John Ramming Chappell is a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for International Policy, where he focuses on human rights, armed conflict and U.S. foreign policy. John previously worked at Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), where he led advocacy campaigns on atrocity prevention in Palestine, Sudan, maritime Latin America and elsewhere.
Akbar Shahid Ahmed's new book, "Crossing the Red Line: Biden, His Advisors and Israel's War in Gaza," is the first detailed account of the decisions that made the United States complicit in Israel's atrocities in Gaza and Lebanon. Reporting intimate details on former U.S. President Joe Biden's administration during and after Oct. 7, 2023, Ahmed highlights how American actions toward Israel enabled atrocities against Palestinians and Lebanese, setting a clear precedent: "The next bloodbath will be easier to normalize."
The book centers on the Biden administration's policy of unconditional support for Israel amid its genocide. In this colossal undertaking, Ahmed explains how the United States became complicit in Israel's unspeakable horrors in Gaza and identifies which administration figures were primarily responsible.
The book distinguishes itself among its peers by relying on extensive interviews with people who directly participated in or witnessed the U.S. policy process. Having extensively covered the war in Gaza as the Huffington Post's senior diplomatic correspondent, Ahmed draws upon interviews with more than 100 administration officials, legislators, advocates, experts, Palestinian and Lebanese civilians and others to illustrate how Biden's policy developed and failed.
Ahmed's account scrutinizes a policy framework defined by incompetence and callousness, describing U.S. policy on Gaza as a "moral and strategic failure, but not a master plan."
- John Ramming Chappell
Ahmed's account scrutinizes a policy framework defined by incompetence and callousness, describing U.S. policy on Gaza a "moral and strategic failure, but not a master plan." At every critical moment, Washington failed to use its immense leverage over the Israeli government to end the genocide.
The spring of 2024 marks a crucial moment in this narrative. Following Biden's infamous "red line" for Rafah, aimed at blocking an Israeli invasion of the southern Gaza city that had become a humanitarian hub, Israeli forces struck a World Central Kitchen convoy, killing an American citizen and six other aid workers. The administration proceeded to halt a shipment of bombs to Israel, but quickly softened its positions amid mounting political pressure. It then submitted a mandated report to Congress concluding that U.S. law did not require an arms transfer suspension to Israel, despite congressional and expert findings to the contrary.
That decision-making process would repeat itself. As Ahmed highlights, among U.S. foreign policy decisionmakers, dissent was discouraged, assessments of Israeli misconduct were watered down and dehumanization of Palestinians was widespread. "Crossing the Red Line" reveals how a small inner circle of advisors in the U.S. National Security Agency and State Department micromanaged Gaza policy while shutting out expert assessments, refusing to use the most potent tool available to end the genocide: suspending weapons deliveries. Biden deferred excessively to this inner circle, placing his longstanding personal commitment to Israel before action to save Palestinian lives or respect international law.
The predispositions and biases of these American policy elites are central to the book. Heavily informed by socialization in and around Washington, D.C., the people and institutions who shaped and maintained Biden's Gaza policy formed their views through the United States' post-9/11 wars, yet seemingly learned few lessons from them. In many instances, they clearly misunderstood the failings of American excess and impunity.
As one insider said of Brett McGurk, a deputy assistant to Biden and the National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa: "Do you learn from your mistakes if you keep being hired because of your mistakes?"
In that sense, the book offers a much-needed performance review of several foreign policy elites intent on returning to power, making it especially timely. While Biden's career has ended, his appointees will soon pitch their services to presidential hopefuls ahead of the 2028 presidential election. Hopefully, those candidates will review the index of this book to see how they fared.
As Ahmed highlights, among U.S. foreign policy decision-makers, dissent was discouraged, assessments of Israeli misconduct were watered down and dehumanization of Palestinians was widespread.
- John Ramming Chappell
Many are exposed in the accounts of their colleagues upon which "Crossing the Red Line" relies. As they recall, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, McGurk and Biden quickly pursued a blank-check policy of support for Israel's genocide. They avoided drawing conclusions as to whether the Israeli military violated international law. According to the book, McGurk consistently pursued personal vanity projects like Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia as Israel's atrocities in Gaza raged.
Other figures may be less familiar. Mira Resnick of the State Department's arms transfers bureau — empowered by her boss, Jessica Lewis — forced weapons sales to Israel and stymied accountability efforts, including by spearheading opposition to congressional efforts to block sales. Israeli officials insisted on discussing their war crimes investigation with Resnick, who displayed awards from the Israeli government in her office. Likewise, Uzra Zeya, who oversaw the human rights, humanitarian and international justice bureaus at the State Department and now leads the non-profit Human Rights First, discouraged her teams from "internal critiques of the U.S.-Israeli approach to the war" and blocked efforts to implement U.S. laws conditioning arms sales on humanitarian access. The U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Jack Lew, justified arms sales to Israel with perfunctory risk assessments that whitewashed humanitarian access concerns.
Other officials covered in Ahmed's book are those who saw the administration's Gaza policies fail but chose to remain. USAID Administrator Samantha Power, U.N. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield and Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer criticized the U.S. approach while repeatedly and willingly quelling opposition. They retained their roles by softening criticism, thereby maintaining access and, of course, safeguarding their careers.
Ahmed avoids telling his readers how they should judge these people. Yet in reading his account, I asked myself: Where were their red lines? What would it have taken for them to resign and speak out publicly? I recall a line from Omar El Akkad's book, "One Day Everyone Will Have Always Been Against This," where he writes, "The moral component of history, the most necessary component, is simply a single question asked over and over again: when it mattered, who sided with justice and who sided with power?"
Many did choose justice, as "Crossing the Red Line" covers in detail. Ahmed discusses how congressional leaders like Sen. Chris Van Hollen, Sen. Bernie Sanders and Rep. Joaquin Castro pressed the administration to grapple with reality and end arms sales to Israel. He recounts Abbas Alawieh and Layla El Abed of the Uncommitted Movement and their warnings to the Democratic Party establishment of the depth of voters' disillusionment with the administration's approach. Several individuals who publicly resigned from administration roles in protest feature prominently.
"Crossing the Red Line" is not a polemic, nor is it intended to be. It is a remarkable, first-of-its-kind account of some of the greatest moral failures in recent U.S. foreign policy. For anyone who watched in horror as American bombs wiped out families in Gaza, this book explains how it happened and who made it possible. For aspiring foreign policy professionals contemplating government careers, it is a cautionary tale of how civil service can veer into war crimes complicity. And for those advising presidential aspirants on their personnel picks as Gaza has become a defining political and moral issue of our time, this book is a performance review for those vying to return to power.
As Ahmed writes, "Biden and his top aides oversaw disaster and then lost power, but few were humbled by the experience."
Ahmed does not shy away from identifying trends or drawing critical conclusions, yet his journalistic discipline will make the book difficult for even Washington power players to ignore. In this sense, one question echoes throughout the book: When it comes to picking people to make policy and hold power, where is your "red line?"
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
