economy, and this kind of trauma that the people are going through, particularly in Tehran and some urban areas, with the bombing and witnessing what has happened to Iran, and assume that this will not be transformative for Iran.
- Vali Nasr
OM: There has been a lot of speculation that this is an Israeli war that is being sold to President Trump. Do you think there are differences between the U.S. objectives in this war and Israel's objectives? Is there any point at which we might see a divergence between the two in the near future?
VN: I mean, it's much clearer to see why Israel wanted this war. Israel came out of the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023, out of the Gaza war, determined to finish off the Axis of Resistance. It started with destroying Hamas, then destroying Hezbollah, and then it saw an opportunity to destroy Iran.
Of course, particularly after the June 2025 war, it's very evident Israel does not have the capacity to do this alone. It needs the United States. It needs the United States' air defense system. It needs the United States' air power. And it ultimately needs the United States to take responsibility when it comes to a ground invasion or the many larger operations that it would require to take Iran out.
In a way, Israel persuaded the United States that this was the opportunity to do this war. And so, the reason for why Israel wanted to do this is much, much clearer. Why the United States might have seen this as the reason for a large war is obviously much less evident. Going forward, the longer this war goes on, the more difficult it seems, I think there will be a divergence. First of all, it's very clear that the original objective, which was to collapse the Islamic Republic, has likely not happened.
The strategy that both Israel and the United States have had of decapitation, of systematically bombing the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC] military sites has not collapsed the regime. They're now going after civilian infrastructure targets, which is also alienating the Iranians in many ways, and the regime is not collapsing. The U.S. has no solution to opening the Strait of Hormuz without escalating the war further, which then has its own difficulties.
So, for Israel, the goal might still be to destroy the Islamic Republic or to make Iran into a failed state, so it won't be a threat to Israel going forward. But for the United States, I think the goals might end up being more modest. For instance, there may be an off-ramp for the United States to say, "I took the uranium out of Iran, I opened the Strait of Hormuz, I badly damaged Iran's infrastructure and military capabilities and I killed the Supreme Leader in Iran as well. And so, I have achieved enough goals to move away."
I think the divergence will come with costs. And I think that's exactly where the Islamic Republic is exploiting this division. The longer and more costly this war becomes, the more each country will have to assess the costs versus their objectives. For Israel, the costs may always be more justified because Iran is a very big enemy in its neighborhood. It may be willing to pay a much higher cost for a longer period, but the United States may begin to have a different assessment, especially if the price of gas goes very high. The Americans may begin to say that the objectives, which President Trump never made clear, are not worth the costs. And I think that's the point that you begin to see the divergence.
OM: Beyond the cost of gas, is it also a factor that the longer the United States is in this war, the more it is exposed to China and would be weakened when it comes to global issues like the competition with Beijing or the war that the Russians have with Ukraine?
VN: Yes, I think so. I think the war has begun to impact the United States well beyond the Middle East. Even within the Middle East, the U.S. stature as a singular outside superpower that can impose security on the region and provide a security shield to its allies has been shattered.
As we've seen during this war, the United States, first of all, made no preparation for defending Persian Gulf monarchies. It was only prepared to defend Israel with its aircraft carriers and air defense systems. It was not even prepared to defend its own bases in the Gulf. It brought the war to the Persian Gulf without defending them. And so, that has actually reduced its stature as a reliable security partner for the Arab world.
Secondly, I think it's the way in which the world looked at President Trump, like he's walking 20 feet tall and everybody has to bow to him. That, too, has now been shattered because here is this Islamic Republic that nobody took seriously, which has stood up to him and is also showing the way for other countries to stand up to him. In other words, there are other choke points like the Strait of Hormuz and a variety of other issues around the world that other countries could also manipulate in order to put pressure on the U.S.
Thirdly, I would say that the Iran War has galvanized public opinion. Outside of Iran, I mean, because Iranians obviously live under the Islamic Republic and they have very different views, but outside of Iran, all the anger that exists towards America and towards President Trump has now been mobilized to a greater degree. And therefore, the U.S. is facing a much broader, if you would, sentiment globally.
And then, finally, the big winner in this war is China, and Russia, to an extent, for a number of reasons. One is that the United States did not plan for a long war, it did not plan for ammunition and for war production for a long war. It has used a lot of both its offensive missile capabilities and defensive interceptors in this war and had not prepared to replenish them. In some cases, it will take up to two years to replenish them. The number of Patriot missile batteries that the Gulf countries, the United States and Israel have spent in this war, you cannot replenish them very quickly unless you take them away from Ukraine, Taiwan or other places, which means that you leave them exposed. The number of Tomahawk missiles that the United States has fired on Iran also cannot be easily replenished very quickly, which means that you have to take him out of other theaters of war.
So, gradually, U.S. capabilities and the capabilities of U.S. allies globally will begin to show. And so, I think the U.S. is guilty of going into this war unprepared and, as a result, exposed itself.
Since the start of the war, Nasr has been one of the leading voices helping explain its dynamics and implications in the media.
Source: Photo by Pier Marco Tacca/Getty Images
OM: What's the outcome of all this? When President Obama came to power, he said, "We should pivot to Asia, these endless, expensive wars in the Middle East only benefit China." First, he, then President Trump and then President Biden all tried to avoid getting entangled in the Middle East to focus on China. Now, President Trump actually has done the reverse. We've left China alone and focused on a war in the Middle East, which could potentially become a very long war. That, or a very long headache: Even if the Islamic Republic were to collapse and leave a mess behind, the United States would own the problem. Who's the beneficiary? China. Instead of being focused on China, the United States is focused on the Middle East.
VN: Exactly. The war is still ongoing and we are six weeks in. It appears that both the U.S. and Israel might have misunderstood or underestimated Iran's resilience, particularly its strategy of regionalizing the conflict and putting pressure on global economies through disrupting the Strait of Hormuz. There might have been expectations that the Iranian government would collapse within weeks, and we have heard this many times. Regardless of how the war ends, what miscalculations and misunderstandings existed about the Islamic Republic? And to what extent were these errors foreseeable?
I think a lot of them were foreseeable, first of all, because there was another war before this one. There was a war in June. And some of the fundamental assumptions that Israel and the United States had about Iran were already proven false. So, in June, Israel started the war by killing about 30 Revolutionary Guard commanders, and the expectation was that any regime in which you kill 30 military leaders should collapse if they are organized in a top-down command structure like regular militaries. It didn't happen, and Iran continued to fight, to Israel's surprise, all the way to the 12th day of the war.
Israel also anticipated in June that, given the anger of the Iranian public towards the Islamic Republic, which was manifested very clearly during the Women, Life, Freedom movement, the war would lead to an uprising. In fact, Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu very openly called on the Iranian people to come in and support the war. Reza Pahlavi [son of the former Shah of Iran] came out and asked people to rise up and topple the regime, taking advantage of the war. It didn't happen. The Iranians did not rise up during the war. So, it was proven that these two fundamental assumptions were wrong.
Now, you fast forward. Yes, there was a massive uprising in Iran in January, the largest, I would say, in probably over a century. But that happened six months after the war, not during the war. It was a consequence of the war, but it didn't happen during the June war. Now, Israel and the United States should know that this regime is not going to collapse by just killing some of its leadership. It didn't happen in June; there was no reason to think it would this time. The Iranian people may not rise up. It's true that the January uprising was far bigger, far bloodier and the anger towards the Islamic Republic after the massive massacre was far greater. But at least as planners, you should have had it in the back of your mind that this assumption may not be easily proven.
Thirdly, the Iranians had been telling everybody in the Gulf that if we get attacked, it's going to be regional. Even Khamenei had said that the next war would be a regional war. And maybe the Israelis understood that, and they didn't want to make a big issue of it because they didn't want to discourage the Americans from going to war. But it's a case of two things. One is that the Americans and Israelis chose to focus on arguments and assumptions that would make a case for a quick war and discounted arguments that could have said that the war either will not be easy or it would be very long as a result. Secondly, I think it's the way that President Trump reads and digests intelligence, which is that he doesn't like to be argued with. He doesn't like generals or bureaucrats or politicians who challenge his assumptions. He wants people to say "yes." And the way he gets information is directly from people who are his peers, which means billionaires and Prime Minister Netanyahu or maybe some Arab Gulf leaders. And then he gives an order.
So, once he decided he was going to go to war, he discounted that the Strait of Hormuz might be closed. He discounted that Iran might attack U.S. bases. And there are also some things that they may not have known. They may have underestimated Iran's intelligence capabilities and abilities to hit advanced radar systems or American bases. But I think there was a desire to go to war. So, you have a case of overemphasizing the notion that it's going to be quick, it's going to be nice and easy and it's going to have a good outcome, either from an Israeli perspective or an American one. They discounted all the arguments that suggested this might be difficult, long and, in some ways, dangerous. They even discounted the lessons that they should have learned in June, when their assumptions were disproven: The people didn't rise up and the Revolutionary Guards did not collapse with the killing of their leaders.
OM: On the Iranian side, what were the key miscalculations by the Iranian government in interpreting Israel's long-stated intentions? It's been years that Israelis have been threatening to attack the Iranians. They have threatened to strike nuclear facilities in Iran and to "cut off the head of the snake." How didn't the Iranian government see this coming? Or did they know this was coming?
VN: I think where the Iranian government's main mistakes happened is much earlier than either the June or the January war. First of all, they did not fully appreciate how deeply they were penetrated by Israeli intelligence, or even how deeply Hezbollah was penetrated. Particularly, in June, it was very difficult for them to defend against the level of penetration Israel had in terms of underground intelligence operations, even being able to launch drones from within Iran against targets.
Another mistake they made was that they over-relied on their proxies. That is, on Hezbollah in particular, but also on Syria, as basically being Iran's air defense system. I think one of the reasons that Iran had such a poor air defense system is because it always assumed there would be no attack, because Hezbollah and Syria would provide deterrence; that Israel would not attack them because Hezbollah could attack Israel. And this was a formula that had worked for decades. That's why Israel never attacked Iran sooner than now. And Hezbollah and Syria collapsed very quickly, which obviously have reasons of their own.
But once those two collapsed, Iran did not have a substitute, and still doesn't have a substitute, in terms of an air defense system. That is also one reason why Israel wants to finish the job with Iran, quote unquote, before Iran comes up with some substitute to the old order. So, I think Iran's miscalculation was, one, over-reliance on the defense that it had created in Lebanon and Syria, and then also not dealing with the intelligence penetration long enough.
I think when you come to June, and particularly to January, Iranians knew the war was coming. Particularly in February, they knew the war was coming. I don't think they were surprised that they were going to be attacked. But they couldn't do much about it because the holes that I just mentioned could not be filled very quickly.
In other words, you cannot create an air defense system in between the killing of Hassan Nasrallah [the former leader of Lebanese Hezbollah] and the June attack, and you cannot create a proper air defense system between June 2025 and February 2026. It's too short a time. They did some cleaning up on the intelligence side, but not enough. In other words, they still are unable to completely protect against Israel's ability to identify leaders' locations, et cetera, to attack.
The initial goal of collapsing the Islamic Republic "has likely not happened," and as costs rise, the United States may look for an "off-ramp," even as Israel's objectives remain broader.
- Vali Nasr
OM: Strategically, when Iran moved toward enriching uranium up to 60%, was it a mistake for them? I think they were trying to create leverage, but it turned out to be a liability. Was it the biggest mistake they made after Trump pulled out of the nuclear deal [the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; JCPOA] in 2018?
VN: Well, I think the mistake with the nuclear program is much bigger than that. And in fact, there are voices in Iran, particularly more hawkish hardline voices, the kind of people who are now in charge in Iran, who basically believe Ali Khamenei's nuclear doctrine was a massive mistake.
[They think] that going back to 2003, 23 years ago, he should have either abandoned the nuclear program there and then when it was discovered and was outed, or he should have gone for a bomb right away. Or even he shouldn't have developed the program in the way in which it was discovered, with a small number of centrifuges spinning in Natanz when the program was discovered at 119 centrifuges running. That from the very beginning, like Pakistan, like North Korea, like India, either he should have gone for a secret bomb right away, or he should have not done the nuclear program at all because, 23 years forward to 2025, say, the nuclear program cost Iran hundreds of billions of dollars to build.
And yes, they did learn a lot of technology and knowledge, et cetera. But all that it brought Iran was sanctions and now war. And in fact, in the two wars in June and February, the nuclear program is not defending Iran. It's not deterring an attack on Iran.
The only things that have worked for Iran are essentially its missiles and its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz. So, there is now a sort of a re-reading of the kind of nuclear doctrine that Ali Khamenei followed, which is: the program's above ground, we try to convince the West that it's civilian, maybe we enrich a little bit more to get leverage and then, when they come to the table, we get sanctions relief to do this and that. It never worked. And in fact, it collapsed spectacularly in 2025.
Even if they hadn't gone to 60%, it might not have averted war because fundamentally, it's not about the 60%. It's about Iran's capabilities. I mean, Israel, yes, and America, yes, they want Iran to hand over the 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium. But they also want Iran to basically give up the enrichment altogether. So, basically, go back to where it was in 2003 or even before 2003. So, you know, it may have accelerated things towards the end, but in reality, I think the nuclear doctrine basically is now, obviously with the benefit of hindsight, fundamentally flawed.
As I said, in a bigger sense, if you went back to 2003, the Islamic Republic had many problems. Not many, many problems, but its population was not as unhappy as they were in February of 2026. And when you sort of dispassionately look at how things went, and when they all of a sudden took a nosedive, you can trace it back to the maximum pressure sanctions.
That, from then on, even those social classes in Iran that were a bit apolitical — they didn't care particularly about hijab or politics, et cetera — even those became really, really angry and became very disenchanted and alienated from the Islamic Republic. So, you could say that even the Islamic Republic that it is today, with much greater poverty, with an enormous amount of social anger among its population, under war and still under massive sanctions, is a consequence of a problematic nuclear doctrine.
OM: The nuclear program, the missile program and the programs supporting proxy groups in the region — this entire security doctrine that the U.S. government public has created over the past few decades — this is not something people voted for, and people didn't have any representation in choosing this pathway for Iran. Now, with the dismantling of a good portion of the resistance groups in the region and the war inside Iran, with 10,000 targets in Iran hit, if the Islamic Republic survives this attack, this war, how is its relationship with the people going to look afterward?
After the January killings, as you said, it has created a lot of anger in society. Some people say that, for the Islamic Republic at this time, fighting with the United States, with the biggest or most advanced military in the world, is much easier than going back to the post-war reality and dealing with the Iranian people: the frustration, the anger and the lack of any prospect for a brighter future.
VN: I think all of these are true, particularly because the leadership that has now taken over Iran is much more hardline. I mean, it's not just that the IRGC rules over Iran; it's the most hawkish part of the IRGC that is ruling. It's not one monolith.
Somebody like General Zolgadhr, who took over as national security advisor, even within the spectrum of the IRGC, was viewed as a big extremist: somebody who was involved in the suppression of students in 1999, in the suppression of the Green Movement in 2006 and in the rigged election for Ahmadinejad in 2006. So, now he is Iran's national security advisor.
Or, even worse, somebody like Hossein Taib, who became head of IRGC intelligence after 2009, who was a heinous butcher. Even within the Islamic Republic, people detest and fear him. Even leaders of the Islamic Republic shun him. So, this person now is at the apex of power in Iran. None of that augurs well for the situation afterwards.
So, this is basically looking at the evidence that we have and projecting that these are the kind of people in charge. Although we don't know exactly how [new Supreme Leader and son of Ali Khamenei] Mojtaba Khamenei wants to rule Iran. You know, he does have choices. None of them may be good, but we also know very little about him personally — we know little bits here and there — but he's never governed directly on anything.
Now, I would say my sense, like yours, is that things are going to be very tough afterwards because politics returns in times of peace. Just like the January protests that happened six months after the June war, let's say six months after this war, there could potentially be a return to "Where is my bread? Where is my butter?" You know, "I want this, I want that. You have to give me this." And I don't think that the shadow of the January massacre is gone. So, it's very much still there.
At the same time, I think this war is gradually becoming so big for Iran, such a massive event in its history, that it's impossible to think that everything in Iran will not change after this. And by everything, I mean everything: from a massive change in the character of the Islamic Republic, to the Islamic Republic not being there at all in a year's time, to major changes in Iran's society in how people think about security, and a variety of other things.
So, I think, in a way, we always look at previous experience as a way of projecting analysis into the future. But in this particular instance, we might be facing scenarios that are not necessarily foreseen: major social revolution, major drastic change, major change of orientation in the leadership itself.
In other words, many different things are possible, and it's difficult to forecast because I think this war will ultimately have a massive impact on the country. You cannot have this kind of devastation to the country's infrastructure and economy and this kind of trauma that the people are going through — particularly in Tehran and some urban areas, with the bombing and witnessing what has happened to Iran — and assume that this will not be transformative for Iran.
OM: I want to move to the regional impact of the war. Many Gulf countries — Persian Gulf countries — have long feared that a U.S.-Israel attack on Iran could spill into their own territory. And some, like Saudi Arabia, had taken steps in recent years, I think in 2024 and 2025, to improve their relationship with Iran, and had stated before the war that they had nothing to do with it and didn't want to get involved. Now Iran has attacked most of these countries many times. How have Iran's recent attacks on these countries affected those relationships between Iran and countries in the region?
VN: I mean, right now, not well at all. There is an enormous amount of anger in the Gulf countries toward Iran, because they believe not only that Iran has attacked them and violated their territorial sovereignty, but actually has damaged their economies, particularly in the UAE, and to some extent Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where they had invested in future economies that rely heavily on the trust of the international community in the stability of the Gulf.
So, they are extremely angry. Yes, Iran says, "Well, the bases are there and therefore we had to target the bases," but this is not an argument that the Arabs accept. So, there is an enormous amount of anger. There are scenarios in which, let's say, they may join the war in a much bigger way, but that would have its own implications. I think once the war ends, there are certain realities they will have to live with.
One is that it is now very clear to the Gulf countries that the United States will not defend them, either against Israel or against Iran. It didn't protect them, and in fact, it doesn't even protect Gulf countries against each other. When Saudi Arabia and the UAE went after Qatar, the United States did not defend it. Then, when Israel attacked Qatar, the U.S. didn't defend it. And now that Iran is attacking Qatar, the U.S. is not defending it.
So, either it doesn't want to defend them, or it cannot defend them. Whichever way you interpret this, it means they now face a security dilemma. As much as they may be angry at Iran and dislike Iran, they still have to figure out how they are going to protect themselves. And if they no longer trust American bases or the U.S. to do it, they have to find another way.
So, some of them, like Saudi Arabia, may decide to go nuclear or to build or buy even more advanced weaponry. Some of them, like Qatar and Oman, may decide that they need to coexist with Iran. Qatar is already signaling that regardless of what Iran does. Ultimately, they are going to try to coexist with Iran. Some, like the UAE, are hoping that the United States will finish off Iran.
The bottom line is that they are still dealing with the same problem as before: They have an aggressive neighbor and they cannot trust the United States. So, they have to come up with other mechanisms for dealing with Iran. Some will probably try to engage Iran as a way of de-escalation post-war. Some will look to a military buildup and try to protect themselves. I think one outcome might be that there is no longer a single Gulf response to Iran. I mean, even the idea of the GCC — the Gulf Cooperation Council [composed of the six Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain] — as a unified front against Iran may not be viable in the future if the positions of these countries in relation to Iran diverge significantly.
A lot of it, Omid, also depends on how this war ends. Does it end with Iran in an assertive position in the Gulf? Or does it end with the U.S. forcing Iran to back off? All of this will affect how Gulf states calculate how to protect their economies.
But I would say that the priority for Gulf countries, particularly the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, must be stability. Because otherwise their economies won't recover. Airlines, insurance companies, expatriates and businesses are not going to return unless the Gulf returns to stability. So, the question becomes: How do you convince the international community that war will not return to the Gulf? I think that's going to be their highest priority.
OM: What is the worst-case scenario and the best-case scenario that can happen for Iran right now? To an extent, some people say it might go to a civil war, like what happened in Syria in 2016, with the U.S. arming opposition groups as the worst-case scenario. And the best-case scenario is that Iran basically engages, comes up with an agreement with the United States, engages in the global economy and has a U-turn when it comes to its foreign policy, internal politics and all that. In your eyes, what are the best-case and worst-case scenarios here?
VN: The worst-case scenarios that you mentioned were probably more likely early in the war, that the U.S. might arm the Kurds or the Baluch. I think that has now largely evaporated because the neighboring countries are not supportive: Turkey and Iraq with the Kurds, or Pakistan with the Baluchis. And actually, it became very clear that as soon as you talked about that, a lot of Iranians in the center became more worried about the disintegration of Iran than about the Islamic Republic. So, it actually strengthened the Islamic Republic.
I think it is possible Iran may end up in civil conflict if the Islamic Republic were to totally collapse and Iran would not have a government at all. But at this stage, as you and I are talking, the collapse of the Islamic Republic does not look close or imminent, despite the massive amount of bombing.
And the population, at least in the center, is not showing signs that it wants to politically go into the streets and fight against the Islamic Republic. In fact, I think the way the United States and Israel are now bombing Iran is actually having a counterproductive effect, with people becoming more nationalistic. I don't mean pro-regime, but nationalistic, and more worried about the future of the country than about politics, to put it that way.
So, I think there are really only two scenarios going forward now. One is that this war is going to get a lot worse: that President Trump, threatening to destroy Iran, "send it back to the Stone Age" or occupy an island or part of Iranian territory, could escalate this war into a much more vicious regional war.
The other is that the two sides decide that the time is right for them to actually engage, and the U.S. decides it is going to change the 15 points that it has put on the table, give more and ask less. And the Iranians also decide that it is time to cut a deal, that this is a better deal and they agree to give more and ask less as well.
You could then have negotiations that would bring the war to an end. Everything else that has to do with changes in politics, et cetera, in Iran would have to come after the war. I mean, this war at this stage is not going to solve Iran's political problems. It cannot do that at this level. Unless the United States were willing to put boots on the ground and go all the way to Tehran and change the regime, the war itself is not going to change the regime in Iran by itself. Not at this stage, and not at this level of intensity.
So, either it becomes much more violent against Iran — more destruction of industries, more cities, more universities, more damage to the country — or the war stops. It might not stop exactly where it is today, but at some point, say in two or three weeks, it could stop. And the stopping of the war may not mean the end. We might be back at war in six months, or even in three months. That depends on what happens. But I don't see other alternatives here unless some spectacular unknown event suddenly changes the direction of the war.
When you look at the shape of the war today, there are not many alternatives between escalation and talking. And if you are sitting in President Trump's position, those are the two choices before you. I mean, this is no Venezuela situation. Every time he talked about it, either the Israelis killed who he was going to talk to, or the Iranians would not come forward. The regime is not falling. So, he has only two options: Either he escalates, as he is threatening, or he talks. There is no third option right now.
OM: This last question is from a mutual friend, so I'm going to read it for you. You have predicted that the IRGC would welcome a war with Israel and America, as it would be the only way to obtain leverage to ensure no future wars and to negotiate from a position of some strength. What do you believe are the contours of a deal that could be reached?
VN: Well, I think the IRGC's thinking was that a long, costly war now is the best deterrence against future war. If the United States comes to the conclusion that this war was too costly, and Israel comes to the same conclusion, then perhaps in the future they may not say that all options are on the table. Although this is a very risky bet. I don't want to say it's working, but I think that's their assumption.
Also, if you look at this war, the longer it has gone on, the more strategic leverage they have found. On day one, day two, day three — when Khamenei was killed, when leaders of the Islamic Republic were killed — you didn't see any leverage in Iran's hands. But as the war went on, they closed the Strait of Hormuz, they attacked energy infrastructure in the Gulf and they created leverage in the Gulf, so that President Trump is now using four-letter words about an issue that didn't exist before the war.
The issue that is really animating him is not Iran's nuclear program: It's the Strait of Hormuz. That tells you that the Iranians established some kind of leverage that is now putting pressure on the president, which they didn't have before the war. And that kind of leverage becomes more effective with time because the longer the strait is closed, the more pressure builds on energy markets, et cetera. So, that's why a long war is beneficial to them.
But at the same time, I think the key issues for them and for the civilian leadership — let's say Mojtaba Khamenei, et cetera — are, first, that the war does not repeat. This cannot be a situation where every six months Iran's universities, industries, et cetera, are destroyed. So, they are looking for something close to a guarantee that war will not repeat. This is not just a ceasefire; this is an end of war.
Secondly, I think they want serious economic relief. Not only were they already under tremendous economic pressure, but now Iran has suffered hundreds of billions of dollars in war damage. That relief might come from tolling traffic through the Strait of Hormuz or from sanctions relief, but those are the kinds of things they are asking for.
Now, if you look at President Trump's 15-point plan, it is offering almost nothing on the economic front, and nothing on guarantees. It is basically saying: "You hand over everything — proxies, weapons, missiles, the Strait of Hormuz, everything — and we will lift international sanctions on Iran." Not U.S. sanctions, and not U.S. secondary sanctions, which are the main problem.
So, ultimately, there has to be somewhere in the middle, I think, for the Iranians to feel they are getting more than what is currently on the table, and for the U.S. to get some of what it wants as well. So, right now, the war itself is the negotiation. Each side is trying to force the other side to make more concessions and come to the table.
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
