Jamal al Tahat is a longtime advocate for democratization in Jordan. Al Tahat worked as an instructor, researcher, and managing editor of the strategic journal (Istrategia Al-Ordun) at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Jordanian National Defense College.
The American-Israeli war on Iran and new talks between Washington and Tehran within their memorandum of understanding (MOU) framework present a rare strategic opportunity in the Gulf: the possibility of establishing and sustaining regionally-led stability within a new security architecture while reducing direct U.S. engagement. Yet opportunities born of conflict are never self-executing, requiring deliberate political efforts to translate them into a viable strategy.
The current MOU between the United States and Iran appears tenuous, with no guarantee that escalation has truly stopped. Recent Israeli strikes in Lebanon, followed by an Iranian response, underscore how quickly the conflict can combust, amplifying risks to the global economy, the region and its people while constraining U.S. strategic options. Israel's role as a spoiler should not be discounted.
Washington faces a familiar but acute dilemma, one largely of its own making and rooted in decades of interventionist policy, sustained support for Israeli military operations and escalation choices that have entrenched instability rather than contain it. The White House can neither escalate without incurring significant global costs nor confine the conflict within manageable limits without serious concessions to Tehran and efforts to restrain Tel Aviv.
Major elements in both Iran and Israel retain incentives to expand the confrontation. The central strategic requirement, therefore, is to eliminate or reduce the pathways for further escalation.
Meanwhile, the traditional American military posture in the Gulf, once a cornerstone of regional security thinking, is increasingly vulnerable in an era defined by precision strikes, asymmetric warfare and proxy networks. What was once viewed as a stabilizing security framework is exposing Gulf states to the consequences of conflicts they neither want nor initiate, transforming them into targets placed second in regional U.S. security logic to the defense of Israel. This exposed an already problematic history of American security involvement marked by repeated interventions, entrenched military dependencies and cycles of escalation that have often undermined stability in the Middle East.
Washington faces a familiar but acute dilemma, one largely of its own making and rooted in decades of interventionist policy, sustained support for Israeli military operations and escalation choices that have entrenched instability rather than contain it.
- Jamal Al Tahat
Public resentment, meanwhile, toward the United States in the Arab world has grown due to Washington's unwavering support for Israel, including its genocide in Gaza, placing Arab governments in a legitimacy crisis. Thus, the U.S. military presence is increasingly viewed as a political burden rather than a security guarantee. If Arab governments want to preserve stability and regain legitimacy, they must accept the contradiction of the U.S. regional role: one that is more of a liability than protection.
The risks in this context remain immediate, even under the truce. Iran has demonstrated that it can severely disrupt Gulf energy production and exports at will, destabilizing critical maritime transit routes across the region. Shielding both the Gulf and key waterways from spillovers is therefore essential but difficult in an environment where ceasefire violations and wars of choice carry limited consequences. Declaratory policies alone cannot solve this problem.
A viable strategic rethinking is necessary. In this context, a new regional security framework designed to contain a prolonged Iran-Israel confrontation could be effective. This structure should disincentivize conflict by forcing regional states to hold direct responsibility over their security dynamics. Such a move would push regional leaders to break free of the moral hazard problem that has long defined the U.S.-dominated security framework in the Middle East, in which interstate violence by actors who know they have Washington's backing feel empowered to make policy decisions that carry extensive risk.
One practical option is to replace reliance on Washington for security with an alliance of four pivotal regional powers — Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan (STEP) — to form a joint political-military umbrella undergirding regional stability. This framework could deter both Iran and Israel from pursuing escalation while providing security coverage for Gulf states and key maritime corridors. Comparable to structures like the European Union, a strong regional security and governance architecture can discourage escalation by shifting belligerents' calculations through the threat of collective action, effectively balancing the region's security dynamics into equilibrium.
If Arab governments want to preserve stability and regain legitimacy, they must accept the contradiction of the U.S. regional role: one that is more of a liability than protection.
- Jamal Al Tahat
Frontline states within the immediate conflict zone, such as Iraq, Syria and Jordan, should be deliberately excluded from this structure initially. While their inclusion may become important later, including them at the outset could compromise the framework's neutrality upon its inception. Key stakeholders cannot risk this framework's misinterpretation as an extension of the war effort, rather than a mechanism of containment, by including parties that could be perceived as partial or fully aligned with either Israel or Iran.
The viability of this framework rests on political will and capacity. The STEP countries would form a de facto strategic belt surrounding the conflict zone, from the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Each state holds strong incentives to prevent the conflict's spillover effects, providing political will. Indeed, recent diplomatic engagement among these states suggests a growing awareness of the risks and opportunities of the Middle East's current geopolitical landscape. However, they lack a clearly defined operational pathway and remain constrained by broader strategic parameters that are primarily set by Washington to keep them within its orbit.
This opportunity will not materialize spontaneously. Like most openings created by crisis, it requires proactive recognition and careful orchestration on the part of key stakeholders. The current regional pause in large-scale hostilities presents an opportunity, but risks collapsing at a moment's notice due to Israel's spoiler role and U.S. President Donald Trump's sporadic decision-making. Urgency is critical, but so is sensitivity.
An effective security strategy must shift the burden of stabilizing the Gulf from an American responsibility to a regional one. Washington's disengagement, however, should be framed as a strategic recalibration, not a retreat. In a fragile ceasefire environment, this distinction is important politically. Done correctly, such framing can reassure allies and preserve deterrence credibility, preventing the emergence of a security vacuum. This potential vacuum could further destabilize the region by attracting regional and extra-regional powers seeking to advance their interests, including and particularly Israel and Iran.
If properly structured, the STEP coalition could deter any geographic expansion of the conflict, increase the cost of escalation for both Iran and Israel, accelerate strategic fatigue and incentivize a durable de-escalation. The guiding principle is to contain the conflict geographically while increasing its internal cost to the belligerents — a shared interest between these states.
This strategy depends on early and discreet alignment with Washington. A U.S. endorsement would prevent any misinterpretation of the U.S. redeployment as withdrawal while enabling effective coordination across the STEP capitals and Washington. Early signs of these efforts are apparent through increased regional diplomatic coordination and discussions about a STEP-centered framework that could serve as the basis for a broader regional security and economic system.
Critics of this effort will quickly accuse it of deceptively pushing for U.S. disengagement. Such accusations are far from the truth. Rather, this framework is steeped in a strategic rebalancing on the part of both Washington and the Middle East's states. By regionalizing containment, limiting the geography of escalation and preserving deterrence credibility, Washington can reduce its regional exposure while placing security responsibility, and thus interest in stability, more deeply in the hands of states with more to lose.
If successful, this approach could lay the foundation for a broader regional security architecture, one capable not only of containing war, but of shaping the postwar regional order. The present moment, defined by a fragile and uncertain truce, may offer a narrow but critical opportunity to move in that direction.
The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
