In light of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and Israel's growing military and diplomatic superiority—bolstered by American and Western support—Palestinian factions now face a decisive crossroads regarding their future inside and outside Palestine. Although Hamas has governed the Gaza Strip since 2007, the latest devastating war with Israel suggests the group is unlikely to resume governance in the same form. Where it and other Palestinian factions stand moving forward across the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) is equally in question.
The Sharm El-Sheikh Agreement, finalized on Oct. 9 to establish a ceasefire and initiate the first phase of a broader U.S.-backed peace plan, marks a potential turning point but does not constitute a definitive end to the war. The agreement includes a prisoner exchange, a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces to a "mutually agreed line" and a commitment to open Gaza's crossings for large-scale humanitarian aid. However, the agreement does not guarantee a full Israeli withdrawal, nor does it clearly resolve the question of Gaza's future governance or Hamas's role in it—issues that remain deeply contested among all parties involved.
Militarily, Hamas is significantly weakened after nearly two years of continuous fighting. The tightened blockade has obstructed arms smuggling, while Israel's widespread destruction of infrastructure and tunnels has severely limited local weapons production. Hamas fighters have largely engaged in defensive guerrilla operations in recent months.
With this new agreement, Hamas and other resistance factions face a dual challenge: Ensuring that Israel fully complies with its commitments under international and regional supervision and redefining their political and administrative role in Gaza. That role is currently in flux, with questions of participation or withdrawal dictating the group's future in the broader Palestinian landscape.
Thus, Gaza's future governance, Hamas's political standing and the balance between international pressure, Arab involvement, internal Palestinian divisions and the evolving military reality all remain uncertain and open to multiple scenarios.
Gaza's future governance, Hamas's political standing and the balance between international pressure, Arab involvement, internal Palestinian divisions and the evolving military reality all remain uncertain and open to multiple scenarios.
- Ahmed AbdelHalim
In the occupied West Bank, where the Israeli army has continued its military operations against multiple armed factions since before Oct. 7, the fighting has intensified. Resistance groups in the Nur Shams, Tulkarm and Jenin camps, among other pockets of resistance, do not possess heavy weapons. Moreover, Israel is repeating a similar Gaza strategy in the West Bank, demolishing homes, displacing tens of thousands and arresting thousands of young men—all forms of collective punishment. Israel has targeted and killed many young fighters who led operations against Israeli security forces in the West Bank, weakening Hamas and other aligned armed factions like Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the territory.
The Palestinian Authority's (PA) action and inaction further stymied violent resistance in the West Bank—a long-running issue that many argue equates to collaboration with Israel. For its critics, this proves that the PA has no future in improving the Palestinian situation, governing the state of Palestine or resisting the expansion and dominance of the Israeli occupation.
The PA, long dominated by the Fatah faction under President Mahmoud Abbas and other officials, such as recently appointed Vice President Hussein Al-Sheikh, has opposed most attempts to reform the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) after Oct. 7 meant to make the body more inclusive of other factions. For these actions, it continues to see a massive drop-off of support amid the Palestinian polity.
The Palestinian factions lack any presence outside of the OPT that could seriously influence the situation on the ground. To be sure, major factions in Lebanese camps affiliated with Fatah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Islamic Jihad previously held significant roles. However, the real influence of these factions has gradually diminished since the PLO departed Beirut in 1982 and since the Taif Agreement of the early 1990s.
Following these agreements, the features of the Lebanese state were defined under consociationalism—a system divided along sectarian lines among the Lebanese people. Any Palestinian remnants within the camps were largely neutralized, with today's disarmament campaign completing that effort. A statement from the Lebanese Defense Council affirmed the new reformist government's stance, warning that it would not allow any armed actions on Lebanese soil, referring to acts carried out by Palestinians or Lebanese against Israel.
The overarching context for Palestinian factions is ultimately bleak, meaning Palestine's political direction as it relates to political representation faces a serious inflection point.
- Ahmed AbdelHalim
In parallel, repressive Arab regimes increasingly refuse to allow Palestinian activities—especially political work—within their territories. Pro-Palestine actions in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria are increasingly unwelcome. The only country that has sponsored both Hamas's political and military presence and helped it survive is Iran. But now, after receiving significant and impactful blows to its proxies and itself from American and Israeli strikes, it has withdrawn to repair the damage inflicted over the past two years.
That leaves Hamas's formal and informal political representation limited to a few countries: Qatar, Turkey, Iran and Algeria. Yet this representation is also fraying due to Israeli assassinations of Hamas's senior political leadership in some of these and third countries, including Gaza. Those connections may further weaken after the war ends, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pledging to strike the group's leaders wherever they are after illegally and dangerously striking Qatar's capital of Doha, attempting to wipe out the group's leaders. American and regional pressure to restrict Hamas's political representation only worsens this dynamic for the group.
Beyond the Middle East, the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and other parts of the world lacks any real political organization. Some small groups might be active—specifically in Europe, where there is more freedom for cultural work—and their activities include solidarity events with Gaza and the Palestinian cause in general. There are also groups working to revive Palestinian heritage, raise funds and monitor Israeli violations. But oftentimes, these efforts are symbolic or detached from higher-level politics, constituting cultural, human rights and financial dimensions—not political actions in a direct sense.
In this situation, leading Palestinian political organizations—especially Hamas—face a fragile reality amid major challenges. Internally, it is very difficult to reform the PLO because of Fatah's control over it and Israel's grip over Fatah itself. The PA serves the occupation's dominance and has become a burden on the Palestinian cause, as many newer but relatively insignificant factions have long argued in their calls for reform.
One notable example of these smaller, alternative factions is the Palestinian National Initiative. Founded in 2002 under the leadership of Mustafa Barghouti, it emerged as a political movement seeking to offer a "third way" between Fatah and Hamas. It is grounded in the principles of democracy, social justice and peaceful popular resistance, representing a reformist voice demanding an end to Palestinian division and the establishment of transparent and independent national institutions.
Still, its electoral presence, like other smaller factions, has remained limited, although its symbolic and political influence exceeds its organizational size. The issue, however, is one of real political power—a dynamic unlikely to change outside of major PA reforms and elections not held in over two decades.
The overarching context for Palestinian factions is ultimately bleak, meaning Palestine's political direction as it relates to political representation and influence faces a serious inflection point. To overcome this period, more work is needed. Palestinian leaders—new and old—must focus on rebuilding a unified movement, conducting reviews and engaging in a serious and honest examination of the history of Palestinian factions and the broader national movement. Such efforts must centralize learning from the past, including adopting a critical self-awareness of the present, to effectively advance beyond a future of formidable challenges.
Without such efforts, the Palestinian national movement will further fracture and lose influence, negatively impacting efforts to realize a Palestinian state.
