Nikola Mikovic is a freelance journalist, researcher and political analyst based in Serbia. His work focuses on geopolitical developments across the post-Soviet space, the Balkans, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, with particular attention to Russian foreign policy. His articles have appeared in various international outlets, including the South China Morning Post, CGTN, The Times of Central Asia, the Lowy Institute, the Diplomatic Courier, and Byline Times, among others.
Where two are fighting, the third wins. Although preoccupied with the war in Ukraine — now in its fifth year — Russia aims to benefit from the ongoing conflict between the United States and Israel against Iran. But how realistic are the Kremlin's ambitions? Moscow likely seeks to use the situation around Iran — at least temporarily — as a counterweight in balancing its relations with the United States. In this game, energy appears to matter more than potential territorial gains in Ukraine.
Energy has traditionally been one of the major drivers or Russia's foreign policy. The American and Israeli military campaign against the Islamic Republic has produced a significant rise in oil prices, with most benchmarks over $100 per barrel. Russian Urals crude is no exception to this spike. It is, therefore, not surprising that Russian President Vladimir Putin has called on the country's energy companies to take advantage of the current situation in the Middle East. He has simultaneously signaled Moscow's willingness to resume oil and gas exports to Europe — Russia's major market until its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
The Kremlin undoubtedly hopes that Washington will continue to ease oil sanctions on Russia to help curb the surge in global energy prices.
- Nikola Mikovic
At the same time, the Kremlin undoubtedly hopes that Washington will continue to ease oil sanctions on Russia to help curb the surge in global energy prices. According to Alexander Frolov, Deputy Director of the Russian Institute of National Energy, such a move would allow Russia to reap significant gains, boosting revenues and strengthening the federal budget. In his view, Washington thinks it is "better to ease sanctions temporarily now, rather than wait for other countries to violate them, as that would weaken the credibility of U.S. restrictions."
Although the United States issued a 30-day waiver for countries to buy sanctioned Russian oil and petroleum products, there is no guarantee that the European Union will follow suit, following years of restrictions it imposed on Moscow over its actions in Ukraine. On the contrary, several European states reportedly plan to significantly disrupt Russia's shadow fleet, aiming to prevent Moscow from exporting oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). If reports that Ukraine was behind the recent naval drone attack on a Russian LNG tanker in the Mediterranean between Libya and Malta are true, it is unlikely that Kyiv and its European allies will allow Russia to profit from the global oil crisis.
Moreover, the fact that oil prices are rising does not necessarily suggest that the Russian economy — despite 30% of the federal budget coming from oil and gas tax revenues — will experience tangible gains. Like the rest of the world, fuel prices are soaring in Russia regardless of oil reserves, which constitute some of the world's largest. That dynamic is occurring as the country's economy is experiencing significant stagnation.
What could potentially help the Russian budget increase revenues is a rise in oil exports to China — currently the largest buyer of Russian crude and fossil fuels overall — but only if Moscow stops supplying oil to Beijing at discounted prices. However, if oil prices begin to fall, and should hostilities in the Middle East end, Russia cannot count on any benefits to materialize as of now.
As long as Tehran absorbs U.S. attention and resources, it diverts focus from other global arenas where Moscow has more direct stakes.
- Nikola Mikovic
Politically, the Kremlin has shown no signs of trying to leverage the U.S. preoccupation in the Middle East to achieve any strategic goals in Ukraine. After massive missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure last winter, which triggered nationwide blackouts, Kyiv has managed to stabilize the situation, indicating a reduction in Russian attacks. Paradoxically, it is the Ukrainian Armed Forces, rather than the Russian military, that seems to be utilizing the Iran war to secure at least some tactical gains.
Russia, for its part, remains passive — both politically and militarily. It is not taking decisive steps that could secure at least some of its strategic objectives in Ukraine. Instead, the Kremlin seems to be waiting for U.S. President Donald Trump and his team, acting as a de facto mediator, to arrange a new round of talks between Moscow, Kyiv and Washington.
While Iran — Russia's strategic partner — rules out renewed negotiations with the United States following the recent escalation and the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Kremlin has repeatedly stressed that it remains open to dialogue with Washington over the war in Ukraine. Although Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently warned that the United States "will not stop at Venezuela, Cuba and Iran," Moscow does not appear overly concerned that it could be the next target.
What seems to worry Russia at this stage is a potential escalation of the Iran war and Azerbaijan's possible involvement. Although such a scenario currently appears unlikely, a direct military conflict between Baku and Tehran would almost certainly disrupt supply chains across the Caspian Sea — a strategic and rapidly growing trade artery for both Russia and Iran. Given Moscow's role as the world's largest wheat exporter and as a major grain supplier to Iran, it would stand to lose a great deal in the event of a further escalation of the war or the collapse of the Islamic Republic.
Yet despite these ties, the Kremlin could be turning a blind eye as the United States and Israel conduct what the White House has described as "major combat operations" in Iran. Not only did Moscow refrain from supplying weapons to Iran before the American and Israeli military campaign, but it also remains unclear whether the Islamic Republic is really receiving intelligence from Russia.
At the same time, Moscow may see some strategic upside in Iran's confrontation with Washington. As long as Tehran absorbs U.S. attention and resources, it diverts focus from other global arenas where Moscow has more direct stakes. In the calculus of great power politics, such a distraction can carry significant value. In this context, the Kremlin seems to be relying on its old strategy of treating Iran as a bargaining chip in dealings with Washington, restraining support for Tehran in exchange for potential sanctions relief. Such an approach, however, could backfire.
If the United States and Israel achieve their objectives in the Islamic Republic, a postwar Iran could ultimately view the West — not Moscow — as its main geopolitical orientation. But even if they do not, Tehran is unlikely to count on Russia as a reliable partner, given the Kremlin's flip-flopping on their partnership at existential moments for the country.
Yet Iran's room for maneuver remains limited. Despite clear mistrust, its relationship with Russia has long been shaped less by confidence than by converging interests. As a regional power, the Islamic Republic is aligning pragmatically with the Russian Federation — widely perceived as a great power — to offset external pressure. In that sense, Tehran may have little real alternative but to continue engaging Moscow, even while recognizing the limits of its reliability.
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
