Karim al-Yemani is the pseudonym for a researcher and reporter from Yemen, whose real name is not being used given the security situation in Yemen.
In early December 2025, Yemen's Southern Transitional Council (STC) seized two provinces in the country's east, Al-Mahra and Hadramout, in an unprecedented military operation constituting the most significant singular event in the country's civil conflict since the Houthi truce with the International Recognized Government (IRG) and its Gulf backers in 2022. Indeed, this moment represents a major step in a long-running trend for the IRG, in which stability has worsened over the course of the decade-long conflict. Yet while the IRG's authority and legitimacy have severely shrunk—moving toward political irrelevance—U.S. indifference represents a major factor in this decline.
The IRG has fared poorly across the military, political and economic fronts during the war. As such, its authority has disappeared in the north and has increasingly shrunk in the south amid a complicated mosaic of often competing armed factions constituting the anti-Houthi bloc. The north—except for the districts Taiz and Marib—has been under the control of the heavily-armed Houthi group since they toppled the government in Sana'a in 2015.
In this context, the STC—a southern secessionist faction aligned with the United Arab Emirates—moved to increase its power, influence and territorial holdings in early December. The government quickly lost control of ports, airports, military headquarters and vital public institutions across the south, with at least 32 dead and 45 wounded in its ranks in Hadramout. The IRG's authority was nearly eliminated as its forces handed over their positions after a brief clash with the STC in Hadramout and Al-Mahra. The remainder of the southern provinces had been under the control of the STC for years, including the presidential palace in Aden, the south's de facto capital.
For years, the separatists have struggled for an independent state in the south, and their military escalation in December was an extension of that struggle. The STC leadership believed that its control of territories would quicken the foundation of a separate country in south Yemen.
Riyadh's involvement effectively prevented the government's complete eclipse in the south. Still, many questions regarding the future remain.
- Karim al-Yemani
Thus, the STC appeared to be in the driver seat. However, a pivotal and slightly surprising development followed. Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes targeting the separatists in Hadramout and Al-Mahra in late December 2025 and early January 2026, enabling IRG forces to reassert authority in these provinces. Then, on Jan. 7, Saudi and PLC forces moved on Aden and much of the south amid a widespread STC reorganization and its leader, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, reportedly fleeing the country as conflicting statements from senior officials of the group suggest it could or could not be disbanding.
With these moves, the government has somewhat revived its clout in South Yemen after almost a decade of fragility. Riyadh's involvement effectively prevented the government's complete eclipse in the south. Still, many questions regarding the future remain.
In no small part, the fate of Yemen's IRG having become a peripheral question in U.S. foreign policy—especially in recent years—led to this moment. Washington's engagement has been largely limited to rhetorical backing and routine diplomatic meetings with Yemeni government representatives. Any substantive political or strategic American commitment remains intangible.
Researchers and Yemeni citizens argue that this American posture is unlikely to restore the government's authority in the entire south, let alone facilitate any meaningful advance into the Houthi-dominated north.
Mohammed Al-Kathiri, a resident of Hadramout, believes that regional and international powers—particularly the United States—have effectively abandoned the IRG. "Without the American approval or nonchalance, the separatists would not have advanced into government-controlled territories, nor would they have dared to kill dozens of pro-government soldiers," Al-Kathiri told Democracy in Exile.
He argued that the current U.S. administration appears primarily concerned with the stability of the Bab al-Mandeb Straight and the safe passage of commercial shipping off Yemen's coast. "Events across the deserts, cities and mountains of Yemen are of little concern to Washington," Al-Kathiri said.
Naef, a pro-government soldier in Hadramout, blames Washington and Riyadh for their lack of a viable strategy to end the war in Yemen or empower the IRG to assert dominance. If the United States truly regards the Yemeni government as a legitimate authority, Naef said, it should provide meaningful diplomatic and military support.
In no small part, the fate of Yemen's IRG having become a peripheral question in U.S. foreign policy—especially in recent years—led to this moment.
- Karim al-Yemani
"Yet, if it considers this government ineffective and Yemen's unity irreparably ruined, it can support a referendum on southern independence and leave the north for the Houthis. People are exhausted by this endless chaos," Naef told Democracy in Exile.
Although the U.S. embassy to Yemen continues to express support for the IRG, analysts say words alone cannot address the formidable challenges facing the war-torn country. Bridget Toomey, a research analyst at the Washington, D.C.-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and close Yemen watcher, has urged Washington to engage all parties, including the southern forces, in the fight against the Iran-backed Houthis and in countering AQAP.
"The Trump administration should encourage both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to prioritize stability in Yemen and to maintain focus on the fight against the Houthis," she concluded.
April Longley Alley, a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, indicated that the recent expansion of the separatists in South Yemen made the country "more combustible," while Washington continues to disengage. For her, this approach does not serve American interests. "The U.S. ignores Yemen at its peril…The administration has also largely stepped away from supporting the government of Yemen and providing diplomatic leadership to end the civil war."
Alley emphasized the need for recommitting serious American attention to Yemen, arguing, "Most urgently, the administration must press Saudi Arabia and the UAE to quickly de-escalate tensions in the south and come to a common approach to Yemen."
At the grassroots level in both northern and southern Yemen, many view the IRG as an "irreparable military and political body," according to Faisal Nasser, a political science graduate in Sana'a. He told Democracy in Exile that neither the United States nor Saudi Arabia appear to have confidence in the viability of this fragile government.
"It has failed in politics, war and the economy. It lacks vision, and its leaders are opportunistic, prioritizing their self-interests. This government has not recovered in a decade, and its victory now seems far-fetched," Nasser said.
He does not hold Washington or any other regional power solely responsible for the incompetence of the IRG, recognizing how poor governance played a major role. However, "I blame the U.S. for leaving Yemen disintegrated, in chaos and without effective leadership for a decade," he argued.
"It has been a gross failure in peacemaking. This has deepened the suffering of the populace," Nasser concluded.
As a global military, political and economic power, the United States could have played a more effective and active role in advancing peace in Yemen. However, solutions that were practical yesterday may become infeasible tomorrow, further limiting options for a sound, or even reasonable, end to the conflict.
These missed opportunities for peace can quickly foster insecurity, presenting increasingly grave consequences for the country and the wider region. As Yemen's conflict grows more complex, the United States continues to look on from afar as the situation worsens, at significant expense to the region and broader international community.
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
