Dr. Radwan Masmoudi is the President of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID)
In early 2011, Tunisia captured the imagination of the world. The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi sparked an uprising that ended decades of authoritarian rule and inspired revolts across the Arab world. While Egypt quickly descended back into military dictatorship, Libya collapsed into civil war and Syria slid into a brutal conflict, Tunisia stood apart. It alone appeared to make democracy work.
In 2014, Tunisia adopted one of the most progressive constitutions in the region, enshrining rights, freedoms and checks on power. It held six free and fair elections between 2011 and 2019. Civil society thrived, and Tunisia's media space opened substantially. For the first time, Tunisians could criticize leaders without fear, protest openly and dream of a future based on dignity and rights.
But this promise abruptly collapsed on July 25, 2021, when President Kais Saied suspended parliament, dismissed the prime minister and began ruling by decree. Within two years, Tunisia had returned to authoritarianism. By October 2024—nearly a decade after Tunisia's new constitution was adopted—Saied won a second term, largely squashing any hopes for a democratic Tunisia.
Just over one year after that election, the question is no longer whether Tunisia's democratic transition succeeded, but why it failed.
Countries that fail to confront authoritarian remnants often see them sabotage democracy from within. Tunisia's decision to accommodate, rather than constrain, the old elite proved costly.
- Dr. Radwan Masmoudi
The revolution succeeded in 2011 because Tunisians united across ideological divides. Islamists, secularists, labor unions and civil society organizations set aside differences to confront dictatorship. But once former dictator Ben Ali fled, that unity crumbled.
Instead of building a broad national unity government to stabilize the fragile transition, political elites plunged into bitter rivalries. Ennahdha, which won a plurality in the 2011 Constituent Assembly elections, saw itself as the legitimate voice of the revolution. Secular rivals increasingly framed Ennahdha as a threat to Tunisia's secular identity.
The divide turned toxic in 2013 after the assassinations of leftist leaders Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi. The country nearly descended into chaos, with mass protests, counter-protests and paralyzed institutions. Only the mediation of the National Dialogue Quartet—civil society groups that later won the Nobel Peace Prize—averted collapse.
But the damage was lasting. Ordinary Tunisians saw leaders consumed by ideological trench warfare rather than governance. Jobs, development and corruption went unaddressed. By mid-decade, public trust in parties and parliament had eroded dramatically. Democracy became associated with division, not dignity.
Another critical mistake was allowing remnants of Ben Ali's regime to return to power unchecked. Instead of enforcing transitional justice, Tunisia permitted many former regime elites to re-enter politics. In 2014, Nidaa Tounes—a party dominated by figures from Ben Ali's Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD)—won elections.
Rather than acting as loyal participants in a new democracy, many of these figures sought to weaken it. Alliances between Nidaa Tounes and Ennahdha blurred the lines between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Corruption persisted, accountability was abandoned and public faith in the democratic project waned.
Comparative lessons are clear: Countries that fail to confront authoritarian remnants often see them sabotage democracy from within. Tunisia's decision to accommodate, rather than constrain, the old elite proved costly.
By 2019, Tunisia's democratic order faced open threats. Kais Saied, though elected as an outsider, made no secret of his disdain for representative democracy. Similarly, other politicians like Abir Moussi called for parliament to be dissolved and for Ennahdha to be banned.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Egyptian and Emirati interference intensified. Their embassies in Tunis became hubs for meetings with opposition figures and journalists. Money flowed into disinformation campaigns on social media, where new Facebook groups amassed hundreds of thousands of followers almost overnight, spreading propaganda that painted democracy as chaos.
When Saied moved to take over the government on July 25, 2021, there was little resistance. The coup did not succeed because it was unforeseen. It succeeded because Tunisia's democrats ignored every warning.
- Dr. Radwan Masmoudi
Evidence of coup plotting was widespread. In April 2021, a leaked document outlined, step by step, how parliament could be suspended and power centralized in the presidency. Saied never denied receiving it. Yet Tunisia's political elite, paralyzed by infighting, did nothing. Civil society, unlike in 2013, failed to unite.
When Saied moved to take over the government on July 25, 2021, there was little resistance. The coup did not succeed because it was unforeseen. It succeeded because Tunisia's democrats ignored every warning.
If politics weakened democracy, the economy killed it. For most Tunisians, democracy brought freedoms but no improvement in daily life. Growth stagnated at 1-2%, unemployment remained high and inflation eroded purchasing power. Corruption scandals persisted as regional inequalities worsened.
The pandemic devastated the tourism sector, which employed hundreds of thousands. By 2021, many families were struggling simply to survive. Politicians seemed oblivious, locked in ideological battles while citizens demanded bread, jobs and dignity.
Democracy without economic dividends quickly lost legitimacy. Surveys showed rising nostalgia for the Ben Ali era. Many Tunisians came to believe life was better under dictatorship. This disillusionment explains why large segments of the population initially supported Saied's coup.
The international community also bears responsibility. Western governments praised Tunisia as the "Arab Spring's success story" but failed to provide meaningful economic support. Early talk of a Marshall Plan evaporated. Aid increased only marginally and focused largely on civil society programs or security cooperation. International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans provided liquidity but saddled Tunisia with austerity that only worsened the economic situation for most Tunisians.
Meanwhile, the U.S. and Europe turned a blind eye to the destructive interference of the Gulf monarchies and Egypt. Offers of billions of dollars to exclude Ennahdha, disinformation campaigns and financial meddling were ignored. Tunisia was abandoned to authoritarian neighbors determined to crush its democracy.
Western policy reflected a contradiction: Authoritarian allies were tolerated because they served strategic interests, even as they sabotaged Tunisia's fragile democracy. The result was "cheap democracy promotion," rhetorical support without the economic or political commitment needed to sustain a democratic transition.
Still, Tunisia's democratic collapse was not inevitable. It was the product of compounded errors: divided elites, unchecked old regime networks, ignored warnings of a coup, neglected social reforms and weak international support.
The lessons are urgent. Democracy cannot survive on constitutions and elections alone. It must deliver tangible improvements—jobs, justice, dignity—for ordinary people. International partners must match rhetoric with real investment and defend fragile democracies against authoritarian interference.
Tunisia's fall should serve as a warning to others. Without unity, accountability, social justice and international solidarity, even the brightest democratic experiments can quickly fade into darkness.
*The views and positions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DAWN.
