Mira Al Hussein is an Emirati sociologist specializing in the Arab states of the Gulf. Her research focuses on state-society relations, citizenship, migration and women's rights in the region. She holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge.
"An Emirati is Saudi and a Saudi is Emirati" — a cheesy slogan once repeated by citizens of the former allied Gulf states — has now run its course. The rupture between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was a long time coming, requiring only a spark to ignite. Yet, as with their competition across the Middle East and Africa, not limited to Sudan and Yemen, the feud is leaving local communities out to dry.
Cracks within their alliance, formally announced in December 2017, started developing less than a year later. In May 2018, Abu Dhabi withdrew most of its soldiers from Yemen's Socotra following Saudi Arabia's intervention to defuse tensions between the Yemeni government and the UAE over the latter's unsolicited presence on the island. This moment would come to define the Saudi-Emirati relationship.
Yemen proved to be the primary point of unraveling. For Riyadh, the country represents both its strategic depth and border vulnerability. A unified, stable Yemen governed by a Saudi-friendly administration is a security imperative. Yemen's coastal ports are viewed as potential alternative export routes to mitigate any closure of the Strait of Hormuz should conflict break out in that corridor. Meanwhile, the UAE views Yemen as a strategic node in its expanding maritime empire, through which it rationalizes interventions across the Red Sea rim.
The Saudi-Emirati rivalry has evolved into a war of narratives in which Saudi Arabia is gaining the upper hand.
- Mira Al Hussein
Sudan serves as another node where fissures in the Saudi-Emirati relationship have become apparent. The roles of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in perpetuating and funding the war are well-documented. So is the military pipeline running between Sudan and Yemen. Weapons, fighters and funds traverse this route, previously characterized by Sudanese conscripts — including minors — sent to join the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. The militarization of disadvantaged Sudanese, whose short deployments provided both income and combat experience, simultaneously inflated the ranks of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of two primary actors in Sudan's civil war.
Today, the UAE stands accused of backing the RSF, who are implicated in systematic violence, sexual crimes and crimes against humanity amounting to genocide in El-Fasher and across south and west Sudan. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Abu Dhabi's entrenchment in the conflict began as it announced its withdrawal from Yemen in 2019, much to Riyadh's dismay.
After withdrawing, the UAE delegated its role in Yemen to allied militias it previously trained and equipped, including the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) previously affiliated with the official government's Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). That decision allowed it to redirect resources towards shaping the Sudanese revolution that ended the long-standing rule of former dictator Omar Al-Bashir. At the time, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi appeared aligned in Sudan, investing $3 billion in a joint fund for the country in 2021.
The RSF's withdrawal from Yemen alongside the UAE helped advance the divide, as Saudi Arabia increasingly backed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) ahead of Khartoum's power struggle with the RSF. The SAF's recommitment in 2022 to Riyadh's war effort in Yemen following the RSF's withdrawal likely furthered this dynamic.
An equally significant economic dimension deepens these fault lines, placing particular strain on Saudi Arabia. While the UAE's economic interests are dispersed and away from its immediate neighborhood, instability along Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast carries outsized economic risks. With nearly 2,000 km of coastline , Saudi Arabia faces the prospect of Emirati encirclement, given the UAE's geopolitical adventurism and its spillover effects.
Saudi Arabia is already grappling with economic stagnation caused by low oil prices, a persistent fiscal deficit and difficulties with flagship projects like NEOM. The economic rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could resurface in forums like the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), especially if a U.S.-Iran conflict upends the global oil regime. While much of the confrontation plays out indirectly abroad, coordinated efforts with allies have resulted in a soft blockade, denying airspace for Emirati cargo flights suspected of arms trafficking.
The debate surrounding Yemen and other areas of competition like Sudan has collapsed into a polarized contest between pro-Saudi and pro-UAE narratives
- Mira Al Hussein
In this context, the Saudi-Emirati rivalry has evolved into a war of narratives in which Saudi Arabia is gaining the upper hand. On Jan. 5, Saudi state-owned Al Ekhbariya, aired footage supposedly depicting a stockpile of weapons discovered in the Emirati Red Crescent building in Yemen's Hadhramaut — a repeated accusation against the UAE spanning years. In such reporting, Riyadh utilizes soft power media tools to imply that, while Abu Dhabi claims to have left Yemen, it continued to supply its local proxies and fuel ongoing conflict.
The information war against the UAE intensified amid swift Saudi mobilization to contain the STC's shock December 2025 offensive across south Yemen — a campaign likely driven from Abu Dhabi. To counter, the Saudis invited STC leaders to Riyadh to discuss a resolution to the "southern cause." However, contact with the delegation was soon lost.
Saudi Arabia then orchestrated a televised announcement by the STC delegation, in which Secretary General Abdulrahman al-Subaihi announced the group's dissolution. The moment was reminiscent of the Saudi kidnapping of former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, who resigned in a televised statement from Riyadh after being held hostage for weeks.
Compelling an invited delegation to announce its dissolution in a televised statement constitutes diplomacy through coercion. The move violates principles of sovereignty and diplomatic inviolability, contravening the human rights of those subjected to duress.
Incidentally, STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi failed to travel to Riyadh, with a Yemeni delegation accusing the UAE of smuggling him to Abu Dhabi via Somaliland. When Emirati officials denied the allegations, Saudi Arabia produced evidence. The incident marked an unusual disclosure of surveillance operations through which Saudi Arabia not only tracked al-Zubaidi's movements, but intercepted conversations with the Emirati officer organizing his escape.
Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE are known for using spyware and surveillance technology against political dissidents. This moment may, however, be the first instance of a Gulf country publicly acknowledging and sharing damaging information gathered against another. The extent of this disclosure is unprecedented, reflecting a potential evolution in regional competition beyond this incident.
Riyadh's media campaign intensified over weeks, with Saudi media broadcasting segments on secret UAE prisons in Yemen, detailing accounts of torture, enforced disappearances and assassinations. BBC was given access to detention facilities located on former Emirati military bases, corroborating previous investigations. Yet Saudi Arabia's awareness of them and decision to remain silent, thereby allowing injustice to continue, amount to complicity.
While the UAE denies the allegations, neither Riyadh nor Abu Dhabi seek an independent, U.N.-mandated investigation. The absence of any discussion on accountability and justice suggests that investigations could harm their interests, potentially implicating one or both. This dynamic highlights how such state-to-state competition produces crimes and horrors largely felt by those unlucky enough to experience them in those parts of the world deemed acceptable for such wrangling.
In this regard, the debate surrounding Yemen and other areas of competition like Sudan has collapsed into a polarized contest between pro-Saudi and pro-UAE narratives. The former rationalizes intervention as a necessary trade-off in favor of imperfect stability, while the latter embraces a risk-heavy strategy aimed at pre-emptively remaking political realities, accepting and normalizing political fractures through extreme levels of violence. Amid the chaos, Yemeni and Sudanese voices are stifled, displaced by external narratives and regional power struggles.
The resulting erosion of the international human rights framework and the so-called rules-based international order is evident across multiple theaters, from Gaza to Sudan and Yemen. In these contexts, leaders abandon the language of accountability and transitional justice, favoring stabilization or state failure as geopolitical competition resulting in horrific crimes receives, at best, a slap on the wrist. This approach coercively freezes conflicts without addressing their root causes or delivering meaningful redress to victims as states aim to achieve their interests at all costs.
Much of the current analysis on Yemen and Sudan focuses on the broader Saudi-UAE struggle for regional influence, the shaping of a new regional security architecture and its implications for international trade. Meanwhile, places like Yemen and Sudan teeter on the brink of catastrophe — part of a larger crisis that, like accountability and justice, receives minimal attention at the expense of innocent life.
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
