In late April, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas delivered a strong public attack against Hamas, accusing the group of dragging Palestinians into a catastrophic war. He referred to them with a derogatory term, demanding the release of the remaining Israeli captives in Gaza. The speech was not merely a political statement but a calculated signal to Washington, Brussels and key Arab regimes: The PA remains their best hope for restoring governance and curbing armed resistance in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).
While Abbas's efforts reflect his desire for the PA to return to the Gaza Strip—a path likely requiring force—it also highlights the limited confidence in the PA's current leadership. By publicly embracing this vision and framing Hamas as the primary obstacle to stability amid ongoing factionalism in the Palestinian political space, Abbas attempts to position himself as a responsible interlocutor. Yet the need to broadcast such appeals reveals a deep fragility.
The PA has not governed Gaza since 2007. Its institutions are crumbling. Its domestic legitimacy is at an all-time low.
Abbas' remarks come on the heels of a regional proposal unveiled in March by Egypt. The framework includes a $53 billion reconstruction initiative and a six-month transitional period led by a technocratic, non-partisan committee explicitly excluding both Hamas and the PA.
As regional and international actors design a future post-genocide Gaza without much input from Palestinians themselves, Abbas is maneuvering to re-establish himself as an indispensable Palestinian interlocutor. But the performative trappings of legitimacy cannot conceal a clear reality: In the occupied West Bank, where the PA ostensibly holds power, the situation has sharply deteriorated since Oct. 7, 2023.
Israel has intensified its military raids, illegal settlements have expanded unchecked and mass arrests have surged. According to reports by Al-Jazeera, more than 1,000 Palestinians have been killed in the occupied West Bank since Oct. 7.
Complicating the landscape further is the reemergence of Mohammad Dahlan, an exiled Fatah figure with UAE backing and closely aligned with Egypt and Israel. According to Israel's Channel 12, and cited by Middle East Monitor, Israeli officials are actively considering a role for Dahlan in Gaza's future—potentially even in absentia. For states like Israel, the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Dahlan represents a loyal, pragmatic alternative as a vehicle for managing Gaza in line with their geopolitical interests.
Abbas is maneuvering to re-establish himself as an indispensable Palestinian interlocutor. But the performative trappings of legitimacy cannot conceal a clear reality: In the occupied West Bank, where the PA ostensibly holds power, the situation has sharply deteriorated since Oct. 7, 2023.
- Dalia Ismail
Abbas's attack on Hamas is part of a broader strategy that includes the PA's repressive policies in the occupied West Bank. That approach is aimed not just at Gaza, but at suppressing dissent and reinforcing the PA's standing with foreign powers at a time when domestic authority is eroding.
In this context, the Palestinian Authority has orchestrated crackdowns in the occupied West Bank—especially in Jenin, a longstanding hub of resistance. Mirroring Israeli tactics, the PA has launched raids targeting local resistance fighters, causing significant harm to civilians.
In one tragic incident, PA security forces killed 21-year-old journalist Shatha Al-Sabbagh, who was accompanying her two young nephews to buy sweets when a bullet struck her in the head. Israeli forces killed her brother, Motasem, in the same camp just a year earlier. At her burial, their mother, overwhelmed by grief, cried that she had no one left.
These results cause many Palestinians to view the PA less as a governing body than an extension of the Israeli occupation. Dissent is punished, pro-resistance sentiments are criminalized and a climate of fear pervades Palestinian communities. In trying to prove to Israel and the United States that it can manage the occupied West Bank, the PA has only deepened its estrangement from the people it claims to represent. Meanwhile, leaders in Washington and Tel Aviv demand more, taking harsher stances against the governing entity.
While Mahmoud Abbas may wish to regain control over Gaza, he is unlikely to be successful. The PA has not controlled Gaza since Hamas won the 2006 elections and lost the subsequent Hamas-Fatah civil war in 2007. A return to Gaza enforced by foreign actors, without broad public mandate and on the back of Israeli tanks would almost certainly be seen as illegitimate—both in Gaza and the occupied West Bank.
Unfortunately, that foreign influence increasingly shapes Palestinian political leadership today, rather than by grassroots consensus. In this context, Abbas's speech is less a position of leadership and more an audition—an attempt to prove to Western backers that he remains a cooperative, manageable partner. What remains absent from his vision, however, is any real concern for democratic representation, national unity or genuine accountability.
At 89, Abbas is not just unpopular. He has become the symbol of Palestinian political decay. There is no clear succession process, no functioning legislature and no path towards national elections. While Hamas, despite its own legitimacy challenges, continues to draw support through its role in violently resisting occupation and genocide, the PA has become synonymous with stagnation and subservience.
By casting Hamas as the lone obstacle to peace, Abbas seeks to deliberately ignore the PA's crisis of legitimacy by shifting the conversation to Hamas. Rather than pursue reform or inclusive governance, the PA embraces its role as an enforcer of international interests—even at the expense of its people.
The absence of elections is not an accident but a defining example of this dynamic. Both the PA and Israel have repeatedly obstructed the democratic process. In 2021, Abbas cancelled long-awaited Palestinian legislative and presidential elections, citing Israel's refusal to allow voting in occupied East Jerusalem. Many observers viewed this as a calculated move to avoid a likely electoral defeat to Hamas or rival Fatah factions, with significant foreign influence involved in advancing the decision to postpone.
As global powers debate who should govern Gaza after the genocide, the most pressing question is not just "Who can govern," but "Who should govern?" Until Palestinians are allowed to answer that question through free democratic elections, no leadership will carry true legitimacy.
