Dr. Abdelkader Cheref is a Professor of Africana Studies at Southern Illinois University. As a former Fulbright scholar, he holds a PhD from the University of Exeter. His research interests are primarily politics in Africa, the MENA region, decolonial/postcolonial studies, Islam/Islamism and political violence.
In an unexpected move, U.S. President Donald Trump's special envoy, Steve Witkoff, claimed in an Oct. 21 interview that a "peace agreement" between Algeria and Morocco could be signed "within 60 days." Yet, while the announcement is presented as a realpolitik initiative, the reality is far murkier. Indeed, Trump's unusual approach appears aimed at engineering a regional de-escalation. Nonetheless, a fundamental question remains: Is Washington truly willing to disentangle this longstanding conflict—striking an improvised deal between Morocco and the Sahrawi people on the one hand, and between Rabat and Algiers on the other—or will it settle for another symbolic "peace?"
The conflict over Western Sahara dates back decades and is inseparable from similar territorial disputes across the Middle East and North Africa. As such, the 2020 Abraham Accords, signed between Israel and several Arabic-speaking countries, traded recognition of "Moroccan sovereignty" over Western Sahara for Morocco's normalization of relations with Israel. In this context, as the originator of the Accords, Trump now seeks another symbolic diplomatic win.
This effort triggered a recent U.S. draft resolution on Western Sahara, adopted on Oct. 31 in the form of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2797. This resolution endorses Morocco's 2007 autonomy plan for Western Sahara as the "most feasible solution," marking a significant milestone in its occupation of the territory and a major victory for Rabat. Importantly, a key component of the proposed peace deal aims at improving relations between Algeria and Morocco.
Any peace agreement crafted at the White House without the consent of the parties involved is likely to be short-lived
- Abdelkader Cheref
The resolution establishes a U.N.-sanctioned framework for the political aspects of the proposed peace deal. By supporting Morocco's autonomy plan as the most feasible path forward, the resolution aims to guide negotiations between Algeria and Morocco, both key parties in the long-standing Western Sahara conflict.
However, any peace agreement crafted at the White House without the consent of the parties involved is likely to be short-lived. While the unification of the Maghreb (North Africa) has been every Maghrebi's ideal for the last sixty years, the roots of the disagreement between Algeria and Morocco, let alone Rabat and the Sahrawi people, are age-old.
That story began during the 1963 Sand War, one year after Algeria achieved independence from France. Morocco and Algeria waged a war primarily over the Sahara Desert regions of Tindouf and Béchar (respectively 1,134 and 634 miles south of Algiers). The armed conflict stemmed from Morocco's claim to territories in southwest Algeria that had been arbitrarily defined during the colonial era.
While the war was brief and did not result in altered borders, and though it produced a peace treaty in 1964, the border dispute remains unresolved. That reality stems from deep-seated mistrust, animosity and rivalry between the two countries. Besides the exacerbated historical grievances, there is an undeniable geopolitical competition for regional leadership between the two countries.
But the straw that broke the camel's back is the central issue of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony in northwest Africa that Morocco claims as its sovereign territory. Algeria argues that it defends the right of peoples to self-determination under the auspices of the U.N. Charter and has so far armed, trained and funded the Polisario Front—a Sahrawi nationalist movement founded in 1973 that initially fought Spanish control. After Morocco and Mauritania partitioned the territory in 1976 after the end of the colonial period in 1975, the movement shifted to resistance against these countries.
However, hostilities between the Polisario Front and Mauritania ended when the latter, after a series of military defeats, signed a peace agreement with the Polisario in 1979. Nouakchott relinquished its claims to part of Western Sahara and withdrew its troops. Morocco then occupied the territory that Mauritania abandoned, shifting the conflict to one mostly between Morocco and the Polisario.
Denying the Sahrawi people their right to freely choose their future risks locking Western Sahara into a stalemate, where political frustration feeds on a feeling of abandonment.
- Abdelkader Cheref
While the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed the Sahrawi right to self-determination in 1975, a promised referendum has never been held. Morocco proposes autonomy rather than independence, via its autonomy plan. This contradicts the Polisario Front's 1976 declaration of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). While not unanimously recognized, the Polisario's goal remains self-determination for the Sahrawi people through a referendum, which was to be organized in 1991 by the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). That goal has faltered amid recognition issues and stalled negotiations with Morocco.
In this context, UNSCR 2797 coincides with a difficult context and deep fractures. The border between Algeria and Morocco has been closed since 1994 after a terrorist attack in Marrakech that Morocco blamed on Algerian operatives. Rabat subsequently imposed visa requirements on Algerian visitors. In response to Morocco's allegations, Algeria decided to close the border.
However, in August 2021, Algeria severed diplomatic relations with Morocco, accusing the latter of supporting separatist groups involved in Algerian wildfires and using Pegasus spyware against Algerian officials. Algiers also disrupted the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline that ran through Morocco to Spain in October 2021, cutting off critical energy supplies to Morocco.
With Rabat considered a close Western ally and Algeria's long-standing military partnership with Russia, the two countries have also been engaged in a fateful arms race. This has translated on the ground into Moroccan drone strikes against Polisario positions, alongside rocket attacks by the Polisario on Moroccan-administered areas in December 2021.
For millions of Maghrebis, tensions between two neighboring countries with common history, language, religion and culture come at a major geostrategic cost in a world where geopolitical blocs are consolidating. Intra-regional economic integration is mired down, stifling enormous human potential at a time of major technological and economic advancement that could define generations.
In this regard, UNSCR 2797 describes the Moroccan proposal as "the most realistic solution" without addressing the fundamental question undergirding the conflict: The still-unfinished process of decolonizing Western Sahara and the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination. It promises a quick solution at the expense of these rights and the possibility of sustainable peace.
For defenders of international law—mostly non-governmental organizations and countries in the Global South—this resolution sets a dangerous precedent. It transfigures a decolonization case formally recognized by the United Nations since 1963 into a bilateral political deal, sidelining the central role of the Sahrawi people as the only legitimate holders of the right to decide their destiny.
History reveals that justice is the only guarantor of lasting peace. Denying the Sahrawi people their right to freely choose their future risks locking Western Sahara into a stalemate, where political frustration feeds on a feeling of abandonment. The Personal Envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, emphasized this exact dynamic in a Nov. 5 press conference, arguing that any settlement to the half-century-old Western Sahara conflict must remain "political, mutually acceptable and based on the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination."
Trump's initiative conceals a logic of political and geoeconomic opportunism aimed at restoring Washington's influence in the Maghreb amid challenges from China, Russia and the European Union. Still, it could be a win-win situation for Algeria, Morocco and the rest of the Maghreb, should any resolution recognize the central issue at play: Western Sahara.
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
